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ABSTRACT
THE ENDOGENOUS VALUE OF INFORMATION
Thomas A. Weber
Paul R. Kleindorfer
This doctoral thesis examines the value of information in settings, where two or more agents
interact. In such situations, contrary to one-person decision problems, a more informative
signal is not necessarily more valuable, and it may be profit-maximizing for an information
seller to deliberately garble or damage his signal before selling it to another agent. More
generally, the value of information depends on the precise contractual arrangement under which
the information is to be transferred and used. I examine the following applications: (i) value
of information in portfolio decision problems; and (ii) the transfer of information to a wealth-
constrained investor. In a multiagent setting I examine (iii) the value of shared information
services; and (iv) the value of information and flexibility for screening a heterogeneous consumer
base.
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All human knowledge thus begins with intuitions,
proceeds then to concepts, and ends with ideas.
— Immanuel Kant
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Preliminaries
The design and management of information systems responds to the need of decision makers to
efficiently gain access to critical information resources. The decision value of the information
to be stored, accessed and managed partly justifies investments in management information
systems.1 In an uncertain environment with interacting agents, the value of information to any
one of the decision makers generally depends on the precise nature of her strategic relationships
to the other agents. A deeper inquiry into the issues connected with precisely determining this
“endogenous” value of information (which may of course vary from agent to agent and may
sometimes be negative) is the object of this dissertation. The information value is thereby
called “endogenous,” since it fundamentally depends on the actions of other agents and on the
way the information it is procured.
In the Economics literature the value of information to a particular agent is often assessed
using one of the two following methods, depending on the agent’s risk posture (Raiffa and
Schlaifer 1961, Marschak and Miyasawa 1968, Athey and Levin 2000): (i) for risk-neutral agents
the information value is determined as difference between the optimal payoff with information
1There is a rich literature on assessing the value of information technology investments (Barua et al. 1991,
Clemons 1991, Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1996, Benaroch and Kauffman 1999), cf. also Section 1.3. Instead of
entering this discussion directly I am focusing here on the economic value of information for specific strategic
decisions only. Issues such as the impact of IT on the reduction of coordination costs (Shin 1997) or on firm
boundaries (Clemons et al. 1993, Dewan et al. 1998, Hitt 1999), the substitution of IT for other production
factors (Dewan and Min 1997), the real-option value of IT projects (Kambil et al. 1993, Benaroch and Kauff-
man 1999), general productivity increases (Mukhopadhyay et al. 1997, Mukhopadhyay et al. 1997b) or changes
in consumer surplus (Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1996) through IT are not explicitly considered here.
1
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and the optimal “default” (or “no-information”) payoff; (ii) for risk-averse agents, the cost of
an informative signal is typically modeled as a “utility cost,” which is then subtracted from the
agent’s full-information utility, as if the amount for the information was paid out of a separate
budget. These two common approaches to computing the value of information neglect the
“wealth effect” the payment itself has on the agent’s budget set and thereby on constraining
her feasible actions. They also often neglect the strategic utility or disutility the access to
information may exhibit when agents interact.
In this doctoral thesis I investigate the endogenous value of information in multiagent
situations, taking “wealth effects” fully into account. One purpose is to clarify what causes
information to potentially lose value2 when players interact and therefore trigger efficiency
losses compared to its first-best use. For instance, Weber and Croson (2002) show that a
revenue-maximizing risk-neutral seller of investment information may have an incentive to
“damage” the information he sells, so as to render the buyer’s investment in a risky asset (to
which the information relates) less “aggressive” and thus to decrease the risk of default on an
agreed ex-post payment for the information. Here the voluntary distortion of information – in
spite of reducing the buyer’s willingness to pay (WTP) – increases expected revenues (based
on a limited-liability ex-post payment) for the information seller. More generally, if the payoff
of agent A who controls a piece of valuable information depends on agent B’s noncontractible
actions, A might be able to influence B’s actions to his advantage by distorting the information3
and still charge B a (slightly diminished) rent for it.
The aforementioned “wealth effects,” induced by the fact that the payment for informa-
tion reduces the budget set and constrains the information buyer’s feasible actions, are of
considerable relevance at least in a portion of the wealth domain, irrespective of the assumed
risk-aversion characteristics. For instance, if the payment for information occurs ex ante with
respect to the realization of the uncertain event, then the agent’s willingness to pay (WTP) for
it can never exceed her current wealth. I demonstrate that these wealth effects cannot generally
be eliminated by an “appropriate” choice of a class of utility functions possessing multiplicative
or additive separability properties (such as those of constant absolute risk aversion as is often
claimed).
As a consequence, the value of information needs to be carefully defined taking into ac-
count both the exact contractual terms governing the transfer of information from the seller
2It can naturally also gain value, for instance through the aggregation of information by several agents. I
will also investigate such situations (e.g., in the context of shared information services), but in a somewhat less
focused manner, as these effects are better accounted for in the current literature.
3Agent B is fully aware that this distortion takes place.
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to the buyer and the utility variation due to wealth reduction. We define the monetary value
or WTP for information in terms of Hicks’ (1939) measure of welfare change, as the compen-
sating variation that moves the agent’s expected utility with information to the same level as
without information (cf. Kihlstrom (1974) for the product-consumption treatment of informa-
tion). This definition of the value of information to a potential acquirer of the information is
very general, but depends on how exactly the agent is to pay for the information. Payment
may occur ex ante or ex post with respect to the realization of the payoff-relevant underlying
stochastic variable and may be contingent on the signal’s realization or not. In addition, overall
efficiency may be improved if the principal can make the price to be paid dependent on the
agent’s actions or a (possibly composite) signal correlated with the agent’s actions (and/or the
external event) and also dependent on the agent’s payoff (or ex-post wealth). The resulting
contracts generally aim at shifting the risk-averse agent’s actions towards more risk-taking
thereby increasing her (expected) willingness to pay for information.
If the use of the information is rival,4 which means that by selling the information the
principal loses the ability to use it himself, the seller has to be offered a payment that cor-
responds at least to his willingness to accept (WTA) or equivalent variation in utility for not
observing the signal realization and passing it on to the agent. In the next chapter I derive
an exact relationship between WTP and WTA and show that it is not necessary for one of
these welfare measures to be larger than the other, so that rival information may or may not
be traded depending on principal and agent’s respective utility profiles.
Another purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate a new setting in which managerial flexibility
and information can to some extent be substitutes. As an application I consider multiattribute
product differentiation and I explicitly value the option to delay differentiation until perfect
demand information arrives versus the value of imperfect demand information without the
possibility to observe true demand before committing to a product portfolio. I show how much
information is needed ex ante to make the firm indifferent between the flexibility of delaying
the differentiation decision and observing a partially informative signal about demand.
1.2 Research Questions
The first part of the thesis focuses on a general definition of the value of information for a
single agent in terms of her WTP and WTA.
Question 1 How can the value of information be generally defined in terms of an agent’s
4Examples are customized information or information that is protected by ownership rights, such as a patent.
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willingness to pay and willingness to accept, and what is the precise relationship between the
two welfare measures?
In the second part of this dissertation, I look at two-player situations, where an informed
principal proposes to transfer information to an uninformed agent and examine how different
sale contracts influence the revenues for the principal. If his revenues depend on an noncon-
tractible action by the agent, which can be however indirectly influenced by modifying the
information strategically, then there exists a potential incentive for the principal to garble in-
formation strategically, since at the margin the value of the ungarbled information is exceeded
by the value of a favorable change of the agent’s action. As pointed out before, such an action
could be an overly aggressive investment behavior under an ex-post payment agreement for
information about a risky investment opportunity, but more generally it can be anything that
affects the principal’s payoffs.
Question 2 Consider a principal-agent environment.
(i) What are the incentives for the distortion of information in a principal-agent relationship
where information exerts an externality?
(ii) What are the consequences for organizational design for an informed principal?
In the third part of the thesis, I focus attention on the endogenous value of information
in multiplayer situations with both cooperative and strategic information sharing. Chapter 4
examines the value of shared information services. I then turn to situations where a firm would
like to extract information from a consumer base with multiple hidden characteristics.
Question 3 Consider a multiagent environment.
(i) How should a heterogeneous group of agents share cooperatively an investment for a
common source of information?
(ii) What is the option value of being able to wait for information that helps a firm to screen
a heterogeneous consumer base?
The main objectives of this thesis are (a) to provide a theoretical contribution that may
influence the way managers think about the value of information and how it depends on
the particular parameters of the problem; (b) to create a foundation for a justification of IT
investments through an economic analysis of the endogenous information value; and (c) to
examine a number of concrete applications in detail.
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In an attempt to find answers to the above research questions I am using analytical tools
of standard microeconomic theory (Mas-Colell et al. 1995), statistical decision theory (DeG-
root 1970, Raiffa et al. 1995), information economics (Laffont 1989, Hirshleifer and Riley 92,
Chambers and Quiggin 2000), and the theory of incentives (Salanie´ 1999, Laffont and Marti-
mort 2002) to construct theoretical models addressing different features of the overall problem.
1.3 Literature Review
I will now review some of the literature pertaining to the main chapters of this doctoral thesis:
the value of information (i) for a single decision maker, (ii) in two-agent (i.e., principal-agent)
environments, and (iii) in multiagent environments. The reason for distinguishing between
principal-agent and multiagent situations is that in multiagent environments the granularity
of the analysis is necessarily higher due to an increased model complexity. In addition we will
interpret a principal-agent setting in which the type of an agent is only imperfectly known to
another agent as a multiagent situation, since the agent whose characteristic is not perfectly
known can effectively be interpreted as a population of many agents, the distribution of which
corresponds to the prior probability distribution in the characteristic. For instance I will
consider screening methods (e.g., through the “versioning” of information) in that section.
Before discussing the economic value of information in these three regimes, I will briefly
relate this dissertation topic to the literature on the value of information technology.
1.3.1 IT and the Value of Information
The value of IT has been discussed in three main streams of the research literature: (i) the clas-
sic “productivity paradox” contributions (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996, 2000); (ii) the options-
value-of-IT literature (Benaroch and Kauffman 1999); (iii) the literature on optimal invest-
ments in shared information systems, in particular EDI systems (Clemons and Kleindor-
fer 1992, Riggins et al. 1994, Wang and Seidmann 1995). In addition, there are various
contributions on the impact of IT on firm boundaries (Jensen and Meckling 1992, Clemons et
al. 1993, Hitt 1999) or on the reduction of coordination cost (Shin 1997, Nault and Tyagi 2001).
A main conclusion of the first stream of literature is that there exists a link between IT
investment and complementary investment. The motivation for the complementary investment
can be explained via the information processing view of the firm (Galbraith 1974, Radner 1993,
VanZandt 1997). Radner (1993) argues that in an efficient hierarchy the top decision node
is always busy, so that information overload at the top necessitates the decentralization of
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decision rights. Jensen and Meckling (1992) show that as a result of the tradeoff between
the ease of information transmission (favoring decentralization) and the need for costly mon-
itoring (favoring centralization), there exists an optimal level of decentralization, moving the
organization “to the middle” (Clemons et al. 1993).
The options-value-of-IT literature does address the issue that IT generates value by enabling
a more flexible reaction to uncertainty. But most of this literature does not consider strategic
interaction and treats the competitive environment in a stochastic manner in order to use the
standard real-options valuation framework (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck 1994, Trigeorgis 1996).
As already pointed out in footnote 1 on page 1, I concentrate in this dissertation on the
economic value of information as it pertains directly to managerial decision making, and not
so much on the more encompassing assessment of the value of information technology. The
strategic use of the information that actually passes through the information systems has not
received very much attention in the standard information systems literature. However, there is
a substantial literature on information systems and their endogenous value in the Economics
literature. The term “information system” is here understood in the classical sense of Marschak
and Miyasawa (1968) as a “set of potential messages to be received by the decision maker”
(p. 137). The value of an information system derives from an expected payoff variation it
can bring to an otherwise uninformed decision maker. An information system can be inter-
preted as the result of an “experiment” as it relates to a decision maker’s payoff (Raiffa and
Schlaifer 1961, DeGroot 1970). Such experiments can be processed and (sometimes) be gener-
ated by information technology (IT). In that context, the value of IT derives from the ability
to cut down on the cost of generating experiments and/or from the capacity of improving on
the decision value of the generated informative experiment outcomes (referred to as messages
or “signals”). In addition, IT derives value from the aspects mentioned in footnote 1, which
we do not explicitly consider in the theoretical developments in this dissertation. We limit
ourselves to the intrinsic economic value of information where agents interact.
1.3.2 Environments with a Single Decision Maker
The origins of information theory reside in the work by Shannon (1948); a unified treatment of
the main results of information and communications theory can be found in Gallager (1968).
The systematic assessment of the value of an experiment has been pioneered by Bohnenblust
et al. (1949). Based on this work Blackwell (1953) shows that two experiments can be ranked
in terms of their informativeness if and only if one signal is a sufficient statistic of the other.
DeGroot (1962) demonstrates that the signal ranking in terms of informativeness does indeed
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imply an equivalent ranking in economic terms when the signals are benchmarked over all
possible decision problems.5 The point is that in the sense of Bohnenblust et al., Blackwell,
and DeGroot, for a one-person decision problem a distorted or garbled signal could not possibly
be of higher value to the decision-maker, unlike in situations where agents interact strategically
as we will see below. Kihlstrom (1984) unifies these mathematical approaches to the value of
information in economic terms and from a Bayesian viewpoint.
In this dissertation I define the value of information as the Hicks’ (1939) compensating
variation that moves the a decision maker back to his maximum expected utility achievable
without information. This welfare measure has first been used by Kihlstrom (1974) to compute
the value of information in a consumption setting and by Treich (1997) in the context of a
standard portfolio investment problem. As alluded to at the outset, the funds used to purchase
information are in many models, describing for instance information acquisition (such as in
Athey and Levin (2000)) segregated from the wealth used to generate utility, effectively assum-
ing additive separability in utility from the “wealth to be invested” and “wealth earmarked
for purchasing information.” In these models the cash disbursed to acquire information does
not constrain the feasible set of actions, nor does economizing on information or deferring its
purchase settlement yield any investment benefit. The treatment here it inclusive in that it
explicitly takes into account the wealth effects induced by the contraction of the budget set by
the information expenditure.
1.3.3 Principal-Agent Environments and the Incentive to Degrade Informa-
tion
When agents interact Blackwell’s (1953) informativeness criterion does not necessarily coincide
any longer with the economic value of information. For instance, Gal-Or (1988) shows in
the situation of a two-stage Cournot duopoly that less precise information of one firm about
its own cost can increase its incentives to increase production and therefore lead to higher
expected profits than the other more informed firm, which – as a best response – reduces
output in equilibrium. The key reason for the negative marginal value of information is that
a lack of information provides a credible commitment mechanism that deters the informed
party from producing at similar levels. More generally, the value of information can become
negative if the information at the margin leads to a negative externality, for instance – as in
5For more specific situations, such as monotone decision problems with certain characteristics of the payoff
function, there are stronger characterizations of the value of information available (Athey 2000), which allow
for less restrictive criteria than statistical sufficiency.
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Gal-Or (1988) – the reduction of the capability to commit or – in the case of a contractual
transfer of information – moral hazard by the information buyer. A natural consequence is
that in such settings value can be created to at least one party by distorting (or “garbling”)
the information.6
The elements of the research literature related to endogenous garbling of information fall
into three major categories: (1) the concept of signal garbling and relative informativeness
of multiple signals (Blackwell 1953, Marschak and Miyasawa 1968, Holmstrom 1979, Gjes-
dal 1982); (2) the concept of deliberately degrading the quality of a good to be sold, for the
purpose of encouraging buyers to separate by type (Deneckere and McAfee 1996, Shapiro and
Varian 1998); (3) diverse analyses of “perverse” situations in agency contexts, wherein more
accurate information or more intensive monitoring induces less effort or worse outcomes for the
principal (Cowen and Glazer 1996, Dubey and Haimanko 2000, Jacobides and Croson 2001).
1.3.4 Multiagent Environments
I examine multiagent environments from two different viewpoints. First, how should a heteroge-
neous group of agents share cooperatively an investment for a common source of information?
Second, how does a firm facing a mass of agents with heterogeneous hidden characteristics
build a multiattribute product portfolio to extract a maximum of profits and how does it value
flexibility and bettern demand information in that context?
The pioneering contributions in strategic information sharing have been made by Novshek
and Sonnenschein (1982) and Clarke (1983) for oligopolistic firms producing homogeneous
goods (no incentive for information sharing), as well as Vives (1984) for a differentiated Cournot
duopoly (incentive for information sharing exists if the goods are complements or weak substi-
tutes). Raith (1996) unifies and generalizes these and most subsequent treatments. Kihlstrom
and Vives (1989) look at information sharing where it may help firms to collude in a Cournot
oligopoly. I also look at information sharing in a cooperative context, where sharing the cost of
a fixed investment in a common information service implies increasing returns in the number
of participants sharing the service. Nash (1953) founded the field of “cooperative bargaining
theory,” showing that based on a number of axioms a unique solution could be obtained that
implements a Pareto-optimal allocation. A good overview is provided by Roth (1979).
Beginning with Hotelling’s (1929) seminal paper on horizontal competition, numerous con-
6In the case of public (or “social”) information, there may also an incentive for both players to garble the
information, whenever the information destroys the market for mutual insurance (Hirshleifer 1971).
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tributions have been made to product differentiation.7 The corresponding literature can be
divided into locational models in the tradition of Hotelling, where each firm is attributed an
“address” in product space, and into so-called “non-address” models in the spirit of Chamber-
lin’s (1933) monopolistic competition, where a representative consumer exhibits (probabilistic)
preferences for different products.8 An important distinction between the two groups of mod-
els is that in the latter group, each product is competing with each other, while in the former
consumers are truly heterogeneous in their preferences, and some products may have no over-
lap, i.e., may never be in direct competition.9 To find optimal second-degree differentiation
strategies, I adopt the locational approach, which in my view better captures consumer het-
erogeneity and allows the explicit consideration of participation constraints that inevitably
arise when dealing with a spatial distribution of endowed unobservable consumer charateris-
tics. In fact, Lancaster (1966) first realized “[t]he good, per se, does not give utility to the
consumer; it possesses characteristics, and these characteristics give rise to utility” (p. 65). In
addition he pointed out that “[i]n general a good will possess more than one characteristic,
and many characteristics will be shared by more than one good” (ibid.). We refer to these
Lancasterian characteristics as product attributes, and naturally products contain a number of
different such attributes, which – facing a heterogeneous consumer base of unknown types –
allows a monopolist (the “principal”) to screen the “agents.” The product attributes can be
used as instruments in the screening process. Using multiple instruments to screen consumers
of a one-dimensional type has been earlier examined by Matthews and Moore (1987), whereas
the inverse case of a single instrument (price) given consumers of multidimensional types has
been considered among others by Laffont, Maskin, and Rochet (1987). This line of work on
second-degree price discrimination dates back to Mussa and Rosen (1978), based on methods
developed earlier by Mirrlees (1971) in the context of optimal income taxation, who treat
the case for consumers of a single characteristic and single vertical-attribute products. Wil-
son (1993) and Armstrong (1996) provide generalizations for fully nonlinear pricing models
in the multiproduct case. A multidimensional screening model generalizing these approaches
has been advanced by Rochet and Chone´ (1998), based also on results in multidimensional
signalling by Wilson (1985) as well as Quinzii and Rochet (1985). In contrast to Rochet and
Chone´ (1998) I consider a discrete product structure (i.e., “natural” bunching) generated by
7The notion of product differentiation as such can be traced back at least to Launhardt (1885).
8For a good bibliography see Anderson et al. (1992), Beath and Katsoulacos (1991), as well as Tirole (1988).
9A notable exception in this dichotomy, is the model by Perloff and Salop (1985) that combines characteristics
from both groups, driven by symmetry assumptions in the preferences of a representative consumer who is faced
with localized products.
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fixed versioning costs for each new product and deal with type-dependent participation con-
straints. This allows us to be less concerned about single-crossing properties than with the
endogenous choice of the mode of product differentiation (vertical, horizontal, mixed). The
particular setup of our model is inspired by Salop’s (1979) circular city, which allows to avoid
undesired boundary effects of solutions and thus to obtain cleaner results.
1.4 Outline
The outline of this dissertation is a follows. Chapter 2 presents some theoretical foundations
on the value of information. In particular I focus on the value of information that is trans-
ferred from one agent to another and depending on the precise contractual agreement for the
transfer the willingness to pay for information may vary dramatically, even though the under-
lying signal whose realization is to be observed remains unaltered. In Chapter 3, I examine
the value of information given payment that can occur ex ante and/or ex post with respect
to the realization of the for the information-user critical exogenous uncertain event. Chap-
ter 4 deals with the value of information for heterogeneous agents when the investment in
a common information source is to be shared. In Chapter 5 I turn attention to a problem
of multidimensional screening of a consumer base that is heterogeneous with respect to both
reservation prices and a horizontally differentiating criterion. In this context I determine for
a multiproduct monopolist the value of the flexibility to obtain demand information before
committing to a full differentiated product portfolio. Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation by
revisiting the research questions outlined in Section 1.2 and provides some general directions
for future research.
1.5 References
For a detailed list of references see the Bibliography at the end of this dissertation.
I have had my results for a long time, but I
do not yet know how I am to arrive at them.
— Carl Friedrich Gauß
Chapter 2
The Value of Information:
Foundations
In this chapter I first give some basic definitions underlying the general idea of the thesis
and discuss some related applications. A fundamental concept for valuing information is the
notion of “compensating variation,” i.e., the monetary amount that makes the information
user indifferent between having no information but full wealth and the information in question
and wealth diminished by the price for the information. The compensating variation measures
the WTP of an investor for information. The dual concept to the compensating variation
of an information user is called the “equivalent variation,” i.e., the minimal amount that a
seller would accept in order to not use the object (e.g., rival information). I provide later
in this chapter an exact relation between compensating and equivalent variations, essentially
independent of the kind of good that is being transferred (other than that it is non readily
substitutable by other goods purchased on a market).
2.1 Preliminaries
Let an agent’s monetary payoff Π(a, x˜) depend on her action a and let an exogenous uncertain
event be represented by the random variable x˜ ∈ X . The agent is endowed with an intial
wealth W ≥ 0 and her actions belong to a compact action set1 A(W ) ⊂ Rn that is an image
of W and is strictly contracting with decreasing wealth, i.e.,
W ′ < W =⇒ A′ ( A, (2.1)
1We assume that the mapping A : R+ → Rn is upper hemicontinuous.
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where A′ = A(W ′), A = A(W ), and n is some positive integer. For zero wealth we assume
that the action set reduces to a singleton containing only the “zero-wealth” strategy a0, which
naturally is an element of all action sets. The agent’s utility for money is given by the differ-
entiably concave and strictly increasing function U : R → R. We also assume that the payoff
function Π(·, ·) is smooth with respect to both arguments as well as concave in the action a.
It is therefore clear that the maximizer of the agent’s expected utility maximization problem,
aˆ(W ) ∈ arg max
a∈A(W )
Ex (Π(a, x˜)) , (2.2)
exists. As a special case, we can think of the action set as a linear budget set of the form
A(W ) = {a ∈ Rn : a ≤W} . (2.3)
Information is conveyed via a signal, represented by the random variable s˜ with a measurable
probability density defined on the compact support S. The signal s˜ is thereby correlated with
the exogenous random event x˜, from which its potential value for the decision maker arises.
2.2 The Value of Information
In the standard portfolio problem (Ingersoll 1987) the agent’s payoff Π is determined by the
portion a ∈ A(W ) = [0,W ] of her wealth W that she allocates to a risky asset of uncertain
return x˜ = r˜,2
Π(a, r˜) =W + ar˜.
In Chapter 3, we derive simple necessary and sufficient conditions under which any informa-
tion seller prefers to contract for payment to occur after the signal is realized, as opposed to
demanding prepayment. Fully secured payments may not be optimal, depending on the seller’s
risk preferences. We derive optimal pricing structures for this information, characterizing in-
vestment opportunity, signal quality and investor utility conditions under which the seller can
receive more value from his information by deferring payment after the investment realization
occurs. Further, we find that the seller of the information, in order to at least partially secure
payment, may have an incentive to garble the signal, so as to exclude realizations that induce
the investor to allocate a large share of her portfolio to risky assets.
Single-person decision problems. For single-person decision problems the value of
information is strictly increasing in the informativeness of the signal, as is well known through
the work of Bohnenblust et al. (1949), Blackwell (1953), and DeGroot(1962). It also depends
2Note that A(W ) is strictly contracting as W decreases, in accordance with (2.1).
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Figure 2.1: Willingness to Pay, P , for Information.
decisively on the “default” action (2.2) an agent would take without any information. For a
simple informative signal with two realizations (L: “low” and H: “high”), the willingness to
pay can be determined as compensating variation P in wealth that makes the agent indifferent
between obtaining the signal or not, cf. Figure 2.1 (where a∗s are the agent’s optimal actions
in a simple portfolio investment problem contingent on realizations s ∈ {L,H}).
The value of information can be rarely isolated from the precise way in which the agent
obtains it. Thus, in this thesis I pay particular information to the endogenous value of infor-
mation as it is realized for any particular transfer contract from a (trusted) information seller
to the agent.
Value of transferred information. As pointed out above, the value of information
depends on the endowed wealth of the economic agents involved in the transfer, their respective
risk profiles, and the precise contingencies specified in the transfer contract. In addition, if
information is rival this value may be different for buyer and seller so that no trade may
actually occur. Below we provide some alternative definitions of the value of information to
illustrate its dependence on the payment contract. Such a contract be in principle contingent
on the signal realizations as we show below.3
3In following chapters of this thesis I will not discuss signal-contingencies in any detailed fashion. It is an
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2.2.1 First-Best WTP
The agent’s the “default” or “no-information” strategy aˆ(W ) is given by (2.2). Hence the
certainty equivalent of the investment opportunity is determined by
CE(W ) = U−1 (ExU(Π(aˆ(W ), x˜))) .
Thus we are able to compute the first-best WTP, or in other words the absolute maximum of
the information value contained in the principal-agent “system”:
PFB = Es
[
max
a∈A(W )
Ex [U(Π(a, x˜))| s˜]
]
− CE(W ).
This first-best price that the principal can charge a risk-neutral agent given an efficient mecha-
nism is the benchmark against which we can compare other contract designs, of which I discuss
some below.
2.2.2 Ex-Ante Noncontingent Payment
If full payment occurs before the realization of the signal is observed, then the agent’s action
set will be reduced corresponding to the amount she pays. Her maximum willingness to pay
P ∈ [0,W ] is a monetary transfer to the principal that makes the agent indifferent between
having access to the information or not, and
Es
[
max
a∈A(W−P )
Ex [U(Π(a, x˜))| s˜]
]
= ExU(Π(aˆ(W ), x˜)) (2.4)
is necessarily satisfied.4 The so obtained ex-ante noncontingent WTP is strictly less than W ,
iff the zero-wealth singleton does not contain the optimal default strategy, i.e., iff a0 6= aˆ.
2.2.3 Ex-Ante Contingent Payment
If it is possible for both the agent and the principle to observe the signal realization before
the agent selects her action, than the payment can be made in principle contingent on that
realization and be contracted ex-ante.5 For any s ∈ S the following relation therefore describes
interesting direction for future research with potential financial applications such as margin loans.
4Note that from a technical point of view (2.1) does not ensure that (2.4) is satisfied only for a single point
in [0,W ], since the contraction of the action set might have no effect on the feasibility of the optimal action
with information. Thus strictly speaking, one should think of P as a reservation-price interval. Of course P
reduces to a singleton, if we use a linear budget set according to (2.3).
5Of course, this contract must be binding since the agent may have an incentive to renege once the signal
realization has been observed. For instance the principal or a third party may take hold of the agent’s wealth
(surety bond) and then execute her actions after deducting the contingent payment promised to the principal
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the agent’s maximum contingent WTP:
max
a∈A(W−P c(s))
Ex [U(Π(a, x˜))| s] = Ex [U(Π(aˆ(W ), x˜))|s] . (2.5)
Then the expected compensation for the information seller is
P c = Es(P c(s˜)|s˜),
and this value may or may not be larger than P , depending on the agent’s risk aversion
and the specific problem at hand. For the portfolio investment problem discussed below it is
possible to construct an example that produces both results as a function of the riskiness of
the investment6
2.2.4 Ex-Post Noncontingent Payment
The principal may choose to relax the agent’s budget constraint by allowing her to make the
payment after she has taken her investment action. A contract to this effect is written ex ante,
and in the case it is not contingent on the signal realization, the solution Pˆ to
Es
[
max
a∈A(W )
Ex
[
U
([
Π(a, x˜)− Pˆ
]
+
)∣∣∣∣ s˜]] = ExU(Π(aˆ(W ), x˜)) (2.6)
describes the agent’s ex-post noncontingent “nominal” WTP. The WTP is called “nominal”,
since the principal can actually only collect at most all of the agent’s ex-post wealth, so that he
implicitly assumes the agent’s default risk. On average the expected amount P¯ the principal
collects, and what I am referring to as the “ex-post noncontingent WTP,” is given by
P¯ = Es
[
min
{
Pˆ , max
a∈A(W )
Ex [Π(a, x˜)| s˜]
}]
.
It is clear that Pˆ = P¯ , iff there is no default risk, and further we have that P¯ (which is greater
than both P and P c) can in principle exceed W , especially when payoffs are high enough and
the signal is sufficiently informative.
2.2.5 Ex-Post Contingent Payment
If the ex-post payment is made contingent on the common observation of the signal, then the
agent’s WTP in the event of realization s ∈ S is determined by
max
a∈A(W )
Ex
[
U(Π(a, x˜)− P¯ c(s))∣∣ s] = Ex [U(Π(aˆ(W ), x˜))] . (2.7)
6It turns out that for very risky investments any agent would prefer to pay a noncontingent price.
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The expected compensation for the information seller is consequently
P¯ c = Es(P¯ c(s˜)|s˜).
We remark that there is no default risk for the information seller in this case and therefore no
need to post a different “nominal” price as we had to in the non-contingent ex-post payment
contract.
2.2.6 Incentives for the Garbling of Information
The default risk of the agent in the ex-post payment case may provide the principal with an
incentive to garble certain realizations of the signal or otherwise distort the signal, such that
the initial signal x˜ is a sufficient statistic for the modified signal y˜, but the converse does
not hold. I examine the incentives of the principal to distort his signal and how this can be
reconciled with Blackwell’s theorem that predicts x˜ to be more valuable for “any” decision
problem. Another incentive for the modification of a nonrival signal may be to offer a range
of distortions in order to screen a heterogeneous base of agents and engage in second-degree
price discrimination.
2.2.7 Other Forms of Bilateral Information Transfer
As previously mentioned, the principal can propose other nonlinear contracts contingent on the
actions or on ex-post wealth, if either is observable and verifiable. This may increase overall
surplus and distort the agent’s actions towards higher risk-taking, the extreme case being when
the principal compensates the agent by paying her certainty equivalent and then implementing
the action on his own, which achieves a first-best outcome.
2.2.8 Multiagent Problems
The Value of Shared Information Services
In Chapter 4, I analyze the value of shared information services, both when they are operated
by their members and when they are implemented by a monopoly provider. The value of
information is defined as the compensating variation in price that makes a risk-averse agent
indifferent between procuring an informative signal or not. I provide investment sharing rules
that implement an individually rational Nash bargaining solution and compare this to the
situation in which a nonscreening monopolist maximizes profits. We find that any efficient
price schedule for information should take into account (i) the agent’s confidence in the signal,
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(ii) the agent’s project risk, (iii) her risk aversion, and (iv) her wealth and the mean return
of the project if they are small. Interestingly in a cooperative bargaining situation an agent’s
investment share may either increase or decrease when her risk aversion goes up, depending
on if her demand for information decreases faster than her bargaining power relative to the
other agents or vice versa. I further show that even for CARA utilities there are important
wealth effects. Our results, including the definition of a “critical Nash network size,” provide
a benchmark for the value of information that is shared by a group of agents for use in their
respective projects and not employed strategically against each other.
Screening and Delayed Differentiation
In Chapter 5, I investigate the multiattribute product versioning problem, the findings of which
also apply to the maximization of profits from the sale of products to a heterogeneous consumer
base. In this section I examine the value of the option to delay product differentiation until
better information has arrived and compare it to the ex-ante quality of information needed to
make the firm indifferent to having the flexibility to delay differentiation.
2.2.9 Willingness to Accept
I have pointed out earlier that if the use of the signal is rival, because for instance it contains
customized information pertaining to some bilaterally shared idiosyncratic risk or it perishes
directly after observation, then the seller of the information has a reservation price A given by
his willingness to accept depending on his own utility of observing the signal himself. For a
risk-neutral agent the ex-ante noncontingent WTA is determined by
Es
[
max
a∈A(W )
Ex [Π(a, x˜)| s˜]
]
= max
a∈A(W+A)
ExΠ(a, x˜) (2.8)
and the extension of this definition to the risk-averse case is straightforward by introducing
a strictly concave utility function for the principal. As for the WTP, the payment of A can
be made contingent on the signal realizations and other contractual terms such as the timing
of the payment. Definitions of Ac, A¯, and A¯c can therefore be given in complete analogy to
P c, P¯ , and P¯ c and the following discussion of WTP also directly applies, mutatis mutandis, to
the WTA.
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2.3 General Comment: Relation between WTP and WTA
I now present a general, simple and exact relationship between the compensating variation
C and the equivalent variation E associated with an exogenous welfare change. Differences
between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) have been widely acknowl-
edged in the empirical literature, where a persistent discrepancy in the two welfare measures
is noted.7 On the normative side, progress has been made in bounding the difference between
WTA and WTP. The equivalent and compensating variation (denoted by E and C) are the
welfare measures in standard demand theory that directly correspond to WTA and WTP.
Willig (1976) noted that the difference between the two is likely to be small if the change in
welfare is due to a price change of a market commodity. However, based on results by Randall
and Stoll (1980), Hanemann (1991) shows that when the welfare change is induced by varying
a nonmarket public good q, then differences between C and E can be arbitrarily large (infinite
in the limit), depending on the degree of substitutability between q and the other ordinary
market commodities. He restates the bounds on the difference obtained by Randall and Stoll
in terms of elasticities, making plain the separate influence of substitution and income effect,
each accounting for a portion of the deviation.
In this paper, I derive an explicit relation between C and E that holds for a large class of
utility maximization problems. The idea is that, given a certain reference variation in the level
of the nonmarket good, the induced equivalent variation Eˆ at an income level yˆ = y−C, reduced
by the compensating variation, is equal to C. And this identity holds over the whole range
of incomes, so that one welfare measure can be recovered from the other by the fundamental
theorem of calculus. The obtained identity between compensating and equivalent variation
allows bounding the difference, E −C = WTA−WTP, if limits on the changes of one welfare
measure are available, for instance through direct computation or observation.
Suppose there are n ≥ 1 conventional market goods x1, . . . , xn and one nonmarket good
q. Let the consumer’s preferences over the consumption of these goods be strictly convex,
and represented by the increasing and strictly quasiconcave8 utility function, u : Rn+1 →
R. In addition, to simplify the ensuing analysis, assume that u = u(x, q) is continuously
differentiable. Given a vector p  0 whose components represent prices for the respective
market commodities, the consumer tries to find the optimal Hicksian commodity bundle x∗
in some feasible convex set X ⊂ R+, subject to her finite income y ≥ 0. The classical utility
7See e.g., Kahneman et al. (1991).
8Strict quasiconcavity is required only with respect to the conventional market goods x to guarantee the
existence of a unique solution to the utility maximization problem (2.9).
CHAPTER 2. THE VALUE OF INFORMATION: FOUNDATIONS 19
maximization problem is given by
max
x∈X
u(x, q), subject to p · x = y. (2.9)
Because of the continuity of u there exists an optimal solution, x∗, to the utility maximiza-
tion problem (2.9), the components of which are described by the following Hicksian demand
functions
x∗i = h
i(p, q, y), i = 1, . . . , n.
The resulting indirect utility is defined as v(p, q, y) = u(h(p, q, y), q). Note that the indirect
utility is strictly increasing in income, so that for any (p, q) 0,9
y0 < y1 =⇒ v(p, q, y0) < v(p, q, y1). (2.10)
To value a change in the provision of the nonmarket good q from q0 to q1 we define the
compensating variation C(p, y) and equivalent variation E(p, y) by
v(p, q1, y − C(p, y)) = v(p, q0, y), (2.11)
v(p, q1, y) = v(p, q0, y + E(p, y)). (2.12)
Without loss of generality10 we assume q1 > q0. The term C(p, y) is the income that a
consumer would need to be compensated with in order to be indifferent between the higher
level q1 and the current level q0. If the consumer is endowed with q1, then E(p, y) is the
income that yields equivalent utility to her as consuming at the lower level q0. In other words,
C corresponds to the WTP, and E to the WTA for the proposed welfare change.
Proposition 2.1 The willingness to pay, C(p, y) ∈ [0, y], and the willingness to accept,
E(p, y) ∈ (0,∞), for the welfare change from q0 to q1 exist, and are uniquely determined
by (2.11) and (2.12) respectively.
Proof. For any (p, q, y) ≥ 0 there is a unique x∗ = h(p, q, y) that solves the maximization
problem (2.9). We obtain thus
v(p, q1, y − 0) ≥ v(p, q0, y) ≥ v(p, q0, y − y),
so that there exists a C(p, y) ∈ [0, y] that solves (2.11). It is unique, since the LHS of (2.11)
is strictly monotone in C as can be seen by differentiating with respect to C and using the
9This result holds under weaker conditions on u (only continuity and local nonsatiation of the underlying
preferences are required, cf. Mas-Colell et al. (1995), p. 56).
10The results presented here are untouched by this matter; simply the signs of C and E change.
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envelope theorem, which yields using (2.10),
∂Cv(p, q, y − C) = −∂yv(p, q, y − C) < 0.
The existence of E(p, y) follows from a similar analysis of (2.12). Note first,
lim
λ→∞
v(p, q0, y + λ) ≥ v(p, q1, y) ≥ v(p, q0, y + 0).
since
{
u(x, q1) : x ∈ X} is compact and therefore bounded. Hence, a solution to (2.12) exists
and must be unique by virtue of the strict monotonicity of v(p, q0, y) in y.
Let C(p, y) ∈ [0, y] be the unique solution of (2.11) and set yˆ = y − C(p, y). Then the
willingness to accept, Eˆ, at the reduced budget yˆ ≤ y can be determined using (2.12),
v(p, q1, yˆ) = v(p, q0, yˆ + Eˆ).
Equivalently stated,
v(p, q1, y − C(p, y)) = v(p, q0, y − C(p, y) + Eˆ),
so that (2.11), together with the injectivity of v(p, q0, ·) (since ∂yv(p, q0, y) > 0), implies
Eˆ = C. In other words E(p, y − C(p, y)) = C(p, y) for all y ≥ 0. Differentiating the last
identity with respect to y, we obtain
∂yE(p, y − C(p, y)) = ∂yC(p, y)1− ∂yC(p, y) . (2.13)
Note, by differentiating (2.11) with respect to y and using the envelope theorem we find
0 < ∂yv(p, q0, y) = (1− ∂yC(p, y))∂yv(p, q1, y − C(p, y)),
so that ∂yC(p, y) < 1 for all y ≥ 0. Hence, the relation yˆ = y−C(p, y) is strictly monotonically
increasing in y and we define its inverse by f(p, yˆ) = y. Naturally f is continuous and strictly
increasing and with (2.13) it is ∂yE(p, yˆ) = ∂yC(p, f(yˆ))/(1− ∂yC(p, f(p, yˆ))) for all yˆ ≥ 0.
Since E(p, y) can be written, using the fundamental theorem of calculus11 as
E(p, y) = E(p, y − C(p, y)) +
∫ y
y−C(p,y)
∂yE(p, ξ) dξ,
we obtain the main result by a simple change of variables.
11See Rudin (1976), p. 134.
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Theorem 2.1 Let (p, y) ≥ 0. The willingness to accept is related to the willingness to pay by
E(p, y) = C(p, y) +
∫ C(p,y)
0
∂yC(p, f(p, ξ))
1− ∂yC(p, f(p, ξ)) dξ, (2.14)
where f : Rn+1+ → R+, with f(p, ξ) = {y : ξ = y − C(p, y)}, is a continuous single-valued
function.
As a direct consequence of the first mean-value theorem in integral calculus we obtain the
following corollary.
Corollary 2.1 There exists a constant µ(p, y) ∈ [m,M ], such that
E(p, y) = (1 + µ(y))C(p, y),
where m = m(p, y) and M =M(p, y) are the infimum and supremum of the set
L(p, y) =
{
∂yC(p, f(p, ξ))
1− ∂yC(p, f(p, ξ)) : ξ ∈ [0, C(p, y)]
}
respectively.
Corollary 2.2 (i) If E(p, y) is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in y, then E(p, y) ≥
(≤) C(p, y). (ii) If C(p, y) is increasing (decreasing) in y, then C(p, y) ≥ (≤) E(p, y).
The dual relation to (2.14), formulated below, expressing C(p, y) as a function of E(p, y)
can be obtained in a manner completely analogous to Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 2.2 The willingness to pay is related to the willingness to accept by
C(p, y) = E(p, y)−
∫ E(p,y)
0
∂yE(p, g(p, ξ))
1 + ∂yE(p, g(p, ξ))
dξ, (2.15)
where g : Rn+1+ → R+, with g(p, ξ) = {y : ξ = y + E(p, y)}, is a continuous single-valued
function.
The obtained relation between the equivalent and compensating variation directly relates
WTA and WTP, so that from a normative viewpoint the question of which one is greater
is resolved by determining the sign of the integral in either equation (2.14) or (2.15). In
addition, the difference between the two can be bounded, if the concrete problem at hand
allows specifying limits on the slope of either C or E. Another advantage is that the exact
relation can help avoid solving the dual problem to (2.9), when the sole objective is to obtain a
bound on the difference or obtain one from the other. In addition, equations (2.14) and (2.15)
may be useful as an alternative way of measuring the difference between WTA and WTP by
estimating the slope of either compensating or equivalent variation over the relevant interval.
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If we lose our Money, it gives us some Concern.
If we are cheated or robb’d of it, we are angry:
But Money lost may be found;
What we are robb’d of may be restored:
The Treasure of Time once lost, can never be recovered;
Yet we squander it as tho’ ’twere nothing worth,
Or we had no Use for it.
— Benjamin FranklinChapter 3
Information Transfer and Strategic
Manipulation
3.1 Introduction
We determine the sale value of information in an investment decision wherein payment for the
information may occur both before and after investment returns are realized. The demand for
this information comes from an investor who can allocate her finite wealth freely between an
idiosyncratic investment opportunity of random return and a risk-free asset with zero return.
More specifically, the risk-averse investor holds an exclusive nontransferable option on the
risky investment opportunity, which one may think of as a privately-financed startup or a
non-publicly-traded position in a productive asset whose absolute return is proportional to the
amount invested in it and whose expected return is positive but subject to random shocks. To
support her decision of how to divide her wealth between this risky investment opportunity and
a zero-return risk-free asset, the investor can procure an informative signal about the actual
return from an outside risk-neutral information seller.
In the economics literature (e.g., Lawrence 1999), the value of information that supports
a decision is defined as the simple difference between the payoffs from the investor-optimal
actions chosen with and without the information. While this common definition emphasizes
the substitution effect of information – producing economic benefit to a decision maker who
changes her actions as a result of acquiring it – it neglects the wealth effects that the payment
for the information has upon the budget set and thereby on determining or constraining the
feasible investment actions. Further, the wealth effect depends not only on the magnitude of
this payment but also its timing; ex-ante payments made to the information seller cannot also
23
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be invested, whereas ex-post payment obligations may not be met if poor investment outcomes
occur due to limited liability.
In this paper, we examine the time and use value of imperfect information in such an invest-
ment decision. The contractually agreed monetary transfer for a signal from the investor (the
agent) to the seller (the principal) of the information, which determines the agent’s investable
net wealth, can take place before and/or after the realization of the uncertainty. First and
foremost, information-sale contracts which do not require payment until after returns are real-
ized offer a potential Pareto improvement over fully prepaid arrangements, as the full amount
of the investor’s wealth is available for deployment in favorable signal states which both the
investor and the information seller value. Rather than simply dividing a fixed payment into
two time periods, the information seller can rebalance his prices between ex ante and ex post
to collect a higher amount (in expectation) after the returns are realized, leading to a higher
expected revenue than insisting on collecting everything up front. Second, the seller generally
suffers from default risk for a positive ex-post price component: if part of the payment is to
occur after the return realization, then a situation may arise in which (due to poor investment
results) the investor’s remaining wealth does not cover the agreed payment to the information
seller, resulting in partial or complete default. Under our assumption of limited liability, the
seller’s recovery is limited to the investor’s remaining wealth. Third, the investor’s choices may
be altered by the strategic (ab-)use of this default possibility: payment deferral, combined with
the implicit downside protection afforded by limited liability, may induce the investor to take
higher risks than she would otherwise under an ex-ante payment plan, even when starting with
the same amount of investable wealth. Such incentive effects resulting from unsecured debt
have been identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as a source of moral hazard and earlier by
Fama and Miller (1972) as a potential cause for conflict between the interests of debtholders
and shareholders of private enterprises. Particularly under full payment deferral, although
the information seller might well be said to still ‘own’ the information (having ‘lent’ it to the
investor but not having yet received payment), the investor effectively has assumed ‘control’
of the information (Berle and Means 1932); she can use this information for any purpose,
including the unintended and damaging purpose of crafting an investment policy so risky that
it reduces the expected amount collected by the seller.
We argue that, in addition to optimally balancing the ex-ante and ex-post portions of the
payment schedule, it is sometimes revenue-increasing for an information seller (acting as a
principal in this agency problem) to garble the signal so as to induce the agent to take less
risky actions when these actions increase the chances of payment default. The principal is
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able to reduce agency cost, and increase expected revenues, by “damaging” his information
product in the sense of Deneckere and McAfee (1996). Unlike the situation described by
Gjesdal (1982), who shows that a signal is strictly preferred to a nonsufficient garbling of it for
all agency problems of a certain form, we obtain the inverse conclusion for situations in which
the principal can influence the informational environment of the agent. We further suggest
that for contracts with an ex-post payment provision including a portion of unsecured debt,
the principal may be able to increase his expected surplus by properly garbling the signal.
The sale and purchase of information in an investment setting has a fifteen-year history in
the financial economics literature. The value of information for agents that trade on a common
market has been examined in a series of articles by Admati and Pfleiderer (1986,1987,1990),
who provide conditions under which an insider would either trade and sell inside information,
trade without disclosing any information, or exclusively sell information without trading on
the asset market. Also in order to preserve the ability to trade and to be able to sell the
information to many traders, the insider has an incentive to distort the signal by adding noise.
Allen (1990) builds on this work and establishes the link to financial intermediation in a model
where all agents have utility functions with constant absolute risk aversion (for which the
parameters are sometimes not known to all players). The seller in this model cannot capture
the full value of the information due to the reliability problem (any would-be seller can claim
to have information), and intermediaries may be able to capture some of the residual value.
Rather than examine a multibuyer market setting, we focus on the contract structure where
there is only one investor that seeks information helping her to decide what proportion of her
investable wealth she allocates to an idiosyncratic risky asset. We assume that the risk-neutral
information seller can diversify the induced payoff default risk (applicable only if he chooses
an ex-post payment contract) completely. Further we suppose that initially both the investor
and the information seller have identical rational expectations about the return distribution
of the risky asset. We then examine a number of different contracting forms for the sale of
information (by, for instance, admitting the possibility of ex-post payment, which introduces
moral hazard as noted above), absent from the market-interaction mechanisms considered by
Admati-Pfleiderer and Allen.
We also provide a quite different structure than in the previous work on investment advice
(e.g., Kihlstrom (1988), in which the investor would like to both control the effort of the security
analyst (moral hazard) and to get the analyst to reveal whether the information obtained is
reliable (adverse selection). The optimal payment contracts from the investor’s viewpoint (the
“principal” in this context) make the analyst’s fee dependent on both realized and predicted
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return (to deal with the moral-hazard problem) and introduce risk for the analyst (to discourage
an unreliable analyst from accepting the contract, which can achieve a separating equilibrium
in the adverse selection scenario). In our model, the investor is effectively the agent, but knows
the actual signal quality offered by the information seller. Moral hazard still arises because the
investor, by being offered the opportunity to gamble with the deferred fees owed the security
analyst, has an incentive to invest more aggressively than is in the interest of the seller (the
principal).
It should be noted at this point that we relate the investor’s willingness to pay (WTP)
defined as Hicks’ (1939) compensating variation that moves the investor back to her maximum
expected utility achievable without information. In many models of information acquisition
(Athey and Levin 2000 is a recent example) the funds used to purchase information are im-
plicitly segregated from the wealth used to generate utility, effectively assuming additive sep-
arability in utility from the “wealth to be invested” and “wealth earmarked for purchasing
information.”1 In these models the cash disbursed to acquire information does not constrain
the feasible set of actions, nor does economizing on information or deferring its purchase set-
tlement yield any investment benefit. Our treatment here is inclusive in that we explicitly take
into account the wealth effects induced by the contraction of the budget set by the information
expenditure, as introduced by Kihlstrom (1974) under a different setting.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 3.2 we specify the basic investment
model and examine the investor’s asset allocation decision as a function of the prices charged
by the information seller ex ante and ex post. We show that the information seller’s optimal
pricing problem always possesses a solution, and then characterize solution properties in certain
special cases. As a benchmark we examine the sale of perfect information, to which we provide
a general solution.2 In Section 3.3 we then more closely examine the structure of optimal
payment timing, if it is to be used both to take advantage of the co-investment opportunity
and to mitigate the economic damage caused by investor moral hazard. We determine the
optimal investment action from the information seller’s point of view, which trades off gains
from speculative co-investment and losses from default risk. A “moral hazard state” is then
1This applies to a risk-neutral agent. For risk-averse agents, the cost of an informative signal is typically
modeled as a “utility cost,” which is subtracted from the agent’s full-information utility, as if the amount for
the information was paid out of a separate budget. See for instance Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961), Marschak and
Miyasawa (1968), Kihlstrom (1976) or Athey (2000).
2The value of perfect information has been examined earlier by Thon and Thorlund-Petersen (1993), but
without using compensating variation as the relevant welfare measure and without varying the contractual form
under which information can be procured.
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defined to characterize signal realizations that induce the investor to deliberately overshoot
these seller-optimal investment actions, taking advantage of her limited liability for the ex-
post payments portion to capture the incremental upside from favorable outcomes without
suffering losses from unfavorable ones. Section 3.4 introduces an additional tool to influence the
noncontractible investor action: garbling of the information seller’s signal. By systematically
misreporting favorable signal outcomes, the seller can put a check on investor aggressiveness to
limit moral hazard, resulting in lower default risk and therefore increased revenues. Section 3.5
concludes the paper with a description of research in progress and opportunities for future
theory development.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 The Investor’s Asset Allocation Decision
The investor can allocate her wealth w between two assets: a safe asset and a risky asset.
Without loss of generality we assume the return of the safe asset to be zero. The return of the
risky asset is described by the realization of a random variable, r˜, with continuous probability
density function h : R → R+ with support R = [r¯, r¯] where −1 ≤ r¯ < r¯. We assume that for
simplicity the initial beliefs of both the investor and the information seller on the distribution
of the returns are correct and thus given by the probability density function h on R. Moreover,
the ex-ante expected return3 of the risky asset is assumed to be positive,
Er˜ =
∫
R
h(r)rdr > 0.
Let u : R → R be the strictly increasing and differentiably strictly concave utility function of
the investor as a function of wealth, such that without loss of generality u(0) = 0. The investor
has the option to buy from a risk-neutral monopolist information seller a partially informative
signal s˜ ∈ S, where the set of possible signal realizations, S, is Lebesgue-measurable. The
characteristics of the signal are common knowledge: its continuous probability density condi-
tional on r˜ = r is given by f(·|r). If the investor receives access to a realization, s, of this
signal, she updates her initial beliefs according to Bayes’ rule, obtaining the posterior return
density
g(r|s) = f(s|r)h(r)∫
R
f(s|r)h(r)dr
.
3We refer to “ex ante” and “ex post” only with respect to the return realizations. Any signal is observed
during an intermediate period between contracting and investing.
CHAPTER 3. INFORMATION TRANSFER AND STRATEGIC MANIPULATION 28
To ensure integrability we assume that the signal realizations and their ordering in S is such
that the posterior density g(r|·) is a measurable function for any fixed r ∈ R.4 Based on the
information available to her, the investor chooses an action a ∈ [0, 1], namely the proportion
of her investable wealth.5 After the return realization has taken place, the investor’s utility
payoff pi depends on her initial wealth w, her chosen investment action a, the realized return
r, and the price vector p = (p1, p2) that she agreed to pay to the information seller (of which
p1 is charged ex ante, and p2 ex post under limited liability). Hence
pi(a; p, w, r) = u
(
[(w − p1)(1 + ar)− p2]+
) ≥ 0,
where the [·]+-operator is defined for any real ξ by [ξ]+ = max{0, ξ}. Note that pi(a; p, w, r)
vanishes, if for 0 < a ≤ 1, p1 < w the return r does not exceed the critical value
rc(a; p, w) =
(
−1 + p2
w − p1
)
/a. (3.1)
Given these payoff prospects, the investor’s optimal action a∗s after observing a signal realization
s ∈ S is given by the (possibly set-valued) maximizer
a∗s(p, w) = arg max
a∈[0,1]
pis(a; p, w), (IC)
where pis represents the expected utility payoff, pis(a; p, w) = E [pi(a; p, w, r˜)| s], or using (3.1)
equivalently
pis(a; p, w) =
∫ r¯
rc(a;p,w)
u ((w − p1)(1 + ar)− p2) g(r|s)dr. (3.2)
The indirect utility from observing the realization s is thus vs(p, w) = pis(a∗s(p, w); p, w). Simi-
larly, the no-information utility is given by v0(w) = maxa∈[0,1]E [pi(a; 0, w, r˜)]. If there exists an
interior maximizer aos ∈ a∗s∩ (0, 1), it must satisfy the following first-order necessary optimality
condition:6
∂apis(a)
w − p1 =
∫ r¯
rc(a)
u′ ((w − p1)(1 + ar)− p2) g(r|s)r dr = 0, (3.3)
where naturally p1 < w (cf. Proposition 3.1, part (i)). Using the Leibniz Rule the associated
second-order condition can be written as
∂2apis(a)
(w − p1)2 =
∫ r¯
rc(a)
u′′ ((w − p1)(1 + ar)− p2) g(r|s)r2 dr + u
′(0)g (rc(a)|s) r2c (a)
(w − p1)a < 0. (3.4)
4The choice of the particular Lebesgue-probability measure ds naturally depends on the cardinality of S
(finite/countable/uncountable). In addition, there is no need for S to be convex.
5The information seller may or may not demand prepayment, which directly influences the remaining wealth.
If the investor has to pay ex ante (i.e., before the returns of the investment are realized) for example, then her
investable wealth is reduced by the price for the information.
6Here and in the following discussion we drop the notation’s dependence on w and p where not necessary.
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In the presence of default risk (i.e., if rc(aos) > r¯
) nonconcavities can arise naturally due to the
second term in (3.4). This term vanishes as long as rc(a) /∈ (r¯, r¯), which is generally the case
for small positive a. In that case the utility payoff pis is strictly concave in a and the investor’s
problem (IC) has a unique solution. Thus, for a very risk averse investor (with all aos small
enough), the presence of limited liability has no effect on her investment action. This is true as
long as investing all her wealth in the risky asset and thereby “going for broke” cannot make
her better off in expectation. On the other hand, if default risk is significant, the second term
in (3.4) can cause multiple local extrema of the investor’s expected utility pis to appear, and
thus a∗s may contain several elements.
Before considering the information seller’s problem below, it is necessary to fully understand
the investor’s reaction to price changes. We therefore examine the comparative statics of the
investor’s optimal action set a∗s in (IC) under any signal realization s ∈ S.
Proposition 3.1 (Comparative Statics) Let s ∈ S be fixed and a∗s be defined by (IC).
(i) At any interior maximizer aos ∈ a∗s ∩ (0, 1), the investor is indifferent between changes in
p1 and changes in p2, i.e., Dp1pis (a
o
s(p, w); p, w) = Dp2pis (a
o
s(p, w); p, w).
(ii) For any constant policy a¯ ∈ (0, 1], the investor strictly prefers an increase in p2 (decrease
in p1) to an increase in p1 (decrease in p2), iff ∂apis(a¯) > 0. In particular, if a∗s = 1
(singleton), then Dp1pis(1; p, w) < Dp2pis(1; p, w). For a¯ = 0, the investor is indifferent
between changes in p1 and p2.
(iii) The response of an optimal interior policy aos ∈ a∗s ∩ (0, 1) to price changes is given by
∂p1a
o
s = −
∫ r¯
rc(aos)
ρ(·)u′(·)g(r|s)r dr
∂2apis(aos)
+ p2
∂p2a
o
s
w − p1 , (3.5)
and
∂p2a
o
s =
w − p1
∂2apis(aos)
∫ r¯
rc(aos)
u′′(·)g(r|s)r dr + u
′(0)g(rc(aos)|s)rc(aos)
aos∂
2
apis(aos)
, (3.6)
where ρ(·) = −u′′(·)/u′(·) is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion and (·)
abbreviates ((w − p1)(1 + aosr)− p2).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Part (i) of this proposition states that as long as the optimal investment action is not at
the boundary (i.e., either zero or one), the investor is indifferent between price changes in
p1 and p2. This finding is very general and does not depend on the curvature of the utility
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function or on the presence of limited liability as long as aos is a strict maximizer, so that no
“transitions” between neighboring maximizers occur resulting from small price changes. As
stated in the second part of the proposition, the investor is generally not indifferent between
changes in p1 and p2 for any nonzero constant investment policy a¯. In particular if a∗s = 1
(a singleton), then the investor strictly prefers a unit increase in p2 to an increase in p1. As
we will detail below (cf. Proposition 3.4), this immediately implies an optimal price vector for
the sale of perfect information: charge the lowest admissible amount p1 (possibly negative) ex
ante and then as much ex post (via p2) as is permissible until either the investor’s individual-
rationality constraint binds or she becomes indifferent to choosing a∗s = 1 and deliberately
defaulting. Part (iii) details the behavior of interior maximizers with respect to price changes.
It turns out that aos increases with p2 when news is “good” (i.e., s such that most of g(·|s)
is concentrated in high returns) and the limited-liability constraint is present but not too
restrictive (i.e., r
¯
< rc(aos) < 0). If a
o
s increases in p2, then a
o
s increases even more (less) in p1
provided the investor’s utility is of increasing (decreasing) relative risk aversion.
3.2.2 The Information Seller’s Optimal Pricing Policy
We examine now the general problem where the information seller can choose a division of
ex-ante and ex-post payments that maximizes his revenues. Thereby we assume that negative
prices per se are admissible, but that those need to be bounded from below, as the seller’s
liquidity is finite. Negative ex-ante prices thus allow for the possibility of speculative co-
investment. We furthermore assume that the investor’s actions are not contractible since they
are either not observable or not verifiable by a benevolent court of law.7 The investment
opportunity is idiosyncratic to the investor and he is assumed to be the only agent endowed
with the inalienable option to invest in this venture. The information seller can be seen in this
light as a trusted investment advisor or a consulting company that can generate an informative
signal about the future returns of the venture, but does not have the option to invest directly.
To collect as much as possible while still mitigating the possible default of the investor, the
seller can spread payments for the information over time. Ex-ante payments are default-free,
but naturally bounded from above by w. In addition, by charging a positive price ex-ante,
the risk-neutral information seller foregoes a portion of the return prospects generated by
speculative co-investment. However, to focus on the payment timing under a limited-liability
contract, we assume – as indicated before – that the payment cannot be made contingent on
7We also exclude contractibility on the signal realizations and on the investor’s ex-post wealth except for the
zero-threshold that determines her limited liability.
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the return or on the signal’s realizations. Formally, the information seller seeks a price vector
p∗ ∈ P ⊆ R2 (where P is convex, contains the origin and is bounded from below), such that
p∗ ∈ argmax
p∈P
{
p1 + Es
[
Er
[
min {p2, (w − p1)(1 + a∗s˜(p, w)r˜)}| s˜
]]}
(3.7)
subject to the investor’s incentive-compatibility constraint (IC) as well as her individual-
rationality constraint,
v(p∗, w) ≡
∫
S
vs(p∗, w)σ(s)ds ≥ v0(w), (IR)
where σ(·) is the marginal probability density of the signal realizations,
σ(s) =
∫
R
f(s|r)h(r)dr.
The existence of a solution to this principal-agent problem cannot generally be taken for
granted,8 and Grossman and Hart’s (1983) existence result is not applicable here, since the
agent’s (i.e., the investor’s) utility is not multiplicatively separable in her actions and the
principal’s (i.e., the information seller’s) price.
Proposition 3.2 (Existence) There exists a price vector p∗ ∈ P that solves the seller’s
problem (3.7), subject to (IC) and (IR).
Proof: See the Appendix.
The existence is mainly a consequence of the continuity of the underlying functions and
their possessing by the Weierstrass’ theorem extrema on compact sets. Essential here is the
assumption that the set P of possible prices is bounded from below (i.e., existence of a seller
liquidity constraint). This implies by the investor’s individual-rationality constraint (IR) the
existence of a bounded solution p∗ ∈ P. Having guaranteed the existence of a solution, let
us now consider solving the seller’s problem. The seller’s expected revenues in (3.7) can be
rewritten as
R(p, w) = p1 +
∫
S
{
p2
∫ r¯
rc
g(r|s)dr + (w − p1)
∫ rc
r
¯
(1 + a∗sr)g(r|s)dr
}
σ(s)ds. (3.8)
The following proposition characterizes some general properties of revenue-maximizing price
vectors.
Proposition 3.3 (Properties of Solutions to the Seller’s Problem) Assume that the
price domain P is of the form [p
¯
, w] × [p
¯
,∞) with p
¯
≤ 0, and let a∗s be defined by (IC). A
solution p∗ = (p∗1, p∗2) to the seller’s pricing problem (3.7) subject to (IC) and (IR) is such that
8An interesting and disturbing nonexistence example has been given by Mirrlees (1974).
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(i) p∗1 < w, and p∗k ∈ [p¯ , 0]⇒ p
∗
3−k ≥ 0 for k = 1, 2.
(ii) If p∗ ∈ int(P) is a strict maximizer and the investor’s actions are interior (or zero),
a∗s ⊂ [0, 1), for all s ∈ S, then necessarily ∂p1R = ∂p2R and∫
S
{(
∂p1a
∗
s − ∂p2a∗s
)∫ rc
r
¯
g(r|s)dr − a
∗
s
w − p1
∫ rc
r
¯
g(r|s)r dr
}
σ(s)ds = 0 (3.9)
holds at p = p∗, where for aos ∈ a∗s ∩ (0, 1):
(∂p1 − ∂p2) aos = −
∫ r¯
rc(aos)
ρ(·)u′(·)g(r|s)r dr
∂2apis(aos)
+ rc(aos)∂p2a
o
s. (3.10)
On the other hand, if a∗s = 1 for some s, so that S∗+ = {s ∈ S : a∗s(p∗, w) = 1} is of
positive measure and the investor’s individual-rationality constraint (IR) is binding, then
necessarily
∂p1R(p
∗, w)
∂p2R(p∗, w)
= 1 +
∫
S∗+

∫ r¯
p∗2
w−p∗1
−1
u′(·)g(r|s)r dr
σ(s)ds
∫
S

∫ r¯
p∗2
w−p∗1
−1
u′(·)g(r|s)dr
σ(s)ds
. (3.11)
(iii) If there is no default risk at p∗, i.e., if max {−1, rc(a∗s(p∗, w); p∗, w)} ≤ r¯ for all s ∈ S,
then a price vector p∗ ∈ ∂P such that p∗1 = p¯ and∫
S
vs
(
(p
¯
, p∗2), w
)
σ(s)ds = v0(w) (3.12)
is optimal.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The first part of Proposition 3.3 states that it is never optimal for the seller to charge
all of the investor’s wealth up front, since this essentially destroys the investor’s idiosyncratic
investment opportunity. The only way the investor would part with all his wealth before
investing it would be for the seller to promise a compensation in the second period equal
to the certainty equivalent of the expected no-information utility v0(w), which is necessarily
greater than w; thus charging p1 = w is a negative revenue proposition for the seller. Also,
if the seller subsidizes in one of the two payment periods, he naturally must charge a positive
price in the other period. Part (ii) characterizes necessary optimality conditions for a solution
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p∗ in the interior of P. As long as the optimal investor action given the price chosen by the
information seller is interior to her action set (i.e., lies in the open interval (0, 1)), the slopes of
the seller’s expected revenue function with respect to p1 and p2 must be equal at the optimum.
In the event of a corner solution to (IC) (with a∗s = 1) for “good” signal realizations s, the
difference between ∂p1R and ∂p2R at the optimum is negative, so that the information seller
prefers to charge ex post, as this also corresponds to the investor’s preferences according to
Proposition 3.1, part (ii). The last part of Proposition 3.3 provides the optimal solution to the
seller’s problem in the special case when the information transferred is not too valuable and
the lowest achievable return is r
¯
is above the critical return rc below which the investor at her
optimal policy may default for some signal-return realizations. Without default, a maximal
ex-ante subsidy combined with an ex-post charge that extracts all of the investor’s surplus
(making (IR) binding) will maximize seller expected revenue.
In the next two sections, we will further examine the optimal pricing under potential default.
Section 3.3 deals with mitigating the moral hazard induced by the investor’s limited liability by
payment timing and Section 3.4 examines the possibility of garbling information to deter the
investor from too aggressively exploiting her “non-payment” option. Before turning to these
issues of optimal timing and revenue-increasing information garbling, we briefly consider the
case of selling perfect information, as a benchmark. Interestingly, the optimal pricing policy
for perfect information is essentially the same as the one in Proposition 3.3 (iii), even though
we do not explicitly exclude default.
3.2.3 Benchmark: Selling Perfect Information
Consider the situation in which the information seller is in a position to offer perfect infor-
mation. Clearly, the revenues from the sale of perfect information constitute a natural upper
bound for maximum extractable revenues. In addition, perfect information maximizes the
investment return for the investor and also the seller’s extractable revenues.9 Without loss of
generality perfect information about the investment returns can be communicated by setting
S = R and s = r. The investor’s optimal policy given a signal realization s = r is thus
a∗r = [sgn(r)]+ ∈ {0, 1}. Whenever the investment return r is positive, the investor invests her
full wealth (possibly augmented by a subsidy via p1), otherwise she invests nothing at all.10
Thus, under perfect information any investor behaves exactly like a risk-neutral investor. In
9In particular, garbling perfect information is never in the seller’s interest as Proposition 3.6 (iii) shows.
10Strictly speaking, in the case when r˜ = 0 we have that a∗s = [0, 1] which is however of no importance for
our discussion.
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particular, we see that the investor’s optimal policy a∗s does not depend on the price vector
charged by the seller, it is therefore constant with respect to changes in p. Thus, by part (ii) of
Proposition 3.1 we obtain that the investor’s utility is reduced less by increases in p2 than by
increases in p1, as long as (IR) is not binding. In addition, the information seller is indifferent
between revenues from p1 and p2; as long as the investor follows her optimal strategy given
above, no default can occur if p1 + p2 ≤ w. But this in turn implies – in view of making (IR)
the least restrictive possible and maximizing the amount to be co-invested in this now risk-
less opportunity – that the information seller charges a minimum possible p1, and then the
maximal individually rational amount in p2. If on the other hand default is a possibility with
p1 + p2 > w, then the seller’s revenues are given by
R(p, w) = p1 + p2 + (w − p1 − p2)H(rc) + (w − p1)
∫ rc
0
h(r)r dr,
where rc = −1 + p2/(w − p1) > 0 and H(·) is the probability distribution function associated
with the density h(·). Similar to part (iii) of Proposition 3.3, we can then compute the difference
between the slopes of R with respect to p1 and p2,
(∂p1 − ∂p2)R(p, w) = −
∫ rc
0
h(r)r dr < 0,
so that with default the seller’s revenues increase faster by charging ex post than by charging
ex ante. Hence, we may conclude that the optimal price to any type of investor (essentially
independent of the curvature of u) for the sale of perfect information is given by a maximal
upfront subsidy of p∗1 = p¯
≤ 0 and an ex-post charge of p∗2, such that (IR) is binding,
v0(w) =

−H(0)u (w − p
¯
− p∗2
)
+
∫ r¯
0
u (·)h(r)dr, if p∗2 < w − p¯
,∫ r¯
p∗2
w−p
¯
−1
u (·)h(r)dr, otherwise,
(3.13)
where (·) abbreviates ((w − p
¯
)(1 + r)− p∗2
)
. A seller of perfect information has thus an in-
centive to use speculative co-investment to the largest extent possible, i.e., up to his liquidity
constraint. The following proposition summarizes our results on the sale of perfect information.
Proposition 3.4 (Optimal Pricing of Perfect Information) Consider the sale of per-
fect information about the future return r. Given an admissible price domain of P = [p
¯
, w] ×
[p
¯
,∞), an optimal price vector is given by p∗ = (p
¯
, p∗2), where p∗2 is such that the investor’s
individual-rationality constraint (IR) (equivalent to (3.13)) is binding.
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Note that the optimal policy for the sale of perfect information specified in Proposition 3.4
is exactly the same as the no-default pricing in Propostion 3.3 (iii), even though we did not
rule out default for the sale of perfect information. The key is that any risk-averse investor
with perfect information effectively behaves as if risk-neutral, so that in view of the seller’s
speculative co-investment their incentives are aligned to the point of producing a first-best
outcome.
3.3 Optimal Payment Timing
The monopoly seller has the choice not only of the amount to charge for his information but also
of the form and timing that payment will take (subject to the buyer’s voluntary participation
and the buyer’s capability to make such payments). In this section we consider the optimal
payment timing schedule in terms of choosing the vector p = (p1, p2) in the presence of investor
moral hazard and associated default risk, and contrast this to the case of pure ex-ante payment
that naturally eliminates any possibility for default. By deferring a portion or all of the
payment, the information seller may be able to substantially increase his revenues. Investor
default risk somewhat limits the seller’s ability to indirectly participate in the investment
opportunity: providing maximal ex-ante financing (by charging p1 = p
¯
< 0) as obtained in
the previous section in the absence of default may prove detrimental to the information seller
in its presence. This has interesting consequences for the optimal pricing under default risk:
generally p∗1 > p¯
and sometimes the investor’s individual-rationality constraint (IR) will be
slack at p∗ = (p∗1, p∗2).11
3.3.1 Pure Ex-Ante Payment
In Section 3.2, we have already provided a general optimal pricing policy when there is no
possibility for the investor to default on the ex-post payment portion, p2. If p2 is constrained
to be zero – for instance because the outcome of the investment cannot be observed by the
information seller – then no investor default is possible. At the same time the information
seller is unable to derive residual benefits from the information by co-investing along with the
risk-averse investor.
11The fact that (IR) may be slack at the optimal prices can be seen as the investor obtaining an “efficiency
wage” from the seller which discourages her from going for broke and overinvesting. The investor surplus is in
this case an information rent that the investor can extract as a result of the noncontractibility of her (hidden)
investment actions.
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The resulting optimal price vector (p∗1, 0) can be implicitly determined by computing the
investor’s compensating variation for the use of the information,∫
S
vs ((p∗1, 0), w)σ(s)ds = v0(w).
By varying the timing of the payment collection from ex ante to ex post, the information seller
may, in addition to being able to co-invest, also increase the investor’s overall WTP by allowing
her to invest her full wealth. In order to deal with the resulting moral hazard we show that in
general an interior payment policy is revenue-maximizing for the seller.
3.3.2 Payment Policies Under Default Risk
Before discussing optimal pricing policies under investor default, let us briefly focus on the
“ideal” solution to the seller’s revenue-maximization problem, as if he had complete control
over the investor’s investment actions:
aˆs = arg max
a∈[0,1]
∫
S
{
p2
∫ r¯
rc
g(r|s)dr + (w − p1)
∫ rc
r
¯
(1 + ar)g(r|s)r dr
}
σ(s)ds. (3.14)
This allows us to be clear about what exactly constitutes investor moral hazard. Such moral
hazard creates extra default risk, which reduces the seller’s expected payoff below what could
be achieved if the investor had ignored the pending payment of p2 when determining her
optimal investment policy (e.g., treating the cost of information as sunk, as in the case of
ex-ante payments).
Proposition 3.5 The solution to the seller-determined revenue-maximization problem (3.14)
is given by
a˘s =
[
0,
(
p2
w − p1 − 1
)
/r
¯
]
∩ [0, 1], (3.15)
for p1 + p2 ≤ w, and
a˘s =

[
0,
(
p2
w−p1 − 1
)
/r¯
]
∩ [0, 1], if E[r˜|s] ≤ 0,
a˘os, otherwise,
(3.16)
for p1 + p2 > w, where a˘os is defined by∫ rc(a˘os)
r
¯
g(r|s)r dr = 0. (3.17)
Proof: See the Appendix.
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Definition. If an element of the investor’s action a∗s is for a given signal realiza-
tion s higher than any seller-revenue-maximizing action a˘s in that state, then the difference,
max {a∗s} −max {a˘s}, is called the moral hazard (induced by the presence of unsecured default
risk). The corresponding signal realization is termed a moral-hazard state.
Note that all states s ∈ S∗+ in which the investor goes for broke, with S∗+ as defined in
Proposition 3.3, are moral-hazard states. In the following section we concentrate on states
exhibiting moral hazard and show that in some circumstances, it may be beneficial for the
seller to garble the corresponding signal realization, if the investor’s action can be reduced by
enough such that the resultant reduction in default risk offsets her decrease in WTP for the
garbled signal.
Let us now show an argument that leaving slack in the investor’s individual rationality con-
straint (IR) may be optimal. For this let H ∈ S∗+ 6= ∅ be a moral-hazard state (with associated
return density g(r|H)) that occurs with positive probability. Then the change in the investor’s
propensity to invest following a change of either p1 or p2 is governed by ∂p1
(
V 1H − VH
)
and
∂p2
(
V 1H − VH
)
respectively, where we have set V 1H =
∫ r¯
rc(1)
u ((w − p1)(1 + r)− p2) g(r|H)dr
and VH =
∫ r¯
rc(a∗H)
u ((w − p1)(1 + a∗Hr)− p2) g(r|H)dr to denote the investor’s state-contingent
utility from investing fully (a∗H = 1) or at an interior optimal allocation a
∗
H ∈ (0, 1) when H
occurs. Note that as H is by assumption an element of S∗+ (so that 1 ∈ a∗H) we have that
V 1H ≥ VH at the optimal price vector p∗. Let us first compute the change of V 1H − VH with
respect to changes in p1:
∂p1
(
V 1H − VH
)
= −
∫ r¯
rc(1)
u′(·)1(1 + r)g(r|H)dr +
∫ r¯
rc(aH)
u′(·)H(1 + a∗Hr)g(r|H)dr
= −
∫ r¯
rc(1)
u′(·)1rg(r|H)dr +
∫ 0
rc(1)
(
u′(·)H − u′(·)1
)
g(r|H)dr
+
∫ rc(1)
rc(a∗H)
u′(·)Hg(r|H)dr −
∫ r¯
0
(
u′(·)H − u′(·)1
)
g(r|H)dr. (3.18)
Thereby the abbreviations (·)1 and (·)H stand for ((w − p1)(1 + r)− p2) and ((w − p1)(1 + a∗Hr)− p2)
respectively. The first and the last term of the preceding expression are negative while the
other two are positive but in most cases of smaller magnitude, since generally the posterior re-
turn density g(r|H) concentrates relatively more mass into the region of positive returns. The
computation of the change of V 1H − VH with respect to changes in p2 proceeds in an analogous
manner to the above and yields:
∂p2
(
V 1H − VH
)
= ∂p1
(
V 1H − VH
)
+
∫ r¯
rc(1)
u′(·)1rg(r|H)dr (3.19)
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an expression generally strictly larger than ∂p1
(
V 1H − VH
)
. As a result of (3.18)–(3.19) we note
that the investor’s propensity to default in state H is generally higher following an increase of
p2 than following an increase in p1. Conversely, a reduction in p2 is a more effective deterrent
from going for broke than a decrease in p1. Hence, instead of decreasing p1 even further,
the information seller may choose to limit p2 to a level (together with an appropriate interior
p1) that makes the investor indifferent between going for broke and investing at an interior
optimal level. The consequence of this favorable switch in investor behavior towards an interior
investment level generally has a discontinuous positive impact on the seller’s revenue, so that
leaving a modicum of slack in the investor’s individual-rationality constraint to accomplish this
shift may improve expected revenue in some situations. Note that if (IR) is slack at p∗, then
there must be 1 ∈ a∗s for a set of states S∗+ of positive measure. Otherwise, expected revenue
could be strictly increased by a small increase of either p1 or p2 contradicting the assumption
that the vector p∗ was optimal. – In the next section we discuss how the information seller,
by distorting his information, can extract this slack to his advantage.
3.4 Revenue-Increasing Garbling of Information
For the purpose of discussion we consider in this section signals with only two possible realiza-
tions, “high” and “low.” As argued above, a revenue-maximizing payment plan (p∗1, p∗2) for the
sale of an informative signal must account for the investor’s propensity of going for broke in-
vesting all her money into the risky asset. Particularly if the ex-post component p∗2 is high, the
investor’s potential gains from full investment may be large whereas her downside is bounded
at zero ex-post wealth because of limited liability. This misbehavior is particularly serious for
the high signal state, in which the probability of a positive payoff from incremental investment
is highest. Sometimes simply reducing prices will be required to induce more favorable investor
behavior by making her prefer an interior investment level. As we argued above in Section 3.3,
such a “preemptive” pricing policy must generally leave the investor with some surplus at the
optimum set of prices (1983). In this section, we discuss how the seller can further increase
her expected profit by using another technique – garbling the signal prior to its transmission
– that similarly induces an interior optimum choice of investment but costs less than a price
reduction.
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3.4.1 Garbling Properties
Garbling a signal means strictly reducing its informativeness, be it through the adding of
random noise or simply by systematically misreporting its realizations. The elements of the
research literature related to endogenous garbling of information fall into three major cat-
egories: (1) the concept of signal garbling and relative informativeness of multiple signals
(Blackwell 1953, Marschak and Miyasawa 1968, Holmstrom 1979, Gjesdal 1982), (2) the con-
cept of deliberately degrading the quality of a good to be sold, for the purpose of encouraging
buyers to separate by type (Deneckere and McAfee 1996, Varian and Shapiro 1998), (3) di-
verse analyses of “perverse” situations in agency contexts, wherein more accurate information
or more intensive monitoring induces less effort or worse outcomes for the principal (Cowen
and Glazer 1996, Dubey and Haimanko 2000, Jacobides and Croson 2001).
We believe that the analysis of the deliberate sabotage of investment information, treating
the information seller as a strategic actor, is a novel application. Unlike in the damaged goods
or versioning literatures, there is no intent to sell the full version of the information to any
buyer; the intent is to alleviate moral hazard, not enable monopolistic screening. Precise
garbling, the extent of which is chosen by the information seller, can supplement the relatively
coarse tool of payment timing to encourage fine alterations in the investor’s portfolio allocation
choice.12 Following Blackwell (1953) based on Bohnenblust et al. (1949), the garbled signal
is less informative if the resulting signal x˜ is not a sufficient statistic for s˜, and therefore in
DeGroot’s (1962) sense not of more value when benchmarked over all decision problems.13
In a one-person decision problem, the garbled signal could thus not possibly be of higher
value (in the Blackwell-DeGroot sense) to the decision-maker. In a principal-agent setting,
however, wherein a principal is searching for a method to distort the incentives of an agent
to his advantage, the garbling of information may become a viable option even though it may
destroy overall welfare (Lewis 2000, Weber and Croson 2002). Even though such garbling can
shift payoffs internally between the principal and agent, the information is still less valuable
to a social planner (in accordance with Blackwell and DeGroot’s results.)
Proposition 3.6 (Fundamental Garbling Properties) Let (p∗1, p∗2) be an optimal price
12In addition, if the information for sale is of unknown quality, the seller of high-quality information may
be forced to adopt return-contingent prices, as a credible signal of quality, to make any sales at all – even if
inefficient risk-bearing results.
13For more specific situations, such as monotone decision problems with certain characteristics of the payoff
function, there are stronger characterizations of the value of information available (Athey 2000), which allow
for less restrictive criteria than statistical sufficiency.
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vector for the informative signal.
(i) Garbling can increase the information seller’s expected revenue R only if there is a default
risk by the investor.
(ii) Garbling never increases overall welfare in the absence of moral hazard by the investor.
(iii) Garbling perfect information never increases revenue.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 3.3 describes the seller’s optimal pricing policy under no default or in the
absence of moral hazard states. Proposition 3.6 states that in both of these situations neither
seller nor buyer can be made better off by decreasing the informativeness of the signal, so it
must be welfare maximizing not to garble. By extension, since perfect information eliminates
investor misbehavior and default at the optimal price vector (given in Proposition 3.4), the
seller would never find it optimal to distort perfectly informative signals.
3.4.2 Existence of a Revenue-Improving Garbling
For simplicity consider the case in which the space of signal realizations consists solely of two
elements, S = {L,H}, so that Prob(s˜ = k) = σk ∈ (0, 1) for k ∈ {L,H} and σL + σH = 1.
The realization H represents “good news” and L “bad news” in the sense that gH(r) = g(r|H)
first-order stochastically dominates gL(r) = g(r|L) on R. The information seller can distort
his informative signal by deliberately misreporting realizations. In particular, the seller will
find it useful to claim that the received signal is H when it is actually L to induce the investor
to be cautious even when H is reported. Instead of reporting all states truthfully, the seller
thus misreports realizations L with probability α ∈ [0, 1] as H, whereas realizations H are
always reported truthfully. The resulting probabilities of the signal reports observed by the
investor are σˆH(α) = σH + ασL and σˆL(α) = (1 − α)σL. Given such an information garbling
policy (the nature of which is assumed to be common knowledge, just as if it were provably
announced by the information seller), the investor adjusts her posterior beliefs given a report
of H to
gˆH(r, α) =
σHg(r|H) + ασLg(r|L)
σH + ασL
, (3.20)
whereas for a report of L her beliefs are not influenced by the garbling: gˆL(r, α) = g(r|L) for
all α ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the investor’s investment action is influenced only for a report of “good
news.” We will assume that for α = 0, H is a moral-hazard state exhibiting default risk (i.e.,
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H ∈ S∗+). In this situation, there may exist a revenue-increasing garbling of information. The
intuition proceeds as follows: if the signal H were always reported truthfully, the investor
would choose a = 1 at the optimal prices derived in Section 3.3, above. Despite the investor’s
justified optimism given this information, there are still return realizations that fall short of
the expected return given good news. If these returns are negative enough, the seller cannot
collect all of p2 (which may include a recapture of capital lent via a negative p1) and thus
receives lower revenue than if L had occurred (and the investor selected a more conservative
investment policy based on that bad news). By occasionally misreporting L as H, the seller
can temper the investor’s enthusiasm to reduce the risk of default because a report of H is
now less favorable than before. Of course, the investor’s WTP for this adulterated information
is no longer as high as for the truthfully reported information, but by judicious garbling the
seller may be able to collect more by avoiding default than she must give up in a price discount
for the damaged information good.
Proposition 3.7 (Existence of a Revenue-Improving Garbling) If an optimal price
vector, (p∗1, p∗2), subject to α = 0, is such that the investor’s individual-rationality constraint (IR)
is not binding, and H ∈ S∗+ (so that a∗H = 1 is an element of the investor’s utility-maximizing
choice in (IC)), then garbling the information (i.e., choosing α > 0) will result in higher
expected revenue than not garbling, and seller revenue will be maximized by a series of pro-
gressively more intense garblings and corresponding adjustments (p∗1, p∗2) until (IR) becomes
binding.
Note that in the two-state case, at an optimum with positive garbling α the investor must
be indifferent between investing at an interior level and going for broke (i.e., aˆ∗H = {aˆoH , 1}
with aˆoH < 1), the only possible reason for the seller to leave slack in the investor’s individual-
rationality constraint (IR). Indeed if (IR) was not binding and aˆ∗H = 1 was not an element of
the investor’s optimal investment policy in (IC) at H, then a small increase in either p1 or p2
would yield higher seller revenues without triggering going-for-broke behavior on the part of
the investor (from aˆ∗H < 1 to aˆ
∗
H = 1). The seller therefore responds to the investor’s implicit
of going for broke by leaving her with a positive surplus (i.e., slack in (IR)). As we show in
the proof of Proposition 3.7, increasing α strictly reduces the investor’s propensity to go for
broke, as the difference between Vˆ 1H , her utility under a = 1, and VˆH , her utility under interior
optimal ao∗ ∈ (0, 1), strictly decreases, ∂α
(
Vˆ 1H − VˆH
)
< 0. Thus a “discontinuous” switch in
the investor’s optimal policy may sometimes be achieved by garbling the information without
the seller having to adjust prices downward accordingly. Continuing in this manner choosing
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increasingly positive α permits the information seller to extract all slack from the investor’s
individual-rationality constraint, strictly increasing his revenue.
Our conclusion is that garbling can thus expand the profitability frontier for the information
seller, and will enter the optimal solution whenever zero garbling leads an investor to invest
fully in the moral hazard state.
3.5 Discussion
We have focused in this paper on the value of information when the seller can split payments in
ex-ante and ex-post components, and examined the challenges facing the seller who tries to col-
lect payments partially ex post from a wealth-constrained investor under limited liability. We
find that the deferral of collection can create value, even though it subjects the seller to default
risk and potential moral hazard of overinvestment. The optimal pricing structure generally
involves initial speculative co-investment followed by extraction of investor surplus through an
ex-post charge. Furthermore, we show that garbling the signal can increase expected revenues
by discouraging overinvestment in favorable signal states, thereby reducing the frequency and
costs of default.
An intriguing analogy to the time value of money suggests itself. Unlike the timing of cash
flows in which collecting earlier is better, collecting later is better here because substantially
more (in expectation) can be collected. This value accrual through payment deferral is not
driven by assumptions about the pure time value of money, interest payments from the buyer,
or as a required return to compensate for default risk taken (all of which we have assumed
away). Rather, the seller’s deferral expands the total (expected) gain through placing more
capital behind the informative signal’s recommendations, as the seller can effectively invest
the value of the information (plus any subsidy) alongside its buyer’s wealth. In addition,
deferring payment enables more accurate extraction of the buyer’s value of the information, as
the seller can choose an optimal combination of ex-ante and ex-post charges rather than being
constrained to ex-ante contracts only. The time value of this information thus accrues not to
its buyer (who receives value first but pays later), but to the seller (who even subsidizes the
buyer at first, and collects value only later if at all.)
The obvious extension in the investment context is to examine contingent pricing of the
information, either contingent on signal realizations (ex-ante contingency) or on return out-
comes (ex-post contingency), even if investors’ levels of final wealth remain noncontractible.
Presumably, more favorable signals would result both in higher prices and the choice of higher
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investment levels. Our preliminary investigations show that ex-ante contingent pricing strictly
outperforms ex-ante noncontingent pricing, and that ex-post contingent pricing strongly out-
performs ex-post noncontingent pricing, but that ex-ante contingent pricing and ex-post non-
contingent pricing are not strongly ordered.
We see the sale of quality-differentiated information as the first extension outside the invest-
ment context (cf. Allen 1986). While the results presented here make only minimal assumptions
about investor characteristics, we can certainly calculate optimal prices and levels of garbling
for specific forms of buyer utility. Given that different types of buyers differ in their WTP
for the same information, a discriminating monopolist could screen them by charging differ-
ent prices for different qualities of information (i.e., more- or less-garbled versions of the true
signal). The optimal degrading of this information, however, interacts with the price received
when pricing structures other than ex-ante pricing are employed. The spread of versions offered
under various pricing structures may transcend simply vertically differentiated versions of the
same information (Deneckere and McAfee 1996, Shapiro and Varian 1998) and the optimal
combination may mix different revenue models in the same market.
We also hope to apply our theory of deliberate sabotage of information for sale to a cor-
porate governance setting. Ever since Fama and Miller (1972), the moral-hazard effect of the
presence of debt on equity holders’ risk-taking incentives has been a staple of corporate finance
research. Our approach suggests an efficient way to address the costs of this moral hazard in
the selection of risky projects. Garbling (or censoring) the information given to managers
may encourage them to take less risk, reducing the variation of the firm’s cash flows (and the
probability of default on the firm’s debt) and thereby lowering the firm’s weighted-average cost
of capital - which is in the long-term interest of both bond- and stockholders. Of course, the
decisions made by these managers will suffer from this lower-quality information, leading to a
direct theoretical basis for the tradeoff between costs of incentive misalignment and decision
errors posited in Jensen and Meckling (1992).
Finally, the application of the tools we develop in this paper, although developed in a
financial context, need not stop in the area of financial economics. The revenue-maximization
problem faced by the information seller, subject to both individual-rationality and incentive
constraints by the buyer and the noncontractibility of investment intensity, strongly resembles a
principal-agent problem. We hope to extend these results to a general principal-agent model,
where the principal can use a two-part wage structure to induce higher actions but faces
moral hazard because agent actions are noncontractible, and who cannot collect a flat fee
in excess of the agent’s initial wealth. Combining the relatively blunt tool of flat-rate wage
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schedules with the principal’s ability to fine-tune the information conditions and risks faced
by the agent can lead to a setting in which the principal may even deliberately garble his own
information to induce higher agent effort, in the spirit of Cowen and Glazer (1996). Techniques
to motivate wealth-constrained agents are currently at the frontiers of agency theory (e.g., Che
and Gale 2000, Lewis and Sappington 2000) and financial decision-making is a logical research
area in which to derive, extend, and apply these theoretical innovations.
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3.7 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1: (i) Let a0s ∈ (0, 1) be such that it satisfies (3.3)–(3.4). Differen-
tiating the expression for pis in (3.2) at a = aos with respect to p2, we obtain by the envelope
theorem (i.e., by using the first-order condition (3.3)), the Leibniz Rule, and our convention
that u(0) = 0:
Dp2pis(a
o
s) = ∂p2pis(a
o
s) = −
∫ r¯
rc(aos)
u′ (·) g(r|s)dr. (3.21)
Similarly, differentiating (3.2) with respect to p1 yields
Dp1pis(a
o
s) = ∂p1pis(a
o
s) = −
∫ r¯
rc(aos)
(1 + aosr)u
′ (·) g(r|s)dr, (3.22)
and thus by using (3.3) the same right-hand side as in (3.21). We see that this proof does not
depend on the curvature properties of u as long as aos is a strict local maximizer. (ii) If a¯ ∈ (0, 1]
is a constant investment policy, then expression (3.21) remains unchanged.14 Differentiating
with respect to p1 we obtain
Dp1pis(a
o
s) = −
∫ r¯
rc(a¯)
u′(·)g(r|s)dr − a¯
∫ r¯
rc(a¯)
u′(·)g(r|s)r dr, (3.23)
14Clearly we cannot use the envelope theorem, since the first-order condition is not satisfied in general.
However, we have Dp1pis(a¯; p, w) = ∂p2pis(a¯; p, w) + ∂apis(a¯; p, w)∂p2 a¯ = ∂p2pis(a¯; p, w).
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so that the equivalence statement in (ii) obtains. If a∗s = 1, then necessarily ∂apis(1) > 0,
so that Dp1pis(1; p, w) < Dp2pis(1; p, w). If a¯ = 0, then the two derivatives are equal as a
direct consequence of (3.21) and (3.23). (iii) Differentiating the first-order condition (3.3) at
a = aos ∈ a∗s ∩ (0, 1) on both sides with respect to p2 (totally) using the Leibniz Rule we
obtain (3.6) directly. On the other hand, differentiating (totally) with respect to p1 yields
∂2apis(a
o
s)
w − p1 ∂p1a
o
s −
∫ r¯
rc(aos)
u′′(·)g(r|s)r dr − u
′(0)g(rc (aos)|s) p2rc(aos)
(w − p1)2aos
= 0.
After adding and subtracting p2
∫ r¯
rc(aos)
u′′(·)g(r|s)r dr and then multiplying both sides by (w−
p1)/(∂2apis(a
o
s)) < 0, we obtain for ∂p1a
o
s the expression∫ r¯
rc(a)
u′′(·)g(r|s)r dr
∂2apis(a)
+ p2
(
w − p1
∂2apis(aos)
∫ r¯
rc(aos)
u′′(·)g(r|s)r dr + u
′(0)g(rc(aos)|s)rc(aos)
aos∂
2
apis(aos)
)
,
which – after substituting the definition of the relative risk aversion ρ(·) – is identical to the
right-hand side of (3.6). 
Proof of Proposition 3.2: We first note that for any p ∈ P, w > 0 and s ∈ S, due
to the continuity of E [pi(a; p, w, r˜)| s] in a on the compact set [0, 1], there exists a maximizer
a∗s solving (IC). By the maximum theorem (Berge 1959) the maximizer a∗s is compact-valued
and upper-hemicontinuous in p. In addition, the maximum theorem asserts that vs(·, ·) is
continuous for any s ∈ S, which implies that the investor’s expected indirect ex-ante utility
from observing the signal, v(·, ·) as defined in (IR), is also continuous. As a consequence, the
seller’s objective function in (3.7) is continuous in p, but with an image of P that is may be un-
bounded, if P is unbounded. Introducing the investor’s individual-rationality constraint (IR)
we can restrict attention to price vectors p ∈ P that achieve at least her reservation utility
v0(w), which together with the fact that P is bounded from below, defines a compact subset
PIR of P. The image of PIR under the mapping v(·, w) is compact for all w > 0, and hence it
contains an element p∗ solving (3.7) subject to (IC) and (IR). 
Proof of Proposition 3.3: (i) If p1 = w, then the investor’s investable wealth is zero
and her investment opportunity, which by assumption has positive expected value cannot yield
any return. Thus in order for the price for the information to be individually rational for the
investor, p2 needs to be negative and its absolute value equal to the certainty equivalent of
the investment opportunity, p2 = −CE(w) = −u−1 (v0(w)) < −w. Thus, for any signal this
yields negative revenues for the information seller, since p1+p2 < 0. Hence necessarily p∗1 < w.
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Similarly, if any one of the two components p∗k, k = 1, 2, is nonpositive, the other compo-
nent must be nonegative in order for total revenues to be nonnegative. (ii) The Lagrangian
for the constrained optimization problem (3.7) subject to (IC) and (IR) with the investor’s
individual-rationality constraints binding is L(p, w) = R(p, w) + λ
(
v(p, w)− v0(w)
)
with La-
grange multiplier λ ≥ 0. Provided that there exists an optimal price in the interior of P, the
first-order necessary optimality conditions are thus
1 +
∫
S
{(
w − p1 − p2 + (w − p1)a∗src
)
g(rc|s)∂p1rc −
∫ rc
r
¯
g(r|s)dr
−a∗s
∫ rc
r
¯
g(r|s)rdr + (w − p1) (∂p1a∗s)
∫ rc
r
¯
g(r|s)dr
}
σ(s)ds+ λ∂p1v(p, w) = 0, (3.24)∫
S
{(
w − p1 − p2 + (w − p1)a∗src
)
g(rc|s)∂p2rc +
∫ r¯
rc
g(r|s)dr
+(w − p1) (∂p2a∗s)
∫ rc
r
¯
g(r|s)dr
}
σ(s)ds+ λ∂p1v(p, w) = 0, (3.25)
where
∂p1rc =
p2
(w − p1)2a∗s
− rc∂p1 ln (a∗s) , (3.26)
∂p2rc =
1
(w − p1)a∗s
− rc∂p2 ln (a∗s) . (3.27)
By subtracting (3.25) from (3.24) and using (3.1) as well as (3.26)–(3.27) we obtain
(∂p1 − ∂p2)R
w − p1 =
∫
S
{(
∂p1a
∗
s − ∂p2a∗s
)∫ rc
r
¯
g(r|s)dr − a
∗
s
w − p1
∫ rc
r
¯
g(r|s)r dr
}
σ(s)ds,
= −λ (∂p1 − ∂p2) v(p, w) (3.28)
i.e., condition (3.9) as long as ∂p1v = ∂p2v. But from part (ii) of Proposition 3.1 we can imme-
diately conclude that ∂p1v = ∂p2v whenever 1 /∈ a∗s on S. For interior optima aos ∈ a∗s∩(0, 1) by
part (iii) of Proposition 3.1 relation (3.10) also holds. If on the other hand S+ (as defined in
the proposition) is of positive measure, then relation (3.11) follows directly from (3.22)–(3.23)
after noting that (∂p1R)/(∂p2R) = (∂p1v)/(∂p2v). (iii) No default risk means that no return
realization is below the critical return rc in (3.1), given the investor’s choice at the seller’s opti-
mal price. If the information is not very valuable and the investor sufficiently risk-averse, there
will be no default risk. In that case, the sellers revenue function degenerates to R = p1 + p2
and thus he is naturally indifferent between amounts collected ex ante and amounts collected
ex post. Hence the optimal price will be such that the investor’s compensating variation is
highest, which according to part (i) of Proposition 3.1 is (weakly) achieved if the least possible
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amount is charged ex ante (i.e., p∗1 = p¯
) and subsequently an amount ex post that makes the
investor indifferent between procuring the partially informative signal or not, so that (3.12)
determines p∗2. 
Proof of Proposition 3.5: Differentiating the maximand R˘(a; p, w) in the seller-determined
revenue-maximization problem (3.14) with respect to a we obtain using the Leibniz Rule
∂aR˘(a; p, w) =
p2g(rc|s)rc
a
+ (w − p1)
∫ rc
r
¯
g(r|s)r dr − (w − p1)g(rc|s)(1 + arc)rc
a
= (w − p1)
∫ rc(a)
r
¯
g(r|s)r dr, (3.29)
where we have substituted the definition of rc(a) in (3.1). At this point it is useful to distin-
guish between rc nonpositive and positive. (i) If rc(1) ≤ 0 (equivalent to p1 + p2 ≤ w), then
it is clear that ∂aR˘ < 0 and an optimal action is zero investment or any action a˘s for which
rc(a˘s) ≤ r¯, i.e., (3.15) holds. (ii) If on the other hand rc(1) > 0 (equivalent to p1 + p2 > w),
then rc(a) > 0 for all a ∈ [0, 1] and the integrand in (3.29) becomes positive on the interval
[0, rc(a)]∩ [0, 1]. If in addition E[r˜|s] ≤ 0, then similar to the previous case, an optimal action
is zero investment or any action a˘s for which rc(a˘s) ≥ r¯. If E[r˜|s] > 0, then there is only one
optimal action aos, so that (3.16)–(3.17) hold. 
Proof of Proposition 3.6: (i) If the investor’s default risk is zero, then the optimal price
vector is given by Proposition 3.3 (iii). In other words, the investor is liable for all of her
investment losses incurred by investing aggressively, including the agreed upon payment to the
information seller. The buyer’s individual-rationality constraint (IR) is binding and the seller’s
expected payoff is R = p1+ p2. Any decrease in the investor’s WTP as a result of garbling the
signal would be borne directly by the information seller. Thus garbling cannot increase the
seller’s revenues without investor default.
(ii) In the absence of investor moral hazard, i.e., if S∗+ = ∅, the seller’s optimal price vector
is first-best, since prices according to Proposition 3.3 are chosen such that investor utility de-
creases as little as possible, the seller being indifferent between charging p1 or p2. In fact this
leads to a maximum upfront subsidy (p∗1 = p¯
), and a expected full extraction of ex-post suplus
((IR) binding). Thus, if there were a garbling that increased overall welfare, then the resulting
garbled signal would have to be more informative for the one-person social planner’s decision
problem of maximizing overall welfare than the original signal. Hence, garbling information
in the absence of investor moral hazard cannot increase revenues. (iii) As pointed out in Sec-
tion 3.2.3, perfect information yields signal realizations equal to the actual investment returns,
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s = r, and an optimal investor policy a∗s = [sgn(s)]+ ∈ {0, 1}. As the amount invested is zero
whenever r < 0, there can be no default risk. Thus by (i) garbling cannot increase revenue.15

Proof of Proposition 3.7: Consider the moral-hazard state H, in which the investor and
seller’s posterior probability density is given by gˆH(r, α). For α = 0 the moral-hazard state
remains ungarbled.16 Since by assumption gH first-order stochastically dominates gL, we have
that the corresponding investor actions a∗H and a
∗
L are such that a
∗
H(α; p, w) ≥ a∗L(p, w) for
all α ∈ [0, 1]. Increasing the garbling generates progressively worse gambles in the sense of
FOSD, because of the shift of posterior probability mass from higher return states to lower
ones. Hence such a garbling smoothly reduces the investor’s action a∗H as a function of α.
The reduction is strict for all α > 0 if without any garbling a∗H < 1 (i.e., no “saturation”),
which we assume henceforth. Let Vˆ 1H =
∫ r¯
rc(1)
u ((w − p1)(1 + r)− p2) gˆH(r, α)dr and VˆH =∫ r¯
rc(aˆoH)
u ((w − p1)(1 + aˆoHr)− p2) gˆH(r, α)dr, where aˆoH ∈ (0, 1) is an interior maximizer of the
investor’s problem under garbling, analogous to (IC). Correspondingly we define V 1H , V
1
L , VH as
the investor utilities under a policy a = 1 in high/low signal state and a = aoH ∈ (0, 1) (where
solves (IC)) respectively. Assume that V 1H > VH , so that without garbling (for α = 0) the
investor strictly prefers to go for broke allocating all her wealth (including the seller subsidy
if any) to the risky asset. We will show that the propensity to go for broke, Vˆ 1H − Vˆ )H ,
strictly decreases in α. For this, let us first compute ∂αVˆ 1H . Using the definition of gˆH(r, α) =
(σHg(r|H) + ασLg(r|L)) /σˆH , we can write
Vˆ 1H =
σHV
1
H + ασLV
1
L
σˆH
,
so that
∂αVˆ
1
H =
σLσH
(
V 1L − V 1H
)
σˆ2H
.
Thereby we have taken into account that for a = 1 both V 1H and V
1
L do not depend on α. On
the other hand, using the envelope theorem, the Leibniz Rule, as well as the definition of rc
we have that
∂αVˆH = ∂α
∫ r¯
rc(aˆ∗H)
u ((w − p1)(1 + aˆ∗Hr)− p2) gˆH(r, α)dr
=
∫ r¯
rc(aˆ∗H)
u ((w − p1)(1 + aˆ∗Hr)− p2) ∂αgˆH(r, α)dr,
15Note also that there is no moral hazard in any state, as a∗s = aˆs for all s ∈ R.
16This mechanism is assumed to be common knowledge and irrevocably committed to by the seller before the
signal results are observed.
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whereby
∂αgˆH(α, r) =
σLσH (g(r|L)− g(r|H))
σˆ2H
.
Thus
∂α
(
Vˆ 1H − VˆH
)
=
σLσH
σˆ2H
[(
V 1L −
∫ r¯
rc(aˆHc )
u(·)Hˆg(r|L)dr
)
−
(
V 1H −
∫ r¯
rc(aˆHc )
u(·)Hˆg(r|H)dr
)]
,
(3.30)
where (·)Hˆ abbreviates ((w − p1)(1 + aˆ∗Hr)− p2). Note first that
V 1L <
∫ r¯
rc(aˆHc )
u(·)Hˆg(r|L)dr,
since given a true signal realization L with associated probability density g(r|L), it is strictly
better for the investor to invest aˆ∗H which is closer to the unique maximizer a
∗
L than is investing
the full wealth under a = 1. The second term component of (3.30) is also negative, since by
assumption V 1H > VH (“going for broke” in the absence of garbling when α = 0) and
VH >
∫ r¯
rc(aˆHc )
u(·)Hˆg(r|H)dr,
by optimality of VH for an unfiltered realization of H with associated probability density of
g(r|H). As a result, we obtain from (3.30) that
∂α
(
Vˆ 1H − VˆH
)
< 0,
implying that any garbling reduces the investor’s propensity to go for broke. Thus, if the point
of indifference is “close” enough, or in other words, if V 1H−VH > 0 is small for α = 0, then gar-
bling will tend to induce a change in investor behavior for the high signal state from a∗H = 1 to
an interior optimum a∗H ∈ (0, 1). The resulting sharp decline in the investor’s misbehavior en-
tails a finite positive impact on the seller’s revenues. In addition to this, the seller does not have
to adjust prices downward for small enough α, for by assumption there is slack in the investor’s
individual-rationality constraint (IR) at the outset when α = 0. We have thus shown that gar-
bling may provide a way to increase the seller’s revenue, whenever (IR) is slack at the optimal
price vector subject to α = 0. In fact, by adjusting prices up to investor indifference between
going for broke and choosing an interior investment level, the seller can successively extract all
of the investors initial slack in her individual-rationality constraint (IR). The minimal α that
is necessary to achieve no default in equilibrium (with S restricted to two states) is optimal.17
17For a support S containing more states, the seller may find it optimal to tolerate going-for-broke behavior
for some signal realizations.
The greatest loss of time is delay and expectation,
Which depend upon the future.
We let go the present, which we have in our power,
And look forward to that which depends upon chance,
And so relinquish a certainty for an uncertainty.
— Seneca
Chapter 4
Information Sharing
4.1 Introduction
In the current global networked economy information sharing has become an imperative. Still,
the value of the information to be shared is often poorly defined and ill-assessed. Much less
clear is how much each beneficiary of such shared information ought to contribute financially
in order to at least offset the expenses for the creation and dissemination of the information.
A widespread inability of dotcom’s to profitably offer purely informational content over the
Internet speaks for itself. This is particularly striking in the light of the often-repeated ar-
gument that “information is nonrival,” i.e., due to its generally very low cost of reproduction
more than one agent is able to observe at the same time essentially the same realization of the
same informative signal (e.g., the report of a news event or a current stockmarket price). From
such an observation each agent then draws conclusions relating to her respective project and
adjusts her actions accordingly. Hence, depending on the differences in the projects the agents
pursue, their levels of confidence in the observed signal in terms of providing decision-relevant
information about an uncertain future payoff are generally varied.
One can think of a shared information service as an organization that is run by its members
for the sole purpose of producing information that is being used in a nonstrategic but exclud-
able way.1 In particular, we assume that the individual members of the shared information
service pursue independent projects; for instance the involved agents comprise only a small
1This means that the group using the information can prevent others from using this same information source,
but each member does not use the information in a strategic way against another member. In Section 4.3.4 the
assumption of nonstrategic agent interaction is somewhat relaxed through the explicit consideration of positive
and negative network effects.
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portion of a common market, in which they do not have market power or they act in different
fields. There are many concrete examples of nonstrategic shared information services, such
as the Aviation Weather Forecast, the Insurance Services Office,2 networked medical expert
and knowledge-base systems, any type of member-operated information- or news-aggregation
networks, and national agencies with a common set of objectives.3 We allow for the possibil-
ity of customization or versioning of the information (Shapiro and Varian 1998): the precise
observation of the signal may be different from agent to agent; moreover, even the signal itself
may be different across users. For instance, queries to a common database input by different
users corresponding to their individual needs yield different informative signals, even though
the underlying information resource is shared.
The economic incentives for setting up and using shared information services stem from
economies of scale and scope in assembling the raw information as well as economies of special-
ization in generating the informative signal. The fixed cost for the formation of an information
service capable of producing signals of acceptable reliability (“confidence”) is often too high
for any single firm, which calls for group action and a contractual bargaining solution to
avoid the tragedy of the commons (Liebowitz and Margolis 1994). We thereby assume that
the firms, once they decide to enter the bargaining negotiations, act rational in the sense of
Harsanyi (1966) and that the coordination of the negotiations does not pose particular prob-
lems.
The pioneering contributions in strategic information sharing have been made by Novshek
and Sonnenschein (1982) and Clarke (1983) for oligopolistic firms producing homogeneous
goods (no incentive for information sharing), as well as Vives (1984) for a differentiated
Cournot duopoly (incentive for information sharing exists if the goods are complements or
weak substitutes). Raith (1996) unifies and generalizes this and most subsequent work on
strategic information sharing with market interaction. As far as we know, there exists no
prior treatment of information sharing in a cooperative context in the Economics literature.
In the literature on information systems, there is some concern investments in cooperative
inter-organizational information systems. For instance Wang and Seidmann (1995) consider
the investment in an electronic data interchange (EDI) system and show that a “supplier’s
adoption of EDI can generate a positive externality for the buyer and negative externalities for
2The Insurance Services Office (http://www.iso.com) acts as a supplier of statistical, actuarial, underwriting,
and claims information to the property and casualty insurance industry.
3As a current example emphasizing the need for information sharing between federal agencies, consider
Informationweek’s call that “[s]haring data is key to antiterrorism efforts” (Stahl 2001) in the wake of the
September-11 attack on the World Trade Center.
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other suppliers” (p. 401). These externalities play a role in the adoption dynamics of interorga-
nizational systems (1994). A question untouched by Wang and Seidmann and other authors in
this area is precisely how the investment for shared information systems should be distributed
between the different users, based on the decision value of the information. Our goal here
is to derive efficient investment sharing rules, based on cooperative bargaining. We thereby
model explicitly the information to be shared as a signal that is imperfectly correlated with a
decision maker’s uncertain investment payoff. Nash (1953) founded the field of “cooperative
bargaining theory,” showing that based on a number of axioms (cf. Section 4.3.3) a unique
solution could be obtained that implements a Pareto-optimal allocation. A good overview is
provided by Roth (1979). In particular, we focus on the following two research questions:
1. Given that a number of economic agents (e.g., firms, federal agencies or individuals)
may experience a benefit from setting up a shared information service, how much should
each one contribute financially, and how much is the overall venture worth? An answer
to this question can serve as an upper bound for what could be charged by, say, a
monopolist information provider to that same group of agents, and we will compare
both cases. In the first case, firms are assumed to cooperatively bargain about the
share of the implementation cost; in the second case, a monopolist information provider
maximizes his profits if he decides to enter. Naturally, the cooperative bargaining solution
outperforms the monopolistic solution, if of course its efficiency in actually providing and
disseminating the information is the same as for the monopolist.
2. What are the conditions for existence of shared information services? We provide explicit
expressions for the critical mass of users that is necessary to form an information network,
both in the cooperative and the monopolistic situation. We introduce the notion of a
“critical Nash network size” which counts the smallest subset of agents that can create
a shared information network subject to each agent being at least as well off as without
the information.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 4.2 we give an exact definition of the
value of information in terms of the “compensating variation” of the agent’s utility that makes
her indifferent between acquiring the informative signal or not. A definition of the value of
information as compensating variation has first been introduced by Kihlstrom (1974) in a
product-consumption setting and by Treich (1997) for a standard portfolio investment prob-
lem. Although not widely spread, this definition is superior to what is commonly used in the
Economics literature, since it takes full account of all wealth effects. We also compare the gen-
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eral effect of the number of participants on the cost of a shared information service, depending
on its cost characteristics. Section 4.3 then determines what each participant should pay as a
result of a cooperative bargaining process and how the cost for setting up a shared information
service varies with the size of its membership body and associated network externalities. In
Section 4.4 we compare this to what a monopolist can charge in terms of an “ultimatum of-
fer,” and we discuss the sources of inefficiency. Section 4.5 concludes with directions for future
research.
4.2 The Value of Information
In the traditional Economics literature the value of information to a particular agent is assessed,
depending on the agent’s risk posture, using two different methods (Raiffa and Schlaifer 1961,
Marschak and Miyasawa 1968, Athey and Levin 2000): (i) for risk-neutral agents the infor-
mation value is determined as difference between the optimal payoff with information and the
optimal “default” (or “no-information”) payoff; (ii) for risk-averse agents, the cost of an in-
formative signal is typically modeled as a “utility cost,” which is subtracted from the agent’s
full-information utility, as if the amount for the information was paid out of a separate budget.
These two common approaches to computing the value of information typically neglect the ef-
fect the payment itself has on the agent’s budget set and thereby on constraining her feasible
actions. Such “wealth effects” are, as should be expected, of considerable relevance at least
in a portion of the wealth domain, irrespective of the assumed risk-aversion characteristics.
Also, wealth effects cannot generally be eliminated by an “appropriate” choice of a class of
utility functions possessing multiplicative or additive separability properties (such as those of
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) as is often claimed). We demonstrate below, using
CARA utilities, that wealth effects are significant when the agent’s risk aversion, her endowed
wealth, or her project risk is relatively small or her confidence in the information is extremely
large.
As a consequence, the value of information needs to be carefully defined taking into ac-
count the exact contractual terms governing the transfer of information from the seller to the
agent. We define the monetary value or willingness to pay (WTP) for information in terms of
Hicks’ (1939) measure of welfare change, as the compensating variation that moves the agent’s
expected utility with information to the same level as without information. To simplify the
analytical treatment and segregate the “pure” value of information from any specific decision
situation as far as possible, we will assume here that a noncontingent fixed payment p for an
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informative signal s˜ (correlated with the exogenous payoff-relevant random event x˜) is to be
made before any uncertainty is resolved, and that neither the agent’s actions nor her ex-post
wealth are contractible.
More specifically, we consider an agent that has the option to invest a portion a ∈ [0, 1]
of her endowed wealth w > 0 into a project of risky return x˜. The agent’s preferences are
supposed to be representable by a smooth utility function u : R→ R that is strictly increasing
and concave. The agent’s optimal “default” or “no-information” strategy,
aˆ ∈ arg max
a∈[0,1]
Ex [u (w(1 + ax˜))] , (4.1)
exists by virtue of u being continuous over the compact action set [0, 1] (applying Weierstrass’
Theorem) and is unique, since u is concave and strictly monotonic (i.e., one-to-one). The agent
can now improve her default utility,
d(w) = Ex [u (w(1 + aˆx˜))] , (4.2)
from this project at least weakly by observing a random signal s˜, correlated with x˜, before
choosing her optimal state-contingent action,
aˆs ∈ arg max
a∈[0,1]
Ex [u ((w − p)(1 + ax˜))| s] , (4.3)
where p represents the price of the signal.4 The agent’s expected utility with information, v, as a
function of her investable wealth w−p is therefore v(w−p) = Es
[
Ex
[
u ((w − p)(1 + aˆsx˜))
∣∣∣ s˜]].
Hence we define the value of information for this agent as the compensating variation p¯ that
makes her indifferent between observing the signal or not,
v(w − p¯) = d(w). (4.4)
In other words, p¯ is the highest amount that this agent would be willing to pay for obtaining
the right to observe a realization of the signal s˜ prior to choosing her optimal action.
4.3 Cooperative Information Services
We consider now the situation where N+1 agents bargain about their respective contributions,
t0, . . . , tN , to a fixed net present investment F (N) that is needed to set up a shared member-
operated information service.5 This shared service would allow each agent to observe a signal
4The the return of the agents’ investments is assumed to be conditionally independent.
5To simplify the analysis, we assume that this investment has to be fully committed to ex ante, even though
in reality it could be spread over time, realizing a real option value of flexibility through “chunkification” of the
investment.
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Figure 4.1: WTP is defined as the compensating variation p¯ in (4.4).
correlated with her respective uncertain future payoff. We examine at first the value of the
information service to a single user with CARA utility. Then we analyze the cost structure
of a shared information service, which may give rise to both a “critical mass” and a maximal
“carrying capacity,” imposing a lower and (possibly) upper bound on the size of the information
network. At last we provide a characterization of the Nash bargaining solution and examine
the resulting efficient cost sharing and membership policies.
4.3.1 Value of the Information Service to a Single User
Let us focus on the case, where a given user has a CARA utility for wealth w of the form
u(w) = − exp(−ρw) and faces the decision to allocate a fraction a ∈ [0, 1] of her wealth into a
risky project of return x˜. This return is assumed to be normally distributed with mean µ and
variance σ2, and her expected utility, given that she invests aw and retains (1− a)w, is
E [u (w(1 + ax˜))] = −
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
[
−ρw(1 + aξ)− (ξ − µ)
2
2σ2
]
dξ√
2piσ
= − exp
[
−
(
ρw(1 + aµ)− (aσρw)
2
2
)]
, (4.5)
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so that we obtain the unique no-information maximizer6
aˆ =
[
µ
σ2ρw
]
[0,1]
, (4.6)
and consequently for the expected utility of the agent’s default option
d(w) =
{
− exp [− (ρw + µ2/(2σ2))] , if w ≥ µ/ (σ2ρ) ,
− exp [− (ρw(1 + µ)− (σρw)2/2)] , otherwise. (4.7)
Now the agent observes the signal s˜ = x˜ + ε˜, where ε˜ is uncorrelated with x˜ and normally
distributed with mean zero and variance 1/κ. The positive constant κ, corresponding to the
inverse of the variance of ε˜, represents in Bayesian terms the “confidence” (or “precision”) with
which the signal informs the decision-maker about the realization of the exogenous random
variable x˜. Using Bayes’ rule one can compute the probability density of x˜|s,7 which is again
normally distributed with mean
E [ x˜| s] =
(
κσ2
1 + κσ2
)
s+
(
1
1 + κσ2
)
µ, (4.8)
and variance
Var(x˜|s) =
(
κ+
1
σ2
)−1
. (4.9)
The posterior mean E[x˜|s] is a weighted average of signal realization s and prior mean µ. The
relative weight of s is increasing in the confidence of the signal, κ. The posterior expected
utility is then
E [u (w(1 + x˜a))| s] = −
√
1 + κσ2
2piσ2
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
−ρw(1 + aξ)−
(
1 + κσ2
)
(ξ − E[x˜|s])2
2σ2
)
dξ,
which can be maximized with respect to a as before in (4.5) to yield the optimal state-contingent
policy
aˆs =
[
κσ2s+ µ
σ2ρw
]
[0,1]
. (4.10)
Note that aˆs adjusts the default strategy aˆ in (4.6) with the additive state-contingent term κs/(ρw),
so that the investment intensity is increased, iff the observation s is positive.8 Hence the in-
vestor only reduces her investment in the risky asset if she receives unambiguous “bad” news,
6The [·][0,1] operator is defined for any α ∈ R as [α][0,1] = max {0,min {1, α}} = (min{1, α})+, truncating
the value of α to the admissible interval [0, 1].
7We denote by s a particular realization of the signal s˜.
8This adjustment is additive but not linear, since it occurs inside the [·][0,1] operator.
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i.e., iff s < 0, which has a relatively low probability of occurrence. The correction of the default
action aˆ is proportional to the investor’s confidence in the signal, κ, and inversely proportional
to her Arrow-Pratt risk-aversion parameter ρ. As her risk aversion increases, the investor gets
more reluctant to adjust her default action, and consequently the information contained in
the observation loses value.9 The agent’s indirect utility contingent on the observation s is
therefore (using (4.10))
vs(w) =

− exp
[
−
(
ρw
(
1 +
κσ2s+ µ
1 + κσ2
)
− (σρw)
2
2 (1 + κσ2)
)]
, if s ≥ s¯,
− exp
[
−
(
ρw +
(
κσ2s+ µ
)2
2σ2(1 + κσ2)
)]
, if s ∈ [s
¯
, s¯],
− exp [−ρw] , if s ≤ s
¯
,
where we have set s
¯
= −µ/ (κσ2) and s¯(w) = (σ2ρw − µ) / (κσ2) as the two critical observa-
tions, above and below which the agent invests respectively all or none of her wealth in the
risky asset. In expectation, the agent obtains
Esvs(w) = −e−ρw
(
F (s
¯
) +
∫ s¯
s
¯
f(ς) exp
[
−
(
κσ2ς + µ
)2
2σ2(1 + κσ2)
]
dς
+exp
[
−µ+ σ
2ρw/2
1 + κσ2
] ∫ ∞
s¯
f(ς) exp
[
−κσ
2ρw ς
1 + κσ2
]
dς
)
,
where
f(s) =
exp
[
− κ(s− µ)
2
2 (1 + κσ2)
]
√
2pi (σ2 + 1/κ)
is the probability density of the signal s˜ based on (4.8)–(4.9), and F is the associated cumulative
distribution function. This yields
v(w) = −e−ρw
{
F (s
¯
) + ν exp
(
− µ
2
2σ2
)[
F
( s¯
ν
+ µ
)
− F
( s
¯
ν
+ µ
)]
+exp
(
−µ+ σ
2ρw/2
1 + κσ2
− σ
2ρw
(
µ+ σ2ρw/2
)
σ2 + 1/κ
)[
1− F (s¯+ σ2ρw)]} , (4.11)
where we have set ν =
√
1 + κσ2 and v(w) = Esvs(w). Provided that both µ and w are large
enough, there is a very simple approximate solution, since then the interval [s
¯
, s¯] comprises most
of the probability mass. When concentrating on observations s plus or minus three standard
9In fact, the signal is most valuable to a risk-neutral investor who aggressively adjusts the investment policy
to aˆs ∈ {0, 1}.
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deviations, ±3√σ2 + 1/κ, around the prior mean µ, more than 99 percent of the probability
mass is concentrated in the critical interval [s
¯
, s¯] and we can approximate,
v(w) ≈ d(w)√
1 + κσ2
, (4.12)
and from there compute the agent’s WTP, p¯, for the signal by comparing v(w− p¯) to her utility
of the no-information strategy, d(w), which yields
p¯ ≈ log
(
1 + κσ2
)
2ρ
. (4.13)
A sufficient condition for the validity of this approximation is
µ ∈
[
3σ2√
1 + κσ2
,
ρw − 3κ√σ2 + 1/κ
1 + κ
]
, (4.14)
guaranteeing an error in probability weight of less than one percent. This approximate solution
is not valid if (i) endowed wealth w is small, (ii) signal confidence κ is very high, or (iii) the
agent is almost risk-neutral (ρ close to zero), since then s
¯
and s¯ will be close, i.e., a small
variation in the observation within the interval [s
¯
, s¯] induces a large change in the investment
behavior. For such cases, the exact computation of the expected utility with information needs
to take into account all terms as determined in (4.11).10
Special case: Perfect Information (κ→∞). Then s
¯
= s¯ = 0 and the approximation (4.12)
is not valid. From (4.11) we obtain the value of perfect information,
v(w)
∣∣∣
κ→∞
= −e−ρw
[
F (0) +
(
1− F (σ2ρw)) exp (−ρwµ− (σρw)2/2)] , (4.15)
which defines an upper bound for the value of any signal. It depends strongly on the wealth
of the investor and is naturally zero for w = 0. No information service can rationally charge
more for its information than is implied by (4.15) combined with (4.4).
4.3.2 Cost of Shared Information Provision
We suppose that the cost of the information network F (N) contains a fixed portion F0, inde-
pendent of the number of users participating in the shared information service, and a variable
component c(N) that is strictly increasing in N .11 If we further assume for simplicity that the
10Note that in this approximation we have effectively eliminated the dependence on the agent’s wealth w in
the expression for her WTP (4.13), but under condition (4.14) this approximation is justified.
11The cost function c : R→ R is assumed to be smooth with c′ > 0 and c(0) = 0.
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Figure 4.2: The WTP p¯ can be approximated for w large enough by (4.13) (not possible for
perfect information).
users of the information service are identical and each have a WTP of p¯ < F0, as determined
in (4.4), then for a rational creation of the service we need that
F (N) = F0 + c(N) ≤ (N + 1)p¯. (4.16)
If the variable component is linear, c = γN for some nonnegative constant γ < p¯, then the
critical mass of users Nc can be computed explicitly,12
Nc =
F0 − p¯
p¯− γ . (4.17)
If the variable cost component c is strictly concave in N (i.e., c′′ < 0, due for instance to
economies of scale), then there always exists a finite critical mass. The critical mass decreases
if p¯ is increasing in N due to positive network externalities (cf. footnote 12).13 On the other
hand, if c contains convexities (i.e., c′′ > 0 somewhere), these may be balanced by the growth of
p¯(N) in N so that even with high fixed cost and increasing complexity in maintaining a shared
12If γ ≥ p¯, then Nc = ∞, i.e. the shared information service stands no chance of creation, unless in some
way (through additional assumptions) p¯ increases in N . This could be the case as additional members create
positive network externalities on other members by contributing information valuable to everyone.
13There may also exist negative network externalities, where the average confidence in the signal decreases
as more and more agents join the shared information network, because of aggregation effects that decrease the
customization value of the signal or because of strategic interaction between agents (cf. Section 4.3.4).
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Figure 4.3: Critical Mass of the Shared Information Network as a Function of Agents’ Will-
ingness to Pay and Different Marginal Cost Functions.
information network, there may still exist a finite critical mass above which the investment in
this shared venture is viable. Figure 4.3 provides an overview. A maximum “carrying capacity”
can arise in the case of convex costs (c′′ > 0) if c > p¯ from some N on, since then each new
member of the information service is willing to contribute less than the community has to pay
for adding her.
4.3.3 The Bargaining Problem
In this section we derive an efficient apportioning of the cost of the shared information service
among its members. Assume that there are N + 1 agents that are willing to bargain about
their contributions t0, t1, . . . , tN , where
N∑
i=0
ti = F (N). (4.18)
The bargaining solution is chosen here as the benchmark of what can be achieved using a
coordinated approach to the shared allocation of costs to the members of a shared information
network. Harsanyi (1966) notes that such “[a] cooperative game can always be replaced by a
noncooperative game if we incorporate promises and threats in the strategies available to the
players” (p. 616). The threats in the cooperative negotiation game correspond to the players’
ability to interrupt the bargaining process by forcing the default outcome, an extreme action
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that is not generally individually rational (cf. Roth 1977) given that entry into the bargaining
round was free.14 More specifically, we assume that each agent i ∈ I = {0, 1, . . . , N} has an
endowed wealth of wi > 0, is of constant absolute risk aversion with coefficient ρi > 0, and
pursues a risky project of normal return x˜i with mean µi and variance σ2i . Furthermore, she
has confidence κi > 0 in the personalized signal s˜i = x˜i + ε˜i, where the error term ε˜i has
mean zero and is statistically independent from the project return x˜i.15 If the agent disagrees
with a proposed outcome she can force the default outcome di(wi) ∈ RN+1 as previously de-
termined in (4.2) and substituting agent i’s parameters. The compact, convex and nonempty
set S ⊂ RN+1 contains all the feasible utility payoff vectors for the agents in I.16 Nash (1953)
defined a solution to the bargaining game as a function b : S → RN+1, such that b(S,d) ∈ S
for all possible bargaining situations (S,d), where d = (d0, . . . , dN ). Given the four axioms
(cf. Roth (1979), pp. 6–8) (i) Independence of Equivalent Utility Representations, (ii) Symme-
try, (iii) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and (iv) Pareto Optimality,17 there exists a
unique solution v = b(S,d), such that18
v = argmax
vˆ≥d
N∏
i=0
(vˆi − di), (4.19)
where v = (v0, v1, . . . , vN ) and vi = vi(wi−ti) = Es [vis(wi − ti)] is defined in the same manner
as the expected utility for the individual agent in (4.11). Note that the bargaining set S is
defined by (4.18).
Proposition 4.1 (Cooperative Allocation) Consider the bargaining problem (S,d).
(i) The solution to (4.18)–(4.19) is uniquely characterized by
v′j(wj − tj)
vj(wj − tj)− dj(wj) =
v′0(w0 − t0)
v0(w0 − t0)− d0(w0) , j = 1, . . . , N, (4.20)
14It may appear unrealistic that any of the players could carry so much weight as to stop the formation
of the shared information service. However, the preceding remarks should clarify that this does not generally
happen, given the assumption that the players have agreed to bargain about their contribution in the first place.
Individual rationality will generally prevent firms from carrying out their threat, which is a mere modeling device
to support the efficiency achieved by the Nash bargaining solution (cf. also footnote 17). If a particular member
indeed decided to exit the N -firm bargaining, negotiations would subsequently resume with N − 1 firms.
15Each agent i ∈ I is only observing her own customized signal s˜i.
16We further assume that all the projects’ payoffs are uncorrelated and that the agents do not form coalitions.
17The Pareto-optimality axiom can be relaxed to mere “individual rationality” as shown by Roth (1977). In
that case the solution comprises the Nash solution and the default option d.
18Nash (1953) shows this only for two players. The generalization to N players (without coalitions) is trivial
as Roth (1979) points out.
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together with
t0 = F (N)−
N∑
i=1
ti. (4.21)
(ii) If all agents have the same risk aversion ρ and the approximation (4.12)–(4.13) holds for
all i ∈ I, then the optimal cost sharing for the common information service is given by
tj(N) =
1
N
(
F (N)− logQ
ρ
)
+
1
ρ
log
(
qj
q0
)
, j = 1, . . . , N, (4.22)
and t0(N) = (ρF (N) − logQ)/(ρN), where Q = q1q2 · · · qN/qN0 and qi =
√
1 + κiσ2i for
all i ∈ I.
(iii) If the risk aversion ρi of agent i ∈ I increases, then – all else being equal – this agent’s
share ti increases, iff
∂ log (vi(wi − ti)− di(wi))
∂ρi
<
∂ log v′i(wi − ti)
∂ρi
. (4.23)
Proposition 4.1 characterizes the efficient Nash bargaining solution both generally (in terms
of a first-order condition), and explicitly for an important special case where all the agents’
risk-aversion parameters ρi are identical and the approximation condition (4.14) holds. For
differing risk-aversion parameters a general result by Kihlstrom et al. (1981) states that bar-
gaining performance decreases with increasing risk aversion. We find that the agent’s absolute
monetary contribution to the shared information service does not need to increase as a con-
sequence. Indeed, the situation of information procurement produces a countervailing effect,
since the value of information generally decreases with increasing risk aversion.19 The net
change of an agent’s contribution is positive if and only if – as a response to an increase of her
risk aversion – her demand for information decreases faster than her bargaining power relative
to the other agents.20
4.3.4 Effect of Network Externalities
Externalities in information networks do occur as a result of (possibly mediated) interactions
of different network members. These externalities can have both positive and negative effects
19For instance, a risk-averse agent will respond less aggressively to a (imperfect) signal than a risk-neutral
investor, and thus is willing to pay less for the information.
20 “Bargaining power” is meant here in the sense of Kihlstrom et al. (1981) who show – as pointed out in the
main text – that agents with lower risk aversions obtain a larger surplus in ccoperative bargaining situations and
therefore have a higher implicit bargaining power. For an explicit modeling of bargaining power, see footnote 27.
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on the members’ perceived utility. Riggins et al. (1994) examine the growth of interorganiza-
tional systems which can be both hampered and facilitated by differences in perceived network
externalities across the different users. Positive externalities may be a result of the benefit
that comes from sharing information in a nonstrategic way insofar as it increases the signal
quality of individual users. On the other hand, negative externalities can be a consequence of
high user traffic and network capacity limitations that may it harder to retrieve usable signals
and thus indirectly reduce the confidence in these signals. Negative externalities may also
result from a strategic use of information by different members of the same industry against
each other.21 To incorporate such effects in our model, we assume that the firms’ respective
confidence κ in an informative signal retrieved from the shared information service depends
on the number of users N of the information service. For simplicity we thereby assume that
κ(N) ≥ 0 is quasiconcave in N or in other words that κ(N) is either monotonic or single-peaked
in N . For any given network size N , the results of the previous sections remain unaffected;
however, incorporating (possibly strategic) network effects may have a dramatic effect on the
critical mass and maximum carrying capacity of the shared information network. Under the
assumption that (4.14) holds we obtain, by combining (4.13) with (4.16), for the critical mass
under network externalities:22
N ec = min
{
N ≥ 1 : F0 + c(N) ≤
(N + 1) log
(
1 + κ(N)σ2
)
2ρ
}
. (4.24)
For the simple case of a linear network cost expansion path with c(N) = γN one can directly
see that any strict increase κˆ > κ yields a (weak) decrease in the critical mass, as the right-hand
side of (4.17) is strictly decreasing in p¯ which in turn is strictly increasing in κ. This naturally
21Such “strategic externalities” are not necessarily negative. They tend to be positive – increasing the in-
centive of industry participants to share information – when firms’ best responses to their actions are strategic
complements (cf. Vives 1984, Raith 1996).
22To keep the formalism simple, we have here implicitly assumed that the confidences and perceived network
externalities are uniform across all firms. Of course there is no reason for this to be true in any particular
situation. In addition to a more complicated form of the expressions for the critical mass due to aggregation of
the heterogeneous firms with different quasiconcave confidences κi(N), i = 0, . . . , N , the fundamental difference
is that the feasibility of the shared investment and the surplus of the different players will depend on exactly
who is bargaining and not just on the number of participants. Firm heterogeneity in perceived network effects
generally results in nonmonotonic surplus in the number of participants. To deal with full firm heterogeneity in
a proper fashion it is necessary to endogenize firm entry into the cooperative bargaining situation, an extension
that is for space constraints beyond the scope of this paper. It naturally involves determining the fulfilled-
expectations equilibria of which there may be several so that coordination and preannouncements may become
important dimensions of the problem (cf. Farrell and Saloner 1986).
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generalizes to any network cost function considered in the previous section. For convex c, the
quasiconcavity of κ(·) ensures that the critical mass in (4.24) is unique.
4.3.5 Efficient Cost Sharing and Membership Policies
The Nash bargaining solution is efficient provided that all of the bargaining members need
to either agree on a common resource allocation or force the disagreement outcome d (also
sometimes appropriately referred to as the “threat point,” cf. footnote 14). A sequential en-
largement of the membership body does not fulfill this requirement; and naturally the existing
members wish to enlarge their user base such that each of their contributions are nonincreas-
ing, which may result in the exclusion of certain agents, if they did not belong to the original
network.
4.4 Monopolist Information Services
4.4.1 Pricing and Network Size
Consider now a monopolist that decides about entering a market to sell customized information
to a potential client base of M agents. We assume that each agent m ∈ M = {1, . . . ,M}
disposes about enough wealth and is sufficiently risk averse, so that (4.14) holds and each
agent’s reservation price is given by (4.13). Agents are heterogeneous in their risk aversions,
ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρM , where ρm = mρ¯/M for m ∈ M, and ρ¯ is a positive constant.23 Corresponding
to these different risk aversions are the reservation prices p1 < p2 < · · · < pM , where by (4.13)
and by the definition of ρm we have
pm =
log
(
1 + κmσ2m
)
2ρm
=
M log (1 + k)
2mρ¯
.
Thereby we have assumed that the customization of the information is such that the “risk-
adjusted confidence” κmσ2m is constant and equal to k for all m ∈M.24 If (for simplicity) the
marginal cost of providing one additional agent with the customized information is constant
(i.e., c(N) = γN), we can provide closed-form solutions for the monopolist’s optimal price,
optimal profits, and market penetration.
23In other words, we assume here that there is an upper bound for the risk aversion, and that the M agents
are uniformly distributed on the interval [ρ¯/M, ρ¯].
24In that sense the information is horizontally versioned in such a way that the product of confidence in the
signal and variance of the risky project is the same across all agents (i.e., if a project is more risky, then the
agent can be less sure about the relevance of the signal realization, which corresponds to the notion that the
monopolist has “constant” marginal cost to satisfy each additional user of the information network).
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Proposition 4.2 (Monopolistic Allocation) Assume that the monopolist rationally en-
ters the market. Then the optimal price is p∗ = 2γ and optimal profits are
Π∗ =
M log(1 + k)
4ρ¯
− F0, (4.25)
with a market penetration (and resulting network size) of
m∗ =M ·min
{
1,
log(1 + k)
4γρ¯
}
. (4.26)
The monopolist rationally enters the market iff the critical massMc of potential users is reached
(M ≥Mc), so that optimal profits Π∗ in (4.25) are nonnegative, where Mc = 4ρ¯F0/ log(1+ k).
If the monopolist enters the market (the likelihood of which is inversely proportional to the
dispersion ρ¯ in the agents’ risk aversions), then he in general tends to restrict the size of the
information network to maximize his profits. Those agents with high risk aversions also have a
low WTP and are therefore excluded from the use of the network. Especially when fixed costs
F0 are high, this can lead to market failure, i.e., the monopolist does not enter the market,
even though a bargaining solution (which cross-subsidizes the low-value agents) exists, which
is the case whenever M is larger than the minimal network size, which we term the “critical
Nash network size.”25
Proposition 4.3 (Welfare Differentials and Critical Mass) Assume that the approx-
imation condition (4.14) is satisfied for each agent.
(i) The total welfare achieved in a non-discriminating monopolistic environment is26
W =

M log(1 + k)
2ρ¯
[
1
2
+
m∗∑
m=1
1
m
]
− 2γm∗ − F0, if M ≥Mc,
0, otherwise.
(4.27)
whereas the welfare achieved in the Pareto-optimal Nash bargaining solution is given by
W¯ =

N log(1 + k)
2ρ¯
(
N∑
n=1
1
n
)
− γN − F0, if N ≥ Nc,
0, otherwise,
(4.28)
25The critical Nash network size is simply the smallest subset of a given universe of agents that can individually
rationally set up an information network (of a given cost structure).
26The finite sum can also be expressed in “closed form,” using the relation
∑K
k=1 1/k = Ψ(K+1)+ γe, where
Ψ is the Digamma function, related to the standard Gamma function Γ by Ψ(x) = d log Γ(x)/dx, and γe ≈ .5772
is Euler’s constant.
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(ii) The critical number of potential users of the monopoly shared information service, Mc,
and the critical Nash network size Nc are related as follows:
Nc =
2ρ¯F0
log(1 + k)
(∑Nc
n=1 1/n
)
− 2ρ¯γ
=
Mc
2
(∑Nc
n=1 1/n
)
− γρ¯/ log(1 + k)
. (4.29)
(iii) The critical Nash network size Nc is the smallest possible network size of any shared
information network that guarantees individually rational membership, in particular Nc ≤
m∗ ≤Mc.
For small marginal costs γ, the critical Nash network size is less than half as large as Mc,
since using (4.29) we have then:
Nc ≤ Mc2− γρ¯/ log(1 + k) ≈
Mc
2
. (4.30)
However, Mc just represents the consumer base necessary for the monopolist to serve this
heterogeneous market. The actual size of the monopolist’s network, m∗, is smaller than that.
But still joining the network has to be for each user individually rational, not allowing for a
cross-subsidization of low-value agents by high-value agents, as is generally the case with a
Pareto-optimal bargaining outcome.
4.4.2 Sources of Inefficiency
The monopolistic solution is market based, unlike the bargaining equilibrium, which presup-
poses that each player is telling the truth about her confidence in the signal and that there is
common knowledge about the utility functions. In practical situations, an efficiency loss due
to asymmetries in the information can be expected, but nevertheless if all parties can agree on
their respective parameter vectors (ρ, κ, µ, σ) and costs for the service are known to be of the
form (4.16), then any disagreements about splitting the investment burden F is resolved by
the cooperative allocation described in Proposition 4.1.27 Thus, even though there is a nom-
inal efficiency loss by implementing the market-based solution it may actually be preferable,
whenever the expected differences in welfare are small.
27An additional hidden assumption is that the agents all have equal (explicit) bargaining power (cf. also
footnote 20). Situations with asymmetric bargaining power can be dealt with in a manner already suggested
by Nash (1953) by introducing positive exponents βi, i ∈ I into the Nash function (4.19) proportional to the
agent’s bargaining power, such that β1 + β2 + . . . + βN = N . This modification makes the model’s prescribed
sharing rule potentially contentious whenever not all βi’s are equal to one.
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4.5 Discussion
We have examined shared information services from both a cooperative bargaining viewpoint
and the perspective of a monopolist supplier. To approximate the efficient outcome generated
by Nash bargaining, the pricing of information should be contingent on the agent’s confi-
dence in the signal, her project risk, and her risk aversion. Even though each agent’s demand
for information decreases as her risk aversion increases, in a cooperative bargaining situation
her contribution share may actually increase, an effect that a market-based mechanism im-
plemented by a monopolistic information supplier cannot exploit. We have also shown that
wealth effects are significant for low-wealth agents, due to the strong impact of a prepayment
on their investable wealth. This suggests that pricing should be significantly different for agents
with a low endowed wealth, but should be essentially independent of wealth after a certain
threshold (given by condition (4.14)) is reached. We also discussed the critical mass of users
necessary for the creation of shared information services in the presence of network externali-
ties. Clearly any prospective information provider or cooperating group of agents should verify
that they meet these minimum requirements before setting up the information service in order
to avoid failure. We identified the ingredients of an efficient pricing scheme and a (future)
manager of a shared information service network, given that it is somehow possible to isolate
the salient agent characteristics (e.g., their confidence in the informative signal), knows how an
efficient pricing scheme can be structured to maximize welfare or – in the case of monopolistic
information provision – profits.
Future theoretical contributions could evolve along the following three axes: (a) to endog-
enize entry in the presence of uncertainty about the costs of the shared information network
and examine the associated fulfilled-expectations equilibria; (b) to examine monopolistic in-
formation selling mechanisms that involve various screening techniques based on versioning;
(c) to introduce informational asymmetries in the bargaining solution to capture parameter
uncertainty and differences in bargaining power among the agents.
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4.7 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.1. (i) Define u¯i(ti) = vi(wi − ti) for all i ∈ I. Then using (4.18)
the first-order optimality conditions for the problem (4.19) can be written as28
−u¯′0
(
F −
N∑
i=1
ti
)
N∏
i=1
(u¯i(ti)− di) + u¯′j(tj)
N∏
(j 6=)i=0
(u¯i(ti)− di) = 0, j = 1, . . . , N,
which is equivalent to (4.20)–(4.21). (ii) From (4.12)–(4.13) and (4.20) we obtain
−ρdj(wj − tj)
dj(wj − tj)−
√
1 + κjσ2jdj(wj)
=
−ρd0(w0 − t0)
d0(w0 − t0)−
√
1 + κ0σ20d0(w0)
,
28The second-order conditions are satisfied as a consequence of the concavity of u¯i for all i = 0, . . . , N .
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which, after using the multiplicative separability of the CARA utilities implying that dj(wj −
tj) = eρtjdj(wj) for all i ∈ I, is equivalent to
qje
−ρtj = q0e−ρt0 , j = 1, . . . , N,
where we have set the qi’s as in the proposition. From the last relation we can conclude
using (4.21) that
tj = t0 +
1
ρ
log
qj
q0
, j = 1, . . . , N. (4.31)
Summing up the tj ’s from 1 through to N one obtains t0 as given in the proposition. Substi-
tuting this expression for t0 into (4.31) we obtain (4.22). (iii) Let i, j ∈ I and, without loss of
generality, i 6= 0. If we substitute (4.21) into the first-order condition (4.20) and differentiate
both sides with respect to ρi we obtain (using the abbreviation u¯i(ti) = vi(wi− ti) as above) 29(
u¯′′j
u¯j − dj −
(
u¯′j
u¯j − dj
)2)
t′j +∆ij =
(
u¯′′0
u¯0 − d0 −
(
u¯′0
u¯0 − d0
)2)
t′0, (4.32)
where we have set t′j = ∂tj/∂ρi, ∆ij = 0 for j 6= i, and
∆ii =
∂ρi u¯
′
i
u¯i − di − u¯
′
i
∂ρi(u¯i − di)
(u¯i − di)2 .
Differentiating (4.21) with respect to ρi it is t′0 = −
∑N
k=1 t
′
k, and thus after summation of (4.32)
for j = 1, 2, ..., N we find (using (4.20)) that(
u¯′′0
u¯0 − d0 −
(
u¯′0
u¯0 − d0
)2)
t′0 = −
t′i∑
k 6=i
[
u¯′′k
u¯k − dk −
(
u¯′0
∆0
)2]−1 .
Substituting this last relation into (4.32) for j = i we obtain an explicit expression for t′i:
∂ti
∂ρi
= −∆ii/
 u¯′′0u¯0 − d0 −
(
u¯′0
u¯0 − d0
)2
+ 1/
∑
k 6=i
[
u¯′′k
u¯k − dk −
(
u¯′0
∆0
)2]−1 . (4.33)
Since u¯j is concave and strictly increasing, the bracketed expression in (4.33) is negative, so
that t′i is positive iff ∆ii > 0. In other words, t
′
i is positive iff (4.23) holds, which completes
the proof of Proposition 4.1. 
29Here we omit the arguments for simplicity. Note that the arguments in for utilities with the “zero” index
are (F − t1 − t2 − · · · − tN ).
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Proof of Proposition 4.2. The monopolist’s profit function is
Π(p) =
(
M∑
m=1
1{pm≥p}
)
(p− γ)− F0,
where 1 denotes the indicator function. Since there are only a finite number of agents, maxi-
mizing profits is equivalent to finding m∗ ∈M, such that Π(pm∗) = maxp{Π(p)}, i.e.,
m∗ ∈ arg max
m∈M
{
m
(
1− γ
pm
)}
, (4.34)
which yields (4.26) as the unique solution. Hence the optimal price is p∗ = 2γ and profits are
given by (4.25). 
Proof of Proposition 4.3. (i) Let us first compute the consumer surplus in the mo-
nopolistic situtation,
CS =
m∗∑
m=1
(pm − pm∗) = M log(1 + k)2ρ¯
(
m∗∑
m=1
1
m
)
− 2γm∗ ≥ 2γm∗
(
m∗∑
m=2
1
m
)
, (4.35)
where the last inequality binds, whenever the unconstrained solution of (4.34) lies inside [0,M ],
i.e., whenever the monopolist actively excludes potential users from the network. Adding
CS in (4.35) and (4.25) we obtain the expression (4.27). On the other hand, the welfare
W¯ (in monetary terms) for the Pareto-optimal case can be – given that the approximation
condition (4.14) holds – simply determined by adding up the WTPs (4.13) over all agents
i = 1, . . . , N , and subtracting the cost of the network F0 + γN ,
W¯ = log(1 + k)
N∑
i=1
1
2ρm
− γN − F0 = N log(1 + k)2ρ¯
N∑
n=1
1
n
− γN − F0,
as long as N ≥ Nc and zero otherwise, which yields (4.28). (ii) The critical number Mc of
potential users of the monopolistic network have been computed in the main text exactly
offsetting the monopolist’s total cost. The Nash network size is analogously determined by
setting W¯ to zero. From this, equation (4.29) follows directly. (iii) Clearly, since the Nash
bargaining solution is welfare maximizing, and at Nc each agent is as low in her utility that
removing a single agent would prompt at least one user to force the default outcome d. 
“One and one make two” assumes that the changes in the
shift of circumstance are unimportant. But it is impossible
for us to analyse this notion of “unimportant change.”
We have to rely upon common sense.
— Alfred North Whitehead
Chapter 5
Multiattribute Product
Differentiation
5.1 Introduction
Information goods such as computer software or electronic newspapers can be provided by
firms at a low marginal cost, while in many cases large capital outlays are required to produce
their first unit. The substantial setup cost is thereby mainly driven by the cost of developing
the top quality product. Having established this “flagship” product a firm can degrade it
or in other ways modify it, and in this way create a multitude of products with different
attributes at a small “versioning” cost. Information goods are not the only products that
enjoy such cost complementarities in development. Component standardization and design
based on common platforms can be found in a wide range of industries (Ulrich 1995). In
addition, information goods are often bundled in with physical goods determining in part the
functionality of the underlying physical product. Therefore finding optimal versioning policies
is becoming increasingly important, as often lower distribution costs and newfound customer
intimacy render intricate second-degree price discrimination strategies feasible. We present a
model of a firm that chooses a two-product portfolio sequentially, when products can differ
with respect to both horizontal and vertical nonprice attributes. The firm determines its
second, or versioned product after it has completed the development of its flagship product,
and uncertainty over the market acceptance of the latter has resolved.
It is well known that component sharing or in a broader sense cost complementarities
between products can induce a firm to increase its product variety (Fisher et al. 1999) by
keeping the number of components necessary for their assembly manageable. On the other
75
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hand, over time the creation of product variety should be commensurate with the information
available about demand, leading to the practice of delayed differentiation (Lee and Tang 1997,
Anand and Mendelson 1998, Swaminathan and Tayur 1998). Cost complementarities and
opportunities for delayed differentiation are especially large for information goods: provided
a sufficiently modular product design, features can be easily disabled or rebundled leading to
vertically and horizontally different versions of the initial flagship product (Shapiro and Varian
1998). Since most of the development effort goes into the design of the top quality product,
the optimal initial research effort and therefore ultimately the choice of the flagship product’s
quality level depends on the firm’s options of creating a versioned product once the market
demand for the first product has been observed.1 While this paper is not so much concerned
with the timing of product introductions (Moorthy and Png 1992), we are interested in finding
an optimal segmentation of a heterogeneous customer base of multiple characteristics both with
and without delayed differentiation. We derive the option value for delaying the versioning
decision and show that investment in product quality does not not have to be higher when this
option is available.
All consumers are initially endowed with a wealth level and a taste. Each consumer of a
certain (taste,wealth)-type has a utility, which depends on price, product quality, and distance
of the horizontal product attribute from the own taste. Quality is thereby a vertically differen-
tiating instrument and can be thought of as performance or product breadth. If a product is
characterized as a bundle of features (Lancaster 1966), then a product including more features
than another is of higher quality. On the other hand, two products with different bundles of
features, not distinguished in terms of performance or overall product breadth, can be seen
as horizontally differentiated. Each of them appeals to consumer tastes “located” sufficiently
close. Given a distribution of consumer types (here assumed to be uniform for simplicity),
generated for instance by usage preferences or existing standards, the firm can choose product
attributes so as to attract as many of the consumers with sufficiently high wealth (i.e., po-
tential buyers) as possible. More specifically, the goal of the risk-neutral multiproduct firm is
to create a certain number of product offerings of the form (price, quality, horizontal product
attribute), such that expected profits are maximized. Each product offering generally targets
a certain subset or segment of the (taste,wealth)-space, into which the consumers self-select
by choosing the product that maximizes their respective utilities. However, the firm’s ability
1As an example, Microsoft’s Office 2000 software was available in at least four different versions (Premium,
Professional, Small Business, and Standard) essentially to segment the market and thereby screen the hetero-
geneous consumer base. These versions contained both vertically (i.e., more vs. less features) and horizontally
(i.e., disjoint features) differentiating attributes.
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to optimize the choice of its portfolio is limited by imperfect information about the consumer
characteristics at the outset. We assume that this subjective uncertainty gets resolved after
the creation of its flagship product, which can typically be used to evaluate demand. This
creates an option value of delaying differentiation to reduce the firm’s partially irreversible
commitment to a particular product portfolio.
The underlying problem of multiattribute product differentiation is highly nonconvex. We
show that both pure horizontal and pure vertical versioning are locally optimal, whereas mixed
versioning, i.e., the simultaneous differentiation along both horizontal and vertical nonprice
attributes, is never optimal in our quasilinear homogeneous setting. Pure vertical versioning is
globally optimal for relatively low development costs, whereas for high development costs pure
horizontal versioning is superior. Under delayed differentiation the optimal policy is contingent
on the demand realization (“state”). A consequence of this added flexibility might be that the
firm’s optimal ex-ante investment in product development may drastically drop, instead of
increase as a result of diminished (strategic) irreversibility of the upfront sunk cost.
5.1.1 Literature Review
Beginning with Hotelling’s (1929) seminal paper on horizontal competition, numerous contri-
butions have been made to product differentiation. The corresponding literature can be divided
into locational models in the tradition of Hotelling, where each firm is attributed an “address”
in product space, and into so-called “non-address” models in the spirit of Chamberlin’s (1933)
monopolistic competition, where a representative consumer exhibits (probabilistic) preferences
for different products.2 An important distinction between the two groups of models is that in
the latter group, each product is competing with each other, while in the former consumers
are truly heterogeneous in their preferences, and some products may have no overlap, i.e.,
may never be in direct competition.3 In this paper we adopt the locational approach that
in our view better captures consumer heterogeneity and allows the explicit consideration of
participation constraints that inevitably arise when dealing with a spatial distribution of en-
dowed unobservable consumer characteristics. Our model is thereby inspired by Salop’s (1979)
“circular city” that we extend to a “cylinder” by adding a vertical product characteristic.
Mussa and Rosen (1978), based on earlier work by Mirrlees (1971), essentially founded
the line of work on second-degree price discrimination of multiproduct firms with quality as
2For a good bibliography see Anderson et al. (1992), Beath and Katsoulacos (1991), as well as Tirole (1988).
3A notable exception in this dichotomy is the model by Perloff and Salop (1985) that combines character-
istics from both locational and non-address models, driven by symmetry assumptions in the preferences of a
representative consumer that is faced with localized products.
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the differentiating instrument. Cremer and Thisse (1991) demonstrate that in many setups
horizontal differentiation can be seen as a special case of vertical differentiation. However, as
our model contains both horizontal and vertical features it can not be generally mapped into
either a pure horizontal or a pure vertical one, as we shall see below. Jones and Mendelson
(1998) show that for quality-differentiated information goods and a uniform distribution of
consumer types, no differentiation is optimal.4 Our results in this paper do not confirm these
findings interpreting one consumer characteristic as reservation price, which induces an addi-
tional type-dependent participation (or “feasibility”) constraint (no consumer can pay more
than her reservation price), and this in turn gives rise to a stable separation of the consumer
base.
In addition to allowing the multidimensional screening of a heterogeneous consumer base
(Laffont et al. 1987, Rochet and Chone´ 1998), product variety and broader product lines based
on a modular product design5 can help to delay differentiation along the supply chain (Lee and
Tang 1997, Swaminathan and Tayur 1998). The real-option value of delaying irreversible com-
mitment to a full product line can be seen in analogy to financial decision making (McDonald
and Siegel 1986): delaying irreversible investments can carry a significant value, sometimes
comparable to the investment volume itself (Pindyck 1988). This option value is generally
increasing in the magnitude of the uncertainty unless, as Huchzermeier and Loch (2001) show,
imperfectly correlated risks from different sources are pooled, potentially decreasing the value
of managerial flexibility. We restrict ourselves to what they term “market payoff variability,”
a single risk class, and thus circumvent this effect. Examining the real-option value of delaying
the product versioning until – with release of the flagship product – overall demand has been
observed, we find that it is generally nonmonotonic in the cost of quality β. Naturally, the
option value depends in an important manner on the performance of the default ex-ante ver-
sioning policy, and is therefore not necessarily monotonic in the amount of uncertainty over all
β’s. This points to resource flexibility as a driver of this option value (Van Mieghem 1998). De-
laying differentiation does not generally allow to reverse the upfront quality investment. Being
able to make product-line-extension and pricing decisions contingent on the observed demand
carries significant value depending on the firm’s default policy. For instance for development
costs, β, close to zero when the irreversibility of the investment in flagship quality is not very
4These results have been recently generalized by Bhargava and Choudhary (2001). They give sufficient
conditions for goods with nonzero marginal costs and general utility functions under which a stable, incentive-
compatible separation of the consumer base into segments can be reached.
5Krishnan and Ulrich (2001) provide an excellent survey of the recent literature on product development
decisions.
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significant, the option to delay differentiation carries a high value. In fact we show that it is
locally maximal at β = 0. The effects of increased versioning flexibility on upfront investment
in product development as well as on consumer surplus are ambiguous. We provide an example
where delayed differentiation leads to a lower flagship quality as a result of a state-contingent
policy where the mode of differentiation depends on the observed demand realization, which
is generally the case if the dispersion in the firm’s prior beliefs about demand is large. For
very little demand uncertainty, the versioning mode is generally “locked in” ex ante, and the
delay in the differentiation allows to make slight improvements on the pricing and positioning
decisions. Consumer surplus depends both on the actual product development costs as well
as on the chosen mode of product differentiation and thus may vary in both directions when
introducing an option to delay the versioning decision. To the best of our knowledge our paper
provides a first complete analytical treatment of multiattribute versioning combining horizon-
tal and vertical differentiation. We further extend this new approach to account for demand
uncertainty by deriving optimal state-contingent policies under delayed differentiation. Infor-
mation goods are chosen here for mere convenience. Everything in this paper equally applies
to goods with positive marginal costs (cf. Section 5.4.4).
5.1.2 Outline
In the following section we introduce the basic model together with some structural simplifica-
tions that can be made without loss of any generality. In Section 5.3 we examine the ex-ante
versioning case in which both flagship and versioned product are chosen simultaneously. We
show that mixed versioning is never optimal and that investment in quality increases with
estimated demand. Section 5.4 covers the case when the firm possesses the option to delay
product versioning until after demand has realized. We determine the optimal versioning pol-
icy and compute the option value of delayed differentiation in this context. We also show
that investment in product quality under delayed differentiation may both increase or decrease
using a state-contingent horizontal-vertical versioning policy. Section 5.5 discusses the results
and concludes with directions for further research.
5.2 The Model
Let all consumers be distributed uniformly on V × W, where V = R/2Z and W = [0,W ]
denote the sets of tastes and wealths respectively, with W > 0 the maximum reservation price.
The quotient space V is topologically nothing else than the interval [0, 2], where the points
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0 and 2 have been identified; one might think of V × W as a cylinder of radius 1/pi and of
height W .6 The parameter W represents the maximum reservation price and is initially only
imperfectly known, in terms of a measurable probability density function f with compact
support S ⊂ R+. We assume that any information product offered can be uniquely described
in terms of its attributes, price p ∈ W, quality q ∈ R+, and taste z ∈ V. The utility of a
consumer of type (v, w) ∈ V ×W that buys a product of attributes (p, q, z) is assumed to be
additively separable of the form w − p + κq − |v − z|, and equal to w if she does not buy the
product.7 The positive constant κ defines the marginal valuation of quality relative to the
other product attributes, price and taste.8 This consumer can only afford the product, if her
reservation price (disposable wealth) w is at least equal to the price p of the product,
p ≤ w. (5.1)
For any given maximum reservation price W there is a total of 2W consumers, which is there-
fore also the normalization constant for the consumer density.9
Change of Variables. To simplify some of the discussions that follow, we introduce the
new variable u = κq−p, so that consumer utility can be written in the form w+u−|v−z|. The
new variable u represents the net utility gain at perfect horizontal fit. Using this simple change
of variables consumer utility becomes independent of price. The participation constraint (i.e.,
for any consumer the utility obtained for the product has to weakly exceed utility for wealth
w) can be written as
|v − z| ≤ u. (5.2)
Any optimization of the product portfolio at the firm level needs to account for the feasibility
and participation constraints (5.1)–(5.2) as well as incentive compatibility in the sense that
6This model generalizes the common setup of “circular city” models in the spirit of Salop (1979), which are
used to describe pure horizontal differentiation, typically to avoid the endpoint effects Hotelling’s “linear city.”
We have chosen the cylinder topology for this mixed differentiation model with precisely this in mind.
7General conditions for the additive separability of utility functions in wealth have been provided by Gorman
(1968). Instead of κq it is possible to incorporate any nonlinear strictly increasing quality measure φ(q) which
simply corresponds to a rescaling (cf. also equation (5.4)).
8Without loss of generality the marginal utility of taste differences |v − z| can be normalized to one, even
when the cylinder circumference 2V (for some V > 0) is not precisely known. Varying V changes the relative
marginal valuation of taste mismatch. By substituting W ′ = W/V for W and using an appropriate prior
probability density g of W ′ (instead of f) one obtains the same results as the ones derived for the unit cylinder
V ×W, up to a constant factor. Thus, the results in this paper do also hold when both maximum reservation
price and extent of the taste domain are ex-ante uncertain.
9Total wealth in the set V ×W is W/2, independent of the diameter of the cylinder.
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Figure 5.1: Consumer Utilities and Resulting Market Segments (q1 > q2).
each consumer’s choice is utility maximizing.
Cost Structure. Throughout most of this paper we consider information goods with
zero marginal cost which simplifies the closed-form solutions. This assumption is not crucial
and all results can be easily generalized to goods with positive marginal cost as is shown in
Section 5.4.4. For information goods, the costs of reproduction and distribution are indeed
very small, so that this has become a standard assumption in much of the literature.10 The
cost βq of creating the flagship product depends linearly on the quality q, and can be written
in the new variables as
C(p, u) =
β
κ
(p+ u), (5.3)
where β is a positive constant. Without loss of generality it is possible to set
κ = 1, (5.4)
as the results for any arbitrary value of κ > 0 can be recovered by substituting everywhere
β′ = β/κ for β. Indeed, the weight κ in the utility function has the sole effect of scaling the
10Information goods are merely chosen here to keep analytical complexity as low as possible. Of course,
there are settings for which the small, but nonzero, nature of the marginal costs matters, such as in deriving
asymptotic properties of large bundles of information goods (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999).
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quality cost of the firm. In everything that follows we therefore assume that (5.4) holds.
Versioning Problem. After having created the flagship product the risk-neutral firm may
have the option to create a versioned product by varying product attributes in the following
admissible ways:
(a) horizontal version (i.e., same quality, different taste) at a cost αH ≥ 0,
(b) vertical version (i.e., lower quality, same taste) at a cost αV ≥ 0,
(c) mixed version (i.e., lower quality, different taste) at a cost αM ∈ [max{αH , αV }, αH +
αV ].11
This cost structure exhibits strong cost complementarities or economies of scope (Panzar and
Willig 1981) as development costs are only incurred once to create the flagship product.12 The
firm maximizes profits subject to the consumers’ choice and participation. Solutions to this
profit-maximization problem exhibit translation invariance: profits will not change by just
horizontally translating all products, as a direct consequence of the circular symmetry. One
can therefore arbitrarily fix the horizontal location of the first product to zero. Any implied
solution then naturally represents an entire equivalence class of solutions to the more general
problem with arbitrary horizontal location of the first product.
Demand Estimation. As has been pointed out above, the demand parameter W is
initially only imperfectly known to the firm (cf. also footnote 8). For any product of price p
the profit function depends on W through the marginal revenue density p(p−W )/(2W ). By
replacing the random value W with a nonlinear estimator Wˆ = (E [1/W ])−1 we obtain the
expected marginal revenue density. The following technical lemma will be used throughout the
paper without special mention.
Lemma 5.1 (i) E
[
p(p−W )/(2W )
]
= p
(
p− Wˆ
)
/
(
2Wˆ
)
. (ii) Wˆ < W¯ , where W¯ = E(W ).
The first part of this result is trivial but useful, as it allows replacing the imperfectly known
W with the nonrandom Wˆ when computing expected profits. Part (ii) indicates that when
maximizing expected profits, uncertainty in W prompts the firm to use as decision-relevant
11This condition can also be written in terms of the r-norm of the row vector (αH , αV ), i.e., αM =
||(αH , αV )||r = (αrH + αrV )1/r for r ∈ [1,∞) and αM = ||(αH , αV )||∞ = max{αH , αV } for r =∞.
12A multiproduct cost structure of this form has also been proposed by Shaked and Sutton (1987).
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“certainty equivalent” of W an estimator Wˆ that is always strictly (and sometimes substan-
tially) lower than the expected maximum reservation price W¯ .13
5.3 Ex-Ante Versioning
5.3.1 Benchmark: Single-Product Firm
Before solving the multiproduct case we briefly discuss the single-product monopoly as a
benchmark. Without loss of generality we can set z1 = 0, in view of the translation in-
variance discussed above. With this the expected single-product monopoly profit Π¯1(p1, u1) =
EΠ1(p1, u1;W ) as a function of (p1, u1) becomes
Π¯1(p1, u1) =
p1(Wˆ − p1)
Wˆ
min{u1, 1} − β(p1 + u1).
It is clear that u∗1 ≤ 1, since ∂u1Π¯(p1, u1) < 0 for any (p1, u1) ∈ (0, Wˆ )× (1,∞). Furthermore,
there are no interior extrema, since the determinant of the corresponding Hessian matrix
H = ∂2Π¯(p1, u1)/∂2(p1, u1) is negative,14 for all p1 6= Wˆ/2. Therefore, maximum profits are
achieved on the boundary of V ×W,
(p∗1, u
∗
1) =
{
(Wˆ (1− β)/2, 1), if β ≤ 1,
(0, 0), if β > 1.
(5.5)
Thus, the single-product firm would like to achieve “full horizontal market coverage” (i.e.,
q∗1 = 1 + p∗1), whenever it decides to enter the market.15
Proposition 5.1 (i) The optimal expected profit of the single-product firm is
Π¯∗1 =
Wˆ
4
(1− β)2 − β, (5.6)
increasing in Wˆ and decreasing in β. (ii) The single-product firm enters the market, iff
Wˆ >
4β
(1− β)2 . (5.7)
13The difference between W¯ and Wˆ can become very large. As an example consider a uniform distribution of
W on an interval [1, λ] with λ > 1. Then W¯ = (1+λ)/2 and Wˆ = (λ−1)/ lnλ, so that W¯/Wˆ →∞ for λ→∞.
14In particular, this means that interior critical points can only be saddle points.
15This result is driven by the linearity of the cost function. In the case when the cost function is strictly
convex, say, of the form βq2, there may exist interior solutions making it impossible to derive closed-form
solutions in the multiproduct case.
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Relation (5.7) is a viability condition that imposes a lower bound on the maximum-reservation-
price estimator Wˆ as a function of β. In what follows we will use the optimal expected single-
product monopoly profits as a benchmark for the performance of the various differentiation
modes in a multiproduct setting.
5.3.2 Ex-Ante Product Differentiation
As for the single-product firm it is, due to the symmetry of the problem, without loss of
generality possible to set z1 = 0, and z2 can be restricted to the interval [0, 1] (otherwise just
switch products and translate). Any solution under these restrictions defines an equivalence
class of solutions to the versioning problem. There is one further simplification, which directly
results from the linearity of the problem in z2. Indeed, the optimal value of z2 must be at an
extremity of [0, 1], i.e., z∗2 ∈ {0, 1}. The induced two canonical cases of vertical and horizontal
differentiation have to be distinguished in the solution to the versioning problem. Furthermore
we assume that the quality of the second product does not exceed the quality of the first
product (q1 ≥ q2), which after linear variable transformation (u = κq − p) can be written
equivalently as
q1 = p1 + u1 ≥ p2 + u2 = q2. (5.8)
This assumption correlates with the fact that in order for a “versioning” policy to be meaning-
ful, the first (flagship) product has to be of higher quality than the derived product. Figure 5.2
provides an overview of the different modes of differentiation that can arise: (1) no differenti-
ation (z2 = 0, q1 = q2), which is de facto equivalent to the single-product monopoly; (2) pure
vertical differentiation (z2 = 0, q1 > q2); (3) mixed differentiation (z2 = 1, q1 > q2); and, (4)
pure horizontal differentiation (z2 = 1, q1 = q2). To simplify the exposition, we will first set
versioning costs to zero as their effect can be analyzed separately, once all the main expressions
for the zero-versioning cost base case have been established.
Pure Vertical Differentiation. The profit function Π¯V is linear in u1 and u2, so that
we can concentrate on the situation when u1 = u2 = 1, since otherwise the firm would only
enter with one product (u2 = 0, cf. Section 5.3.1). The maximization problem can be written
in the form
max
p1,p2
Π¯V (p1, p2) = max
p1,p2
{
1
Wˆ
(
p1(Wˆ − p1) + p2(p1 − p2)
)
− β(p1 + 1)
}
, (5.9)
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Figure 5.2: Modes of Differentiation.
the solution of which yields the unique interior maximizers, p∗1 = 2Wˆ (1 − β)/3 and p∗2 =
Wˆ (1− β)/3, provided that β < 1. Optimal expected profits are then
Π¯∗V =
Wˆ
3
(1− β)2 − β = Π¯∗1 +
Wˆ
12
(1− β)2, (5.10)
strictly greater than single-product monopoly profits Π¯∗1. Thus, pure vertical differentiation
strictly dominates a single-product monopoly, given that versioning costs αV are small enough.
Pure vertical differentiation is ex-ante viable, iff
Wˆ >
3β
(1− β)2 . (5.11)
It is important to note that since u∗1 = u∗2 at the optimum in pure vertical differentiation,
a consumer of type (v, w) obtains equal surplus from both products. This follows from the
latent assumption that in equilibrium consumers buy the higher-price product if this yields ex-
actly the same utility as the lower-price product (e.g., since resale value is higher also). If this
was not the case, the firm could technically achieve stable separation by letting u∗1 = u∗2 + ε
for any (arbitrarily small) ε > 0 without, in the limit, changing any of the results. The fun-
damental reason for the stable segmentation of the consumer population lies in the feasibility
constraint (5.1): consumers never spend more than their wealth w (reservation price) permits.
Mixed Differentiation. In analogy to the single-product monopoly, profits Π¯M only de-
pend linearly on u1 and u2 (whence results full horizontal coverage). Since the constraint (5.8)
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is by assumption not binding, it is u1 = u2 = 1. The profit-maximization problem thus takes
the form
max
p1,p2
Π¯M (p1, p2) = max
p1,p2
{
1
2Wˆ
(
p1(Wˆ − p1) + p2(Wˆ − p2) + p2(p1 − p2)
)
− β(p1 + 1)
}
.
(5.12)
Straightforward unconstrained maximization yields the optimal prices p∗1 = Wˆ (5− 8β)/7 and
p∗2 = Wˆ (3−2β)/7, which are well defined (i.e., in [0, Wˆ ] and such that p∗1 > p∗2) for any positive
β < 1/3. Optimal expected profits are
Π¯∗M =
Wˆ
7
(
5
4
− 2β
)2
+
Wˆ
16
− β = Π¯∗1 +
9Wˆ
28
(
1
3
− β
)2
, (5.13)
strictly increasing in Wˆ and strictly decreasing in β. In the mixed-differentiation mode, the
multiproduct monopolist enters, iff
Wˆ >
β
1
7
(
5
4
− 2β
)2
+
1
16
, and β <
1
3
. (5.14)
Given entry in mixed-differentiation mode, quality dispersion does in general occur, since by
construction for β < 1/3 that q∗1 = Wˆ (5−8β)/7+1 ≥ Wˆ (3−2β)/7+1 = q∗2. However, vertical
differentiation strictly dominates mixed differentiation. Indeed,
Π¯∗V − Π¯∗M = Wˆ
(
(1− β)2
3
− 1
7
(
5
4
− 2β
)2
− 1
16
)
= Wˆ
(
1
20
− 5
21
(
β − 1
10
)2)
> 0
for all β ∈ (0, 1/3). Therefore, the mixed-differentiation mode does not play a role, which by
itself is an interesting fact.
Proposition 5.2 For any given viable market configuration (β, Wˆ ) either pure horizontal or
pure vertical differentiation is optimal.
Mixed versioning is dominated by pure vertical differentiation. As soon as goods are horizon-
tally differentiated with (z2 = 1), it is best to reduce the quality of the flagship product so as
to economize on providing costly horizontal coverage with each product. Hence leaving slack
in constraint (5.8) does not fully utilize the potential of the flagship product, whose quality
will ex ante be reduced until q1 = q2, i.e., until pure horizontal differentiation is obtained.
Pure Horizontal Differentiation. In this mode constraint (5.8) is binding, so that
q1 = q2 or in other words
u1 = u2 + p2 − p1. (5.15)
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Figure 5.3: Horizontal Separation and Overlap in Terms of Consumer Surplus.
Expected profits are Π¯H = 12Wˆ
(
p1(Wˆ − p1)(1 + u1 − u2) + p2(Wˆ − p2)(1− u1 + u2) + min{p1, p2}
|p2 − p1|(u1 + u2 − 1)
)
− β(p1 + u1) or, using (5.15),
Π¯H =
1
2Wˆ
(
p1(Wˆ − p1)(1− p1 + p2) + p2(Wˆ − p2)(1 + p1 − p2)
+max{p1(p2 − p1), p2(p1 − p2)}(2u2 − 1− p1 + p2)
)
− β(p2 + u2), (5.16)
subject to p2 ∈ [p1 − 1, p1 + 1] ∩ [0, Wˆ ] and u2 ∈ [(1 + p1 − p2)/2, 1]. Thus, depending on
the sign of ∂u2Π¯H =
1
Wˆ
max{p1(p2 − p1), p2(p1 − p2)} − β, either u2 = 1 (for ∂u1Π¯H > 0)
or u2 = (1 + p1 − p2)/2 (for ∂u1Π¯H < 0). In the latter case there is no overlap between
the two products, which we term “separation” (cf. Figure 5.3). In case when u2 = 1, there
clearly is “overlap,” and relation (5.15) entails that then p1 ≥ p2. It is clear that overlap
in practice means horizontal “product cannibalization,” for some consumers are offered an
individually rational choice (satisfying (5.1)–(5.2)) between both products. It turns out that
under ex-ante versioning horizontal overlap is never optimal as the firm can do better by
either eliminating cannibalization or purely vertically differentiating. This finding does not
hold under delayed differentiation where horizontal cannibalization may be optimal as the best
possible “compromise” for certain intermediate demand realizations.
Proposition 5.3 Let the parameters 0 < β < 1 and Wˆ > 0 be given.
(i) Horizontal differentiation with separation yields optimal expected profits of
Π¯∗H1 =
Wˆ
4
(1− β)2 − β
2
= Π¯∗1 +
β
2
, (5.17)
with symmetric product portfolio (p∗k, q
∗
k) =
(
Wˆ (1− β)/2,
(
1 + Wˆ (1− β)
)
/2
)
for k =
1, 2.
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Figure 5.4: Optimal Ex-Ante Product Versioning.
(ii) There is no horizontal product cannibalization, i.e., optimal expected profits Π¯∗H2 under
horizontal differentiation with overlap are dominated,
Π¯∗H2 < max{Π¯∗H1 , Π¯∗V } = Π¯∗. (5.18)
When only considering horizontal differentiation, Proposition 5.3 implies that product canni-
balization is not inherently ruled out, which may seem counterintuitive in our simple setting.
In fact, for lower unit cost of quality β overlap (i.e., product cannibalization) performs better
than separation, which only yields a constant improvement of β/2 over single-product optimal
profits Π¯∗1. Cannibalization implies an overinvestment in quality in the sense that more quality
is provided than necessary for full horizontal coverage of the consumer base. Exploiting the
consumers’ feasibility constraint it is possible (for low β) to achieve a vertical separation of the
consumer base offering one product at a lower price than the other. The high-price product
is then solely preferred by high-w consumers of very good horizontal fit. This feature of the
model explains the possibility of price dispersion in a purely horizontally differentiated market
when the marginal cost of creating additional quality is sufficiently low.
The following proposition summarizes the firm’s entry decision into the market in the
absence of an option to delay product differentiation.
Proposition 5.4 Consider a firm that has the option to enter the market, given (β, Wˆ ) ∈
(0, 1)× S, with one or two information goods.
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(i) For any (β, Wˆ ) such that
2β/(1− β)2 < Wˆ , (5.19)
the firm’s entry is viable, if versioning costs are small enough.
(ii) In the case that (5.19) does not hold, the firm’s entry is not viable, even if versioning
costs are zero.
(iii) If entry is viable and Wˆ < 4β/(1 − β)2, the firm needs to enter the market with two
products.
An interesting implication from the last proposition is that in some markets for information
goods that are unprofitable for any single product, a firm may still be able to enter profitably
with a versioned portfolio of products.
Effect of Versioning Costs. We have seen above that under perfect information mixed
differentiation is strictly dominated by pure vertical differentiation. Thus we can limit ourselves
to adjusting and comparing expressions (5.6), (5.10), and (5.29). As a consequence of the
earlier discussion, write Π¯∗H (instead of Π¯
∗
H1
) for the optimal profits under pure horizontal
differentiation (separation). Following (5.29), pure horizontal differentiation is dominated by
single-product monopoly, iff αH > β/2. On the other hand, it is dominated by pure vertical
differentiation, iff αV < αH + Wˆ12 (1− β)2 − β2 . The resulting partition of the (αH , αV )-plane is
depicted in Figure 5.5.
5.4 Delayed Differentiation
Assume that the risk-neutral firm can delay the versioning decision until after the demand
uncertainty has resolved through introduction of the flagship product. The exact timing pro-
ceeds over two stages (t ∈ {1, 2}): at t = 1 the firm develops its flagship product of fixed16
attributes (q1, z1) and presents it to the market without collecting revenues. In the second
stage (t = 2) firm learns the true value for the maximum reservation price W , decides about
introducing a versioned product of nonprice attributes (q2, z2), and prices both products at
p1, p2 respectively. As a result, the firm needs to choose its product portfolio such that its
16Quality upgrades are not possible for t > 1, since e.g., the development team has been disbanded or upfront
costs to restart significant quality improvements are prohibitive. The firm has never an incentive to change the
horizontal nonprice attribute of the flagship product, z1 = 0.
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Figure 5.5: Optimal Modes of Ex-Ante Differentiation for Versioning Cost (αH , αV ) ≥ 0.
ex-ante expected profits achieve
Π¯∗∗ = max
q1
{
E
[
max {Π∗V (q1;W ),Π∗H(q1;W )}
]}
(5.20)
instead of the Π¯∗ = max{Π¯∗V , Π¯∗H} it obtains under ex-ante versioning according to Proposi-
tion 5.3. We solve this problem in stages, beginning with the second stage.
5.4.1 Optimal Ex-Post Versioning
Assume the firm has observed the realization of W and has decided about the quality q1 of
its flagship product. As in Section 5.3, it is possible to differentiate the versioned product
either vertically (z2 = 0) or horizontally (z2 = 1), provided that its quality does not exceed
the flagship product’s, i.e., q1 ≥ q2 (cf. footnote 16). Alternately the firm has the option not
to introduce a vertically versioned product at all.17
17The firm could also reprice the first product out of the market (p1 ≥ W ) while vertically versioning a
second, which is, however, strictly inferior if versioning cost αV is positive. If the firm does not introduce the
second product at all, then it needs to solve maxp′1∈[0,W ] p
′
1(W − p′1)min{1, q1 − p′1}, with solution p′∗1 that can
be obtained by replacing W with 3W/4 in (5.21). Note that the firm does not incur versioning cost, so that at
least for large αV not introducing a second product is optimal, given that vertical differentiation is considered.
If on the other hand αV = 0 (or αV > 0, but small enough), then introducing the versioned product in the
second round is clearly dominant, since it can always be achieved as a special case by setting p2 = 0.
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Pure Vertical Differentiation. Consider the case when z2 = 0 and the resulting portfolio
contains two products. Without loss of generality we can assume that u∗1 = u∗2 = q1− p∗1, since
– as long as they are free – larger values for u weakly increase profits. The profit-maximization
problem becomes
max
p1,p2
ΠV (p1, p2; q1,W ) = max
p1,p2
{
p1(W − p1) + p2(p1 − p2)
W
min {1, q1 − p1} − βq1
}
with solution equivalent to that of the ex-ante versioning problem, as long as q1 is large
enough so that full horizontal coverage holds. If on the other hand q1 is small compared to
the realization W , then horizontal coverage will not be full and product breadth is traded for
the ability to charge high prices. In other words, “transportation costs” for consumers with
significant misfit will be too high to buy any of the products. More specifically we obtain
(p∗2, q∗2) = (p∗1/2, q1 − p∗1/2), and
p∗1 =

2W/3, if q1 ≥ 1 + 2W/3,
q1 − 1, if q1 ∈ [q¯V (W ), 1 + 2W/3],(
4W + 3q1 −
√
(4W − 3q1)2 + 12Wq1
)
/9, otherwise,
(5.21)
where q¯V (W ) =
(
6 + 2W −√9 + 4W 2
)
/3 ∈ [1,min{2, 1 + 2W/3}]. From this one can derive
an expression for the optimal profits as a function of q1,
Π∗V (q1;W ) =

W/3− βq1, if q1 ≥ 1 + 2W/3,
(q1 − 1)
(
1− 3(q1 − 1)
4W
)
− βq1, if q1 ∈ [q¯V (W ), 1 + 2W/3],
p∗1
(
1− 3p
∗
1
4W
)
(q1 − p∗1)− βq1. otherwise,
(5.22)
Note that due to the cost complementarities a versioned product will always be introduced
as long as versioning cost αV are small enough. The development cost for the flagship prod-
uct is already sunk and a second product can then only increase profits (at least as long as
αV , αH are small enough). It is straightforward to show that for anyW > 0 the profit function
Π∗V (q1;W ) is continuously differentiable in q1 > 0 with ∂q1Π
∗
V (0) = ∂q1Π
∗
V (1+2W/3)) = −β <
∂q1Π
∗
V (q¯V ) =
(√
4W 2 + 9− 3
)
/(2W ) − β. In addition, the state-contingent profit function
Π∗V has at most one maximum in q1 > 0 but is generally not quasiconcave.
18
Horizontal Differentiation (Including Mixed). When deciding to horizontally differ-
entiate, the firm chooses z2 = 1 and then needs to decide about p1, p2 and q2 = u2 + p2 ≤
18It is also locally maximal at q1 = 0, as ∂q1Π¯
∗
V |q1=0 = −β < 0.
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u1 + p1 = q1. As in the ex-ante versioning problem (cf. Section 5.3) there are two general
cases, “separation” and “overlap.” The details of the overlap case, which is synonymous with
“horizontal product cannibalization,” are discussed in the Appendix, where analytical solu-
tions are provided. Under delayed differentiation it is indeed sometimes best to horizontally
cannibalize products, whereas this is never optimal under ex-ante versioning (Proposition 5.5).
Indepedent of the versioning costs it is never optimal to version along both horizontal and
vertical attributes at the same time.19
There are four possible configurations that all exhibit horizontal separation, depending on
how large the quality q1 is with respect to the demand realization W : (i) if q1 ≥ 1 +W/2
(i.e., q1 − p1 ≥ 1), given separation there is just one product and p∗1 = W/2 analogous to the
single-product firm. (ii) If 1/2 ≤ q1 − p1 = 1− (q2 − p2) < 1, then
(p∗1, p
∗
2) = argmaxp1,p2
{
p1(W − p1)(q1 − p1)
2W
+
p2(W − p2)(1− q1 + p1)
2W
− βq1
}
=
(
W
2
,
W
2
)
,
for q1 ∈ [(1+W )/2, 1+W/2]. Note that in this case q∗2 = 1+W − q1 resulting in mixed differ-
entiation without price dispersion. (iii) If q1 ∈ [q¯H(W ), (1 +W )/2], then p∗1 = p∗2 = q1 − 1/2,
and q∗2 = q1 (pure horizontal differentiation). Thereby q¯H(W ) =
(
2 +W −√1 +W 2
)
/2 ∈
[1/2,min{1, (1 +W )/2}]. (iv) If q1 − p1 < 1 − (q2 − p2) (equivalent to q1 − p1 < 1/2), then
p1 = p2 and q1 = q2, since the situation is symmetric (pure horizontal differentiation). We
have
p∗1 = argmaxp1
{
p1(W − p1)(q1 − p1)
W
− βq1
}
=
(
W + q1 −
√
(W − q1)2 +Wq1
)
/3, (5.23)
for q1 < q¯H(W ). Summarizing these results we obtain
Π∗H1(q1;W ) =

W/4− βq1, if q1 ≥ (1 +W )/2,
(q1 − 1/2) (1− (q1 − 1/2)/W )− βq1, if q1 ∈ [q¯H , (1 +W )/2],
2p∗1(1− p∗1/W )(q1 − p∗1)− βq1, otherwise.
(5.24)
Note that in the case of realizations W such that q1 ∈ [(1 +W )/2, 1 +W/2] the firm would
use mixed versioning; however, the following proposition shows that this is never optimal.
Analogous to the pure-vertical-versioning case, it can be shown that the profit function ΠH1 is
continuously differentiable and has at most one maximum in q1 > 0.
19This finding is somewhat driven by the quasi-linearity of the model in preferences and the assumption
that the consumers are uniformly distributed. Including nonlinearities in the consumers’ preferences interior
solutions favoring simultaneous differentiation along more than one attribute cannot be ruled out.
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Figure 5.6: Optimal Cumulative Profits as a Function of q1 and W (for β = .1, S = [1, 2]).
Proposition 5.5 (i) For any given realization of W in S, either pure horizontal or pure
vertical differentiation is optimal. (ii) Horizontal product cannibalization (overlap) may be
optimal for certain “intermediate” realizations of W .
Horizontal overlap in the product portfolio is most likely to be useful if the support S
of demand realizations is such that for low states W vertical differentiation is optimal while
for high states horizontal separation is best. Note that in the presence of horizontal product
cannibalization, there generally is price dispersion (cf. the details on the overlap case in the
Appendix).
Effect of Versioning Costs. As a consequence of Proposition 5.5 mixed versioning cost,
αM ≥ αH , αV , will never be incurred. With perfect ex-ante information about W , the effect
of versioning cost is of course adequately displayed in Figure 5.5 with Wˆ replaced by W . In
the presence of uncertainty, the optimal policy depends on the magnitudes and the difference
between αV and αH as these influence the attractiveness of one versioning mode over the other
and of product-line extensions overall.
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Figure 5.7: Optimal Modes of Ex-Post Differentiation (for β = .1, S = [1, 2]).
5.4.2 The Product Development Decision
In the first stage of the versioning problem with delayed differentiation the firm decides about
the appropriate development effort (i.e., investment in product quality q∗∗1 ) by solving prob-
lem (5.20). As pointed out in Section 5.1, irreversibilities in investments lead firms to value the
option of delaying commitment (Weisbrod 1964, McDonald and Siegel 1986, Pindyck 1988).
Under delayed differentiation in the presence of demand uncertainty the marginal value of qual-
ity may be higher than under ex-ante versioning where an adaptation of the product portfolio
to the realization of the uncertain demand is not possible.
Proposition 5.6 If the optimal ex-post versioning policy is not state-contingent, i.e., the
mode of differentiation does not depend on W , then the optimal ex-ante investment q∗∗1 is
characterized by20
q∗∗1 = 1 +
2
3
∫ W2(q∗∗1 )
W1(q∗∗1 )
f(w)dw − β +
∫ s¯
W2(q∗∗1 )
p∗1(w)
(
1− 3p
∗
1(w)
4w
)
f(w)dw∫ W2(q∗∗1 )
W1(q∗∗1 )
f(w)
w
dw
(5.25)
20It is clear that horizontal differentiation with overlap can never be the result of a non-state-contingent
versioning policy.
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for pure vertical differentiation (with s¯ = max{S}, W1 = 3 (q∗∗1 − 1) /2, q¯V (W2) = q∗∗1 , and p∗1
as in (5.21) for w =W ), and
q∗∗1 =
1
2
+
∫ W2(q∗∗1 )
W1(q∗∗1 )
f(w)dw − β + 2
∫ s¯
W2(q∗∗1 )
p∗1(w)
(
1− p
∗
1(w)
w
)
f(w)dw
2
∫ W2(q∗∗1 )
W1(q∗∗1 )
f(w)
w
dw
(5.26)
for horizontal differentiation without overlap (with s¯ as above, W1 = 2q∗∗1 − 1, q¯H1(W2) = q∗∗1 ,
and p∗1 as in (5.23) for w =W ).
If the uncertainty about the demand characteristicW is low, then [W1,W2]∩S = S, so that
the expressions (5.25) and (5.26) are identical to the optimal ex-ante quality choice q∗1 under
vertical and horizontal differentiation respectively (cf. Section 5.3.2). If the development cost
β is zero, then clearly it is optimal to vertically version and choose q∗∗1 = 1 + 2s¯/3, a quality
larger than the ex-ante optimal quality of q∗1 = 1 + 2Wˆ/3 for β = 0, since uncertainty about
demand implies uncertainty about the optimal pricing of the product portfolio. Hence, even
if quality can be provided at an arbitrarily small positive cost, a firm lacking the flexibility to
version and to reprice according to observed demand will generally limit its flagship product’s
quality.
Example. For state-contingent versioning policies a firm’s investment in product develop-
ment does not necessarily increase. Consider the case when the support S is finite containing
only the positive elements WL = 2 and WH = 4, which correspond to a “low” and “high”
demand realization respectively. The probability of high demand is denoted by piH and the
development cost is β = 1/4. Thus the ex-ante demand estimator is Wˆ = 4/ (2− piH), which
satisfies the viability condition (5.19) for all piH ∈ [0, 1]. For Wˆ less than 6β/(1 − β)2 = 8/3
(i.e., piH < 1/2) the firm decides ex-ante to horizontally version, whereas for piH > 1/2 ver-
tical versioning is optimal. Under delayed differentiation the firm prefers to not commit to
any particular mode of differentiation for a large range of intermediate piH ’s. In the case of
a “surprisingly” high realization of demand the ex-ante quality choice is relatively too small
so that horizontal versioning is optimal. The converse is true for a low demand realization,
when it is better to vertically version in order to make use of the “unexpectedly” high flagship
quality. Figure 5.8 shows that the firm’s development effort (proportional to q1) may go both
up or down with delayed differentiation as a result of actively using its added flexibility in the
form of a state-contingent horizontal-vertical versioning policy.
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Figure 5.8: Optimal Choice of q1 under Ex-Ante Versioning and under Delayed Differentiation
(for β = 1/4, S = {2, 4}).
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Value of Perfect Information. The expected value of perfect information (EVPI) about
the demand under ex-ante versioning is simply the difference between ex-ante optimal profit
evaluated atW (in expectation) and evalutated at Wˆ respectively: EVPI(ex-ante versioning) =
EΠ∗(W )−Π∗(Wˆ ), where
Π∗(W ) =

W (1− β)2/3− β, if W ≥ 6β/(1− β)2,
W (1− β)2/4− β/2, if W ∈ [2β/(1− β)2, 6β/(1− β)2] ,
0, otherwise.
Clearly EVPI is an upper bound for the value of the option to delay differentiation (Conrad
1980). It is generally not monotonic in the development cost β, as the way in which information
alters the versioning decision depends on the firm’s default no-information versioning policy.
Value of the Option to Delay Differentiation. The option value of not having to
commit to the product portfolio ex ante is given by Vd = Π¯∗∗ − Π¯∗. This value must be zero
for large values of β, since both Π¯∗∗ and Π¯∗ are tightly bounded from below by zero and are
strictly decreasing (and continuous) in β.
Proposition 5.7 (i) The value of the option to delay differentiation, Vd(β), is locally maximal
at β ∈
{
0,
(
3 + Wˆ −
√
9 + 6Wˆ
)
/Wˆ
}
. (ii) Its slope with respect to the development cost β
is given almost everywhere by the difference of the optimal flagship qualities without and with
delayed differentiation,
∂βVd
a.e.= q∗1 − q∗∗1 . (5.27)
(iii) The option value is zero for large β’s.
Development costs in which the firm is ex ante indifferent between vertical and horizontal
versioning make the option to delay decisions about the composition of the product portfolio
particularly valuable. A state-contingent policy specifying the mode of differentiation as a
function of the realized demand clearly outperforms the noncontingent ex-ante decision. In
particular, the value of flexibility is generally non-monotonic in quality cost, it depends on the
way in which a deviation from the firm’s default ex-ante strategy influences expected profits.
Varying the development cost, the option value varies proportional to the difference q∗1 − q∗∗1 ,
which can be positive and negative. Figure 5.9 depicts the option value our previous two-state
example (with S = {WL,WH}) together with the expected value of perfect information as a
function of β.
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Figure 5.9: Expected Value of Perfect Information (EVPI) and Value of the Option to Delay
Differentiation (Vd) as a Function of the Development Cost β (for S = {2, 4}, piH = .5).
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Mode of Differentiation Consumer Surplus [uk = qk − pk, δ = p1 − p2]
Vertical W−p2
W
(u1 −min{u1, 1}/2)min{u1, 1}
Horizontal (Separation) W−p1
W
(
u1 −min{u1, 12}/2
)
min{u1, 12}
Horizontal (Overlap) W−p1
W
(
u1 − 1−δ4
)
1−δ
2
+ W−p2
W
(
u2 − 1+δ4
)
1+δ
2
+ δ
W
(
u2 − min{u2,1}2
)
min{u2, 1}
Table 5.1: Expected Consumer Surplus Given a Two-Element Product Portfolio Ω.
5.4.3 Effects on Consumer Surplus
Consumer surplus depends directly on the firm’s product portfolio and can be directly deter-
mined from the set Ω = {(pk, qk, zk)}k=1,2.
Proposition 5.8 (i) Given a demand realization W and the firm’s product portfolio Ω, the
consumer surplus is given in Table 5.1. (ii) Under ex-ante optimal versioning, the expected
consumer surplus is given by
CS =

(2 + β)/6, if β ≤ β′,
(1 + β)/8, if Wˆ ∈ [β′, β′′] ,
0, otherwise,
(5.28)
where β′ =
(
3 + Wˆ −
√
9 + 6Wˆ
)
/Wˆ and β′′ =
(
1 + Wˆ −
√
1 + 2Wˆ
)
/Wˆ .
The first part of Proposition 5.8 describes how consumer surplus can be determined from
the results in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2. The second part shows that under ex-ante differentiation
consumer surplus is piecewise linearly increasing in β. At the points of discontinuity β′ and
β′′, where the first mode of differentiation changes and then the firm decides not to enter
the market, consumer surplus drastically decreases. For each given versioning mode, consumer
surplus is increasing in β because the firm needs compensates its decreasing quality investment
by reducing price so as to ensure a large participation. In fact, expected market penetration21
increases between two and four times faster than consumer surplus.
As shown above, the firm generally values versioning flexibility which may both increase
or decrease the optimal ex-ante quality investment depending on the no-information default
strategy. Interestingly, the increased profitability of the firm’s investment does not always
imply a decrease in consumer surplus. For low development cost, the benefits of the higher
flagship quality may outweigh the firm’s improved ability to screen the consumer base, leading
21Expected market penetration under ex-ante versioning is (1+β)/2 ∈ [1/2, 1] for a horizontally and (2+β)/3 ∈
[2/3, 1] for a vertically differentiated optimal product portfolio.
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Figure 5.10: Consumer Surplus (CS) as a Function of the Development Cost β (for S = {2, 4},
piH = .5).
for low β’s to a higher consumer surplus under delayed differentiation than under ex-ante
versioning (cf. Figure 5.10).
5.4.4 Generalization to Goods with Positive Marginal Costs
A generalization of virtually all results in this paper to goods with positive marginal costs
c > 0 can be achieved via a simple variable transformation. The only restrictive assumption
is that the marginal costs for both goods be the same. This is realistic for many products,
and especially those where the actual versioning decision can be taken far downstream in the
supply chain (Anand and Mendelson 1998), e.g., by the retailer. Replacing the prices pk in
Section 5.3 by the markups mk = pk − c (for k = 1, 2), together with using the constants
Wˆc = Wˆ − c and βc = βWˆ/
(
Wˆ − c
)
is enough for all profit-maximization problems under
ex-ante versioning to carry over to the case with c > 0. Under delayed differentiation the same
change of variables can be used, only that the estimator Wˆ needs to be replaced by the actual
demand realization W . In addition, the firm needs to consider q′1 = q1 − c for its second-stage
versioning decision. Again all of the maximizers can be simply recovered by substituting the
new constants. The overall effect of these transformations is that positive marginal costs are
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equivalent to increasing the development costs and also add an additional fixed cost of entry
changing the firm’s viability requirements for market entry.
5.5 Conclusion and Further Research
Even when a company can extend its product line by varying horizontal and vertical attributes
of a flagship product, it is – given our assumptions of quasilinear preferences and homogeneous
consumer distribution – not optimal to do both at the same time.22 This finding is independent
of the versioning cost structure, as long as αM ≥ αV , αH . Nevertheless, under delayed differ-
entiation the firm’s optimal versioning policy contingent on the demand realization generally
incorporates both modes of differentiation. For low demand realizations it is best to differen-
tiate vertically adding a product of degraded quality to the then relatively high-performance
flagship product to more adequately segment the consumer base by maintaining full horizontal
market coverage. This can be accomplished by deliberately “damaging” the flagship product
(Deneckere and McAfee 1996). On the other hand, for (unexpectedly) large demand realiza-
tions horizontal differentiation is generally superior, since the effective flagship product quality
may not be high enough to guarantee full horizontal market coverage. For intermediate real-
izations of demand horizontal product cannibalization may be the best compromise. The latter
generally implies price dispersion for products of equal quality. Despite the quite general in-
sight from option theory that added flexibility usually leads to an increase of a firm’s ex-ante
investment which has become “less irreversible,” we find that for multiattribute versioning the
opposite may be true. Optimal upfront product development efforts may decrease, if due to the
possibility of delayed differentiation a policy contingent on the demand state becomes optimal.
This result is driven by the nonconvexity of the problem, horizontal and vertical differentiation
yielding locally optimal profits.23
Examining the option value of delayed differentiation further we show that it contains a
local maximum at the point of ex-ante indifference between the versioning modes, and that it
naturally vanishes for very high product development costs. The effect of delayed differentiation
on consumer surplus is mixed. Under ex-ante versioning consumer surplus heavily depends on
22This finding cannot be expected to hold for product portfolios with more than two products, the treatment
of which in our framework poses significant analytical difficulties. It is also not necessarily what is observed in
practice (cf. footnote 1).
23From a technical point of view, the maximizer (i.e., the “optimal policy”) is upper hemicontinuous, es-
sentially as a consequence of the continuity of the objective function. This is guaranteed by Berge’s (1959)
maximum theorem.
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the mode of differentiation used and for each mode is monotonically increasing in the firm’s
development cost, as the firm tends to compensate an increase in quality cost β by lowering
price and thereby enlarging the consumer base. If differentiation is delayed the versioning
modes switch at different points so that effects on consumer surplus are ambiguous. Overall
it tends to decrease as the firm’s ability to make effective pricing and product-line-extension
decisions greatly increases.
Future research could proceed along the following three promising axes: (1) extend the
approach to more than two products. One of the main challenges here is that the poten-
tially multiple overlaps are hard to capture analytically; (2) admit more general cost functions
and demand distributions; and (3) incorporate competitive dynamics into the multiattribute
versioning decision.
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5.7 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 5.1. (i) This part is trivial. (ii) The probability density of W is by
assumption given by the Lebesgue-measurable function f ∈ L1(S). Thus we have using Fubini’s
theorem:
W¯
Wˆ
=
(∫
S
xf(x) dx
)(∫
S
f(y)
y
dy
)
=
∫
S×S
x
y
f(x)f(y) d(x, y)
=
∫
S×S
1
2
(
x
y
+
y
x
)
f(x)f(y) d(x, y)
>
∫
S×S
f(x)f(y) d(x, y) = 1,
since (x/y + y/x)/2 > 1 for all x, y > 0 with x 6= y. Note that the set of points (x, y)  0
where x = y is of measure zero in S × S, so that the strict inequality is warranted. 
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Proof of Proposition 5.3. (i) Since there is no overlap, the expected profits under horizontal
differentiation (5.16) are under separation
Π¯H1(p1, p2) =
1
2Wˆ
(
p1(Wˆ − p1)(1− p1 + p2) + p2(Wˆ − p2)(1 + p1 − p2)
)
− β(1 + p1 + p2)/2.
Note that Π¯H1(p1, p2) = Π¯H1(p2, p1) and therefore, if there is an asymmetric maximizer, there
must be at least two of them. Hence, without loss of generality, assume that p1 ≥ p2. Let us
now introduce the variable δ = p1 − p2 ∈ [0, 1], which leads to the problem of maximizing
Π¯H1(p2 + δ, p2) = −
p22
Wˆ
+
(
1− β − δ(1− δ)
Wˆ
)
p2 +
1
2
(
δ(1− δ)
(
1− δ
Wˆ
)
− β(1 + δ)
)
with respect to p2 ∈ [0, Wˆ ] and δ ∈ [0, 1], subject to the additional constraint 0 ≤ p2+ δ ≤ Wˆ .
Neglecting the latter constraint, the first-order condition with respect to p2 is ∂p2Π¯H1(p2 +
δ, p2) = −2p2Wˆ +1− β −
δ(1−δ)
Wˆ
= 0, which yields p∗2(δ) =
Wˆ
2 (1− β)− δ(1−δ)2 ≤ Wˆ2 (1− β). Thus,
Π¯H1(p
∗
2(δ) + δ, p
∗
2(δ)) =
Wˆ
4
(1− β)2 − β
2
− δ
2
4Wˆ
(
1− δ2 + 2βWˆ
)
≤ Wˆ
4
(1− β)2 − β
2
.
The equal sign in the last inequality holds, iff δ = 0. The unique maximizers of the original
maximization in the “separation” case, now satisfying all of the above constraints, are p∗1 =
p∗2 =
Wˆ
2 (1− β), yielding optimal profits
Π¯∗H1 =
Wˆ
4
(1− β)2 − β
2
= Π¯∗1 +
β
2
. (5.29)
These profits are by the amount β/2 larger than profits for the single-product monopoly and
are positive (i.e., viable), iff
Wˆ >
2β
(1− β)2 . (5.30)
In particular, a multiproduct monopolist firm can substitute horizontal differentiation for a
quality increase, and thereby save on cost (provided that αH < β/2).
(ii) When there is overlap, the expected profit function (5.16) becomes
Π¯H2(p1, p2) =
1
2Wˆ
(
p1(Wˆ − p1)(1− p1 + p2) + p2(Wˆ − p2)(1 + p1 − p2)
+max{p1(p2 − p1), p2(p1 − p2)}(1− p1 + p2)
)
− β(1 + p2).
Note that the single-product monopoly profits Π¯∗1 are attained for p1 = p2 and p1 = p2+1. As
pointed out above, p1 ≥ p2. Let us again introduce δ = p1 − p2 ∈ [0, 1]. Then
Π¯H2(p2 + δ, p2) = −
p22
Wˆ
+
(
1− β − δ(1− δ)
2Wˆ
)
p2 +
δ(1− δ)
2
(
1− δ
Wˆ
)
− β.
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The first-order condition with respect to p2, ∂p2Π¯H2(p2+ δ, p2) = 0, yields p
∗
2(δ) =
Wˆ
2 (1−β)−
δ(1−δ)
4 , and therefore
Π¯H2(p
∗
2(δ) + δ, p
∗
2(δ)) =
Wˆ
4
(1− β)2 − β − δ(1− δ)
16Wˆ
(
δ2 + 7δ − 4Wˆ (1 + β)
)
= Π¯∗1 +
δ(1− δ)
16Wˆ
(δ − δ−) (δ+ − δ) , (5.31)
where δ± =
(
−7±
√
49 + 16Wˆ (1 + β)
)
/2. It is δ− < 0 < δ+, and therefore Π¯∗H2 in expres-
sion (5.31) is greater than Π¯∗1, iff 0 < δ < min{δ+, 1}. The following lemma helps establishing
that the optimal profit Π¯∗H2 is strictly inferior to max{Π¯∗H1 , Π¯∗V }. In other words, if pure hori-
zontal differentiation is superior to pure vertical differentiation, then separation will maximize
profits.
Lemma 5.2 Let the parameters 0 < β < 1 and Wˆ > 0 be given. Then for any δ ∈ [0, 1]:
δ(1− δ)(δ − δ−)(δ+ − δ) < max{8βWˆ , (2Wˆ (1− β))2/3}. (5.32)
Proof. Let δ¯ = min{1, δ+}. As the RHS of (5.32) is always positive, we can limit ourselves
to δ ∈ I = [0, δ¯] for which the LHS is nonnegative. Set f(δ) to be equal to the LHS of (5.32).
Since f is a polynomial with a set of roots {δ−, 0, δ+, 1}, where δ− < 0 < δ¯, it is
max
δ∈I
|f ′(δ)| = max{f ′(0),−f ′(δ¯)}.
More specifically, by the mean value theorem and the fact that f ′′|I < 0, for all δ ∈ I:
f(δ) ≤ min{f ′(0) · δ,−f ′(δ¯)(δ¯ − δ)} ≤ −f
′(δ¯)f ′(0) · δ¯
f ′(0)− f ′(δ¯) . (5.33)
Thereby f ′(0) = −δ−δ+ and −f ′(δ¯) = max{δ+(δ+− δ−)(1− δ+), (1− δ−)(δ+−1)}. Let us first
consider the case when δ¯ = 1, or equivalently
Wˆ (1 + β) ≥ 2. (5.34)
Then by (5.33)
f(δ) ≤ −δ−δ+(1− δ−)(δ+ − 1)−δ−δ+ + (1− δ−)(δ+ − 1) =
16Wˆ (1 + β)
(
Wˆ (1 + β)− 2
)
4Wˆ (1 + β) + 4
(
Wˆ (1 + β)− 2
) = 2Wˆ (1 + β)
(
Wˆ (1 + β)− 2
)
Wˆ (1 + β)− 1 .
(5.35)
One can verify by straightforward manipulations that the RHS of (5.35) is less than 8βWˆ , iff
Wˆ (1− 3β) < 21− β
1 + β
,
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which establishes inequality (5.32) for all
(β, Wˆ ) ∈ D1 =
{
(β˘, W˘ ) : 0 < β˘ <
1
3
, W˘ <
1− β˘
(1 + β˘)(1− 3β˘)
}
∪
(
[1/3, 1)× (0,∞)
)
.
On the other hand, one can verify that the RHS of (5.35) is less than
(
2Wˆ (1− β)
)2
/3, iff
2
1 + β
+
2
3
(1− β)2
1 + β
Wˆ 2 −
(
2
3
(
1− β
1 + β
)2
+ 1
)
Wˆ > 0. (5.36)
Restricting β to the interval (0, 1/3], inequality (5.36) is satisfied, if
3+(1−β)2Wˆ 2−
(
(1− β)2
1 + β
+
3
2
(1 + β)
)
Wˆ ≥ 3+
[
2
3
(1− β)Wˆ −
(
(1− β)2
1 + β
+
3
2
(1 + β)
)]
Wˆ > 0.
The expression in square brackets can be further minorized by setting β = 1/3, based on the
fact that the derivative of that expression with respect to β,
−4
3
1
1 + β
− 4
3
1− β
(1 + β)2
+ 2
1− β
1 + β
+
(1− β)2
(1 + β)2
− 3
2
is negative on (0, 1/3]. In particular,
3 + Wˆ
[
2
3
(1− β)Wˆ −
(
(1− β)2
1 + β
+
3
2
(1 + β)
)]
β=1/3
=
1
9
(Wˆ − 3)(4Wˆ − 9) > 0
implies (5.32) for all (β, Wˆ ) ∈ D2 = (0, 1/3] × ((0, 9/4) ∪ (3,∞)). Alternatively one can
minorize the RHS of (5.36) by substituting
Wˆ =
2(1− β)2 + 3(1 + β)2
4(1− β)2(1 + β) ,
its unique minimizer. Relation (5.36) is satisfied for a given β ∈ (0, 1/3) and all Wˆ > 0, if
23β4 − 20β3 − 150β2 − 20β + 23 > 0.
The last polynomial has the set of approximate roots {−2.0221,−.4945, .3269, 3.0593}, so
that (5.32) follows for (β, Wˆ ) ∈ D3 = (0, 3/10)× (0,∞). Since D1 ∪D2 ∪D3 = (0, 1)× (0,∞),
we have indeed shown that (5.32) holds for all relevant24 (β, Wˆ ) whenever δ¯ = 1. Let us now
examine the case when δ¯ = δ+ < 1 or in other words
0 < Wˆ <
2
1 + β
. (5.37)
24Note that δ¯ = 1 is equivalent to (5.34), which slightly restricts the relevant domain of (β, Wˆ ) to a subset of
(0, 1)× (0,∞).
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Using (5.33) write
f(δ) ≤ −δ−δ
3
+(δ+ − δ−)(1− δ+)
−δ−δ+ + δ+(δ+ − δ−)(1− δ+) <
δ2+(δ+ − δ−)(1− δ+)
2− δ+
=
1
4
√
49 + 16η
(−9 +√49 + 16η) (−7 +√49 + 16η)2
−11 +√49 + 16η , (5.38)
where η = Wˆ (1 + β) and by (5.37) it is 0 < η < 2. Straightforward computations yield that
expression (5.38) is less than 8βWˆ = 8η(1− 1/(1 + β)), iff
(β, η) ∈ E1 =
{
(β˘, η˘) : 0 < β˘ < R1(η˘), 0 < η˘ < 2
}
, (5.39)
where
R1(η) =
(
2η3 − 153η2 − 537η − 294)−1(2η3 + 279η2 + 306η − 1764 +√49 + 16η (15η + 12η2 − 294)
+
[
4032η5 + 70620η4 − 91110η3 − 1744848η2 − 444528η + 7260624
+
√
49 + 16η
(
48η5 + 6756η4 + 14538η3 − 197208η2 − 232848η + 1037232) ]1/2) .
On the other hand, expression (5.38) is less than (2Wˆ (1+β))2/3 = 4η2
(
1− 4/(1 + β) + 4/(1 + β)2) /3,
iff
(β, η) ∈ E2 =
{
(β˘, η˘) : R2(η˘) < β˘ < 1, 0 < η˘ < 2
}
, (5.40)
where
R2(η) =
√
49 + 16η (23η + 98)− 16η2 − 273η − 686
16η2 + 295η + 686−√49 + 16η (25η + 98) .
Since R1(η) > R2(η) for all 0 < η < 2, it is E1 ∪E2 = (0, 1)× (0, 2), and therefore (5.32) holds
also for the case that δ¯ = δ+, which concludes the proof of Lemma 5.2. 
As mentioned before, based on Lemma 5.2 as well as (5.10), (5.29), and (5.31) pure hori-
zontal differentiation in the overlap mode is strictly dominated by either pure vertical differ-
entiation or pure horizontal differentiation in the separation mode. This concludes the proof
of Proposition 5.3. 
Proof of Proposition 5.4. (i) For zero versioning costs, condition (5.19) is necessary and
sufficient, since the viability domains of single-product, pure vertical differentiation, and mixed
differentiation are subsets of the region of positive profits for pure horizontal differentiation in
separation mode, given precisely by (5.19). Thus, if the latter condition is satisfied there exists
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ε > 0 such that αH ∈ [0, ε] is small enough for the resulting profits to be positive. (ii) This
is an immediate consequence of (5.19) being necessary and sufficient for viability under zero
versioning costs. (iii) From Wˆ ∈ (2β/(1 − β)2, 4β/(1 − β)2) it follows that a single-product
monopoly is not viable according to (5.7), while at the same time (5.19) is satisfied. 
Details on the Horizontal-Overlap Case under Delayed Differentiation. Since q1 ≥ q2
we have that necessarily p1 ≥ p2, which generally implies price dispersion for goods of equal
quality. In the following it it useful to distinguish three cases. (i) If q1−p2 < 1, then q1−p1 < 1
and q2 − p2 < 1. We can conclude that p1, p2 ∈ [q1 − 1, q1] or in other words that p1 − p2 < 1.
Thus q1 = q2 (pure horizontal differentiation). The profit-maximization problem is
(p1, p2) = argmax
p1,p2
{
W − p1
2W
(
p1 + p2 − (p1 − p2)2
)
+
p2(p1 − p2)(q1 − p2)
W
}
. (5.41)
Setting δ = p1 − p2 ∈ [0, 1] it is possible to rewrite the profit function as
ΠH2(p2 + δ, δ) =
(W − p2 − δ) (2p2 − δ(1− δ)) + 2p2δ(q1 − p2)
2W
− βq1.
Any interior extremum satisfies the necessary optimality condition for p2, from which we obtain
p∗2(δ) =
2W + δ (2(q1 − 1)− (1− δ))
4(1 + δ)
.
By substituting this expression, the profit function ΠH2 can be expressed as a function of δ
only, and the first-order condition with respect to δ is
aδ4 + bδ3 + cδ2 + dδ + e = 0, (5.42)
with a = 27/16, b = (q1 + 3)/2 −W , c = (q21 − 5W )/4 − 17/16, d = (q21 − 3q1 +W )/2 + 1/8,
and e = −W (W + 1 − 2q1)/4. To analytically find the roots of this fourth-order polynomial
we follow Bronshtein and Semendyayev (1997). Substituting y = δ + b/(4a), equation (5.42)
can be written equivalently in the reduced form
y4 + Py2 +Qy +R = 0, (5.43)
where P = (c/a)−3b2/ (8a2), Q = d/a−cb/a2+b3/ (8a3), and R = e/a+(cb2/16− db/4) /a2−
3b4/
(
256a4
)
. The solution behavior of (5.43) depends on the behavior of its cubic resolvent,
z3 + 2Pz2 + (P 2 − 4R)z −Q2 = 0,
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the roots of which are all real25 and given by zk = 2ρ cos (ϕ/3 + 2(k − 1)pi/3), for k = 1, 2, 3,
with ρ =
√
4P 2 − 3Q/3 and ϕ = arccos ((2P (P 2 − 4R)/3 +Q2 − 16P 3/27) / (2ρ3)). From
this, the roots of the reduced-form polynomial in (5.43) can be computed to
y1 = (
√
z1 +
√
z2 −√z3) /2,
y2 = (
√
z1 −√z2 +√z3) /2,
y3 = (
√
z1 +
√
z2 +
√
z3) /2,
y4 = (
√
z1 −√z2 −√z3) /2,
and a local maximizer of ΠH2(p
∗
2(δ) + δ, p
∗
2(δ)) is
δ∗ = y1 − b4a, (5.44)
as the second-order condition is satisfied at that point.26
(ii) If q1 − p2 ≥ 1, then the optimization problem is
(p1, p2) = argmax
p1,p2
{
p1(W − p1)(1− p1 + p2)
2W
+
p2(p1 − p2)
W
+
p2(W − p1)(1 + p1 − p2)
2W
}
= argmax
p1,p2
{
W − p1
2
(
p1 + p2 − (p1 − p2)2
)
+ p2(p1 − p2)
}
. (5.45)
The quality q2 is actually indeterminate in [1 + p2, q1], but without loss of generality we set
q2 = q1 (which is true for even very small versioning cost). Note that p1 − p2 ≤ 1, otherwise
there is only one product. Also, this case is equivalent to the corresponding ex-ante versioning
situation for β = 0. Introducing δ = p1 − p2 ∈ [0, 1], we obtain
ΠH2(p2 + δ, δ) =
(W − p2 − δ)
(
2p2 + δ − δ2
)
+ 2p2δ
2W
− βq1.
Assuming that there is an interior extremum the first-order condition with respect to p2 is
2W − 4p2 − δ(1− δ) = 0,
so that p∗(δ) = W/2 − δ(1 − δ)/4. The resulting expression for the profits under horizontal
versioning with overlap is
ΠH2(δ) =
W
4
− βq1 + δ(1− δ)(δ − δ−)(δ+ − δ)16W , (5.46)
25This follows from the fact that the discriminant ∆ =
(
(P 2 − 4R− 4P 2/3)/3)3 +(
16P 3/27− 2P (P 2 − 4R)/3−Q2)2 /4 is negative in the relevant domain, which can be verified numeri-
cally.
26An analytical test of the second-order condition is complicated, but it can be readily verified numerically.
CHAPTER 5. MULTIATTRIBUTE PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 112
where δ± =
(−7±√16W + 49) /2. The first-order condition with respect to δ is then
δ3 +
9
2
δ2 −
(
2W +
7
2
)
δ +W = 0. (5.47)
Using the cardanic formula to solve the cubic equation (5.47) it turns out that for any W
there are three real roots, of which only one is associated with an interior maximum of the
fourth-order polynomial at (5.46),
δ∗(W ) =
√
8W + 41
3
sin
(
pi
6
− 1
3
arccos
(
48(W + 3)√
(8W + 41)3/3
))
− 3
2
. (5.48)
It is δ∗(W ) ∈ [0, 1/2] strictly increasing in W with δ∗(0) = 0 and limW→∞ δ∗(W ) = 1/2.
(iii) In the intermediary case with binding constraint, q1 − p2 = 1, the optimization problem
is identical to (5.45), subject to p2 = q1 − 1,
ΠH2(δ) =
(W − (q1 − 1)) (q1 − 1)
W
− βq1 + δ(1− δ)(A− δ)2W
with the abbreviation A = W − (q1 − 1). The first-order necessary optimality condition is
3δ2 − 2(A+ 1)δ +A = 0, and the maximizer is therefore
δ∗ =
A+ 1−√A2 −A+ 1
3
. (5.49)
The second-order condition is satisfied here, since Π′′H2(δ
∗) = −2√A2 −A+ 1 < 0. This con-
cludes our analytical discussion of the horizontal-overlap case under delayed differentiation.
Proof of Proposition 5.5. (i) It is sufficient to show that the profit function under
mixed ex-post differentiation is dominated by pure horizontal differentiation with overlap. Let
(p1, q1) be such that 1/2 ≤ q1−p1 < 1. Under horizontal separation (in which the local mixed-
differentiation optimum occurs) this implies that q1− p1 = 1− (q2− p2) < 1, and furthermore,
as shown in Section 5.4.1, then p∗1 = p∗2 =W/2. Thus, also q1− p∗2 < 1 so that we can compare
the profit function under horizontal separation to the maximand in (5.41) discussed earlier in
this Appendix for the case that q1 − p2 < 1. Subtracting the latter from the former yields
−p1(W − p1) (1− (q1 − p2)) /2 − p2(W − p2)(q1 − p2) − p2(p1 − p2)(q1 − p2)(q1 − p2) < 0, so
that mixed differentiation is strictly dominated. (ii) The claim that horizontal cannibalization
is sometimes optimal can be shown by example and thus Figure 5.7 is sufficient as a proof. It
is not optimal for large q1 (compared to W ), since it can be shown analogously to the compu-
tation in part (i) that pure vertical differentiation is globally better. For q1 small compared
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to W horizontal overlap cannot be achieved. Thus, horizontal overlap can only be best for
“intermediate” realizations of W . This concludes the proof of Proposition 5.5. 
Proof of Proposition 5.6. Assume first that ex post pure vertical differentiation is
optimal, independent of the demand realization W . Then differentiating the expression (5.22)
for Π∗V (q1;W ) and then taking the expectation with respect to W yields
27
−β +
∫ W2
W1
(
1− 3(q
∗∗
1 − 1)
2w
)
f(w)dw +
∫ s¯
W2
p∗1
(
1− 3p
∗
1
4w
)
f(w)dw = 0,
where W1, W2, p∗1, and s¯ are as the corresponding part of Proposition 5.6. The last equation
is equivalent to (5.25). Next assume that ex post pure vertical differentiation is optimal,
independent of the demand realization W . As before we determine the first-order condition
by first taking the derivative of ΠH1(q1;W ) in (5.24) with respect to q1 and then taking the
expectation with respect to W . This yields
−β +
∫ W2
W1
(
1− 2q
∗∗
1 − 1
w
)
f(w)dw + 2
∫ s¯
W2
p∗1
(
1− p
∗
1
w
)
f(w)dw = 0,
which is equivalent to (5.26) using the definitions ofW1, W2, p∗∗1 , and s¯ as in the corresponding
part of Proposition 5.6. 
Proof of Proposition 5.7. (ii) By Berge’s (1959) maximum theorem the option value Vd
is continuous in β as difference of two continuous functions Π¯∗∗ and Π¯∗. Also as a consequence
of the maximum theorem both maximizers q∗∗1 and q∗1 are generally set-valued and upper
hemicontinuous in the parameter β. The maximizers are thereby set-valued, iff the firm is
indifferent between several different q1-values. Let Wˆ > 0 be given. Following our developments
in Section 5.3, q∗1(β), 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, is given by
q∗1(β) =

1 + 2Wˆ (1− β)/3, if β ≥ β′,
1/2 + Wˆ (1− β)/2, if β ∈ [β′, β′′],
0, otherwise,
where β′ =
(
3 + Wˆ −
√
9 + 6Wˆ
)
/Wˆ and β′′ =
(
1 + Wˆ −
√
1 + 2Wˆ
)
/Wˆ . Only for β ∈
{β′, β′′} is q∗1 possibly set-valued; on [0, β′′) \ {β′} it is strictly monotonically decreasing. Sim-
ilarly, the optimal flagship quality under delayed differentiation, q∗∗1 , can only be set-valued at
27This means to switch differentiation and integration when determining the first-order conditions of the
optimization problem (5.20). This naturally presupposes sufficient regularity of the probability density function
f .
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0 < β1, β2, β3 < 1, where β1 ≤ β′ < β2 < β′′ ≤ β3, corresponding to the vertical-contingent
(β1), contingent-horizontal (β2), and horizontal-no entry (β3) mode transitions. We have noted
in Section 5.4 that expressions (5.22) and (5.24) are continuously differentiable in q1. The same
is true for the corresponding expression in the overlap mode. In fact, these expressions are
twice continuously differentiable (“smooth”) almost everywhere, and thus the envelope theo-
rem can be applied in the smooth portions, so that we obtain relation (5.27). (i) At β = β′
the firm is indifferent between horizontal and vertical versioning modes. But if the firm can
observe demand W 6= Wˆ before taking the versioning decision,28 then it generally will not be
indifferent between horizontal and vertical differentiation, so that a state-contingent policy of
intermediate ex-ante quality will at least weakly increase profits at β = β′. As a consequence,
q∗∗1 (β′) ∈ (q∗1(β′+), q∗1(β′−)) so that with (5.27) we obtain a local maximum of Vd at β = β′,
in other words a state-contingent policy will generally improve profits around β′. Consider
now β = 0. Then q∗∗1 (0) = 1 + 2s¯/3 with s¯ = max{S}. On the other hand, it is following
Section 5.3.2: q∗1(0) = 1 + 2Wˆ/3 ≤ q∗∗1 (0) because generally s¯ ≥ Wˆ . (iii) This part is trivial:
for β ≥ β3, β′′, the firm does not enter the market and thus the option value of being able to
delay differentiation is not worth anything. 
Proof of Proposition 5.8. (i) Consider first the case of pure vertical differentiation.
Consumer surplus CSV is then
CSV =
1
W
∫ min{u1,1}
0
[(u1 − v)(w − p1) + (u1 − v)] dv
=
W − p2
W
[
u1v − v
2
2
]min{u1,1}
0
,
an expression equivalent to the first entry in Table 5.1. The consumer surplus for pure hor-
izontal differentiation with separation follows in the same manner. We now turn to the case
to horizontal differentiation with overlap, for which the consumer surplus can be computed as
follows:
CSH2 =
W − p1
W
+
W − p2
W
∫ 1+p1−p2
2
0
(u2 − v)dv + p1 − p2
W
∫ min{u1,1}
0
(u2 − v)dv.
Using the abbreviation δ = p1 − p2, we obtain the third expression in Table 5.1 by straight-
forward integration. (ii) Substituting the ex-ante optimal product portfolio into the first two
28IfW = Wˆ (which can only happen with positive probability for certain “pathological” discrete distributions
of W ), then the firm might be indifferent between horizontal and vertical versioning modes, even under delayed
differentiation.
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expressions for consumer surplus in Table 5.1, one immediately obtains (5.28). 
Since it is Reason which shapes and regulates all other
things, it ought not itself to be left in disorder.
— Epictetus
Chapter 6
Discussion, Conclusion, and Further
Research
6.1 Discussion and Conclusion
Let me briefly return to the three research questions posed in Chapter 1 and discuss some of
the results obtained in this dissertation. I will also mention some specific directions for future
research where appropriate. More general directions for research are outlined in Section 6.2.
Question 1 How can the value of information be generally defined in terms of an agent’s
willingness to pay and willingness to accept, and what is the precise relationship between the
two welfare measures?
In Chapter 2, I have provided the definition of information value as compensating varia-
tion (and in some cases equivalent variation) in the spirit of, for instance, LaValle (1968) or
Kihlstrom (1974). I have argued that the loss of monetary wealth to the payment for infor-
mation often entails a contraction of the decision maker’s action set. Thus, there is a natural
tradeoff between engaging in productive actions and procuring information to enhance these
actions (Arrow 1974, p. 49), which are then generally bound to lie in a subset of the action set
available under full wealth.
In certain cases information is rival, in the sense that once the seller has transferred the
information to the agent, the seller loses any right to use the information himself (such as for a
patent). In that case, the seller’s WTA for the information would have to be below the buyer’s
WTP for trade to take place. In Section 2.3, I provide an exact relation between WTA and
WTP, which amounts to a relation between compensating and equivalent variation. Thus, in
116
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effect by requiring that WTA ≤ WTP as a condition for trade of a unique object between
individuals of equivalent utility representation U and wealth endowment, we have effectively
in relations (2.14) and (2.15) an “endogenous” criterion for bilateral trade between agents of
identical preferences to occur.1
As pointed out in Chapter 2, the value of transferred information generally depends on the
precise details of the payment to an information seller and its contingencies upon actions, pay-
offs and/or signal realizations.2 Only in the transfer of information is the value of information
actually realized by an information seller. The amount that the information seller can extract
from a given agent (for a given purpose) constitutes the true realizable value of information,
which naturally has to depend on the precise context in which the information transfer is to
take place. If the payment for the information depends in some way on a hidden action by
the buyer (“agent”), which may include the use of the information itself (in case payment is
deferred), then the problem of maximizing the value of a given signal to the information seller
(“principal”) becomes one of designing an optimal contract (possibly subject to certain limi-
tations in contractibilities). A resulting optimal contract can naturally include the strategic
modification of the information itself.
Question 2 Consider a principal-agent environment.
(i) What are the incentives for the distortion of information in a principal-agent relationship
where information exerts an externality?
(ii) What are the consequences for organizational design for an informed principal?
In Chapter 3, I have shown that consciously damaging information before its transfer may
allow the information seller to mitigate moral hazard that arises through limited liability of
the information buyer in the presence of an ex-post payment component. Limiting the buyer’s
downside risk might induce “going-for-broke” behavior in the sense that the buyer-investor
tends to invest more wealth into the risky asset than desired by the information seller. The
moral hazard can be sometimes reduced by misreporting “bad” signal states as “good” ones,
thereby “poisoning” the good news, which may lead to a more conservative investment behavior
of the information buyer. We have seen in Chapter 3 that information garbling can only be
beneficial for imperfect information and in the presence of signal states that result in significant
agent moral hazard.
1More precisely, for trade to occur, the integral expressions in (2.14) and (2.15) have to be negative.
2This aspect is not entirely new, but not very well articulated in the literature.
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In organizations (or hierarchies) it is often the “center” (i.e., the principal) that holds a
large portion of the information relevant to a decentralized decision maker (i.e., the agent).
Typically the agent’s actions are only imperfectly observable to the principal and standard
incentive theory (e.g., Laffont and Martimort 2002) describes how to set monetary incentives
such as to maximize the benefits to the principal, subject to securing the agent’s voluntary
participation and incentive compatibility in her actions. If information is included in the prin-
cipal’s transferrable assets, then – as a consequence of the discussion in Chapter 3 – it may be
best for the principal not to transmit the full information to the agent. Anticomplementarities
between effort and information can be taken advantage of by the principal by withholding
possibly mission-critical information in order to induce higher agent effort (Croson and Weber
2002).
Information transfer and use in multiagent environments is considered in Chapters 4 and 5
of this dissertation that address the following question.
Question 3 Consider a multiagent environment.
(i) How should a heterogeneous group of agents share cooperatively an investment for a
common source of information?
(ii) What is the option value of being able to wait for information that helps a firm to screen
a heterogeneous consumer base?
By jointly financing the generation of non-rival information a number of heterogeneous
agents may be able to overcome the critical mass for the creation of a common information
source and thereby utilize the increasing returns to scale from the fixed-cost investment.3 Nash
bargaining provides by construction an efficient mechanism for the joint allocation of resources.
The bargaining outcome thereby depends on the project parameters (volume, riskiness), the
agents’ characteristics (respective wealth, risk aversion), and the signal’s fidelity (“confidence”
in a Bayesian framework). Due to network externalities the size of the fixed-cost block for
the shared information source may also depend on the number of agents participating in the
common investment. In Chapter 4, I provide a general framework for analyzing the sharing
problem in a nonstrategic context. It is shown that for heterogeneous agents, due to the differ-
ences in their evaluations of the size of the bargaining “pie” (the value of a shared information
source can be quite different for each agent), the comparative statics may bear surprising re-
3The variable cost of adding members may of course introduce further increases in the returns, or – as in the
case of convex costs – possible decreases in the returns, cf. (4.16).
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sults, such as increasing risk aversion possibly leading to lower contributions as a result of the
concomitant decrease in the decision value of the received signal.4
If a multiproduct monopolist firm is faced with a heterogeneous base of consumer-agents,
then it is generally profit maximizing to offer a differentiated product portfolio, if the cost
for creating additional products is sufficiently low. In particular for information products it is
relatively easy to create additional versions of products once a flagship version with a complete
set of features has been established. Delaying the differentiation until after uncertain demand
has been observed effectively amounts for the firm to procuring a signal about demand, the
value of which depends on its default (i.e., no-information) versioning policy. In Chapter 5,
I present a model of multiattribute product differentiation for two products, which can be
horizontally and/or vertically differentiated to screen a consumer base of heterogeneous wealth
and horizontal brand preference. The option value of delaying information is composed of the
value of improved screening (i.e., product positioning and pricing) abilities as well as the value
of flexibility.
Limitations. The treatment of the endogenous value of information in this dissertation
is limited as it only pertains to certain situations. The general conclusions obtained from the
research undertaken so far suggests that by endogenously varying the information structure
in agency situations it is sometimes possible to significantly shift welfare between agents,
especially in information-rich environments. The finding that actively damaging information
may help an informed principal to manipulate agents that depend on this information to
take actions better suited for the principal suggests there can be upper bounds for the value of
investment in information systems that are not generated by the typical cost-efficiency tradeoff,
but are due to the negative marginal utility of information past a certain threshold that is an
endogenous result of the agency relationships of the problem. The results suggested by my
dissertation should be seen as a starting point of a longer research agenda in this direction.
6.2 Future Research
This dissertation has shown, using a number of examples, that the realizable value of trans-
ferred information, indeed is very sensitive to the precise conditions under which this transfer
takes place. There are a number of promising directions for future research in the area of
4Agents with higher risk aversion sometimes tend to act less aggressively on a received signal and therefore
their WTP for the information may be lower.
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endogenous information value. We found that the information value depends on its direct use
and its “co-use” in the sense that the information seller may derive side benefits (such as fa-
vorable agent behavior) from the information, which go beyond its direct value with respect to
the agent’s optimal decision. In that sense, the value of information may be nonmonotonic in
its informativeness. More generally, the principal is often “endowed” with a number of “com-
plementary” assets (such as information) that he can use to pay “in kind” rather than using
direct (monetary) wages. The question of how a principal should design general compensation
schemes, using complementary assets in contracting with his agent seems a fruitful area for
further research. Complementary assets, by potentially influencing agent behavior favorably,
may alleviate the inefficiencies resulting from noncontractible actions.
In the arena of information sharing, the absence of strategic interactions between the agents
was limiting the discussion in this dissertation, and further research could be directed towards
integrating the strategic use of information and the incentives for sharing it. As mentioned in
Chapter 4, there exists an extensive literature on information sharing in a standard oligopoly
context, but there is very little work pertaining to situations in which agents modify their
own internal capabilities as a result of information sharing, such as for instance in competitive
benchmarking.
The value of marginal information in a situation of asymmetric information about agent
types (“screening”) is another area for future research. An interesting question is, How should
a firm allocate its resources towards acquiring information about agents (e.g., consumers) and
how should he design the corresponding experiments to maximize the value of the incremental
information (e.g., for the purposes of product differentiation)?
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